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Abstract
This thesis studies financial and insurance markets under various specifications of 
asymmetric information.
The opening chapter considers project financing under adverse selection and moral 
hazard. There are three main contributions. First, the issue of combinations of debt 
and equity is explained as the outcome of the interaction between adverse selection 
and moral hazard. Second, it shows that, in the presence of moral hazard, adverse 
selection may result in the conversion of negative into positive NPV projects leading 
to an improvement in social welfare. Third, it provides two rationales for the use of 
warrants. It also shows that, under certain conditions, a debt-warrant combination can 
implement the optimal contract as a competitive equilibrium.
Chapter 2 examines insurance markets when some clients misperceive risk. 
Optimism may either increase or decrease precautionary effort and we show that this 
determines whether optimists or realists are quantity-constrained in equilibrium. 
Intervention may lead to a strict Pareto improvement on the laissez-faire equilibria. 
These results provide a more convincing justification for the imposition of minimum 
coverage requirements than standard models as well as a case for the use of taxes and 
subsidies in insurance markets.
Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship between coverage and accident rates. In 
contrast to the prediction of competitive models of asymmetric information that if all 
agents buy at least some insurance there must be positive correlation between 
coverage and accident probability, some recent empirical studies find either negative 
or zero correlation. If optimism discourages precautionary effort there exist separating 
equilibria that potentially explain the puzzling empirical findings. It is also shown that 
zero correlation between coverage and risk does not imply the absence of barriers to 
trade in insurance markets. We conclude with some implications for empirical testing.
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Introduction
Since the seminal work by Akerlof (1970), an ever-increasing volume of papers has 
explored the implications of asymmetric information in the functioning of markets. It 
is now recognised that informational problems abound in many markets and that 
information asymmetries have significant effects on the equilibrium outcome. 
Although applications of the asymmetric information (principal-agent) framework can 
be found in most fields of economics, financial and insurance markets have received 
particular attention. It has been argued that financiers (insurers) can observe neither 
the characteristics (adverse selection) nor the actions (moral hazard) of entrepreneurs 
(insurees). Existing studies have produced interesting insights about the effects of 
adverse selection and moral hazard and provided explanations to economic 
phenomena that otherwise would be hard to understand. Nevertheless, puzzles remain. 
This thesis studies financial and insurance markets under various specifications of 
asymmetric information and provides possible explanations for some unresolved 
issues.
Chapter 1 considers project financing under adverse selection and (effort) moral 
hazard. The key feature of the first part of this chapter is the existence of a pooling 
equilibrium involving cross subsidisation across types and the issue of both debt and 
equity. Through the mispricing of equity at individual level, the more prone to 
shirking type receives the subsidy necessary to induce him to choose the socially 
efficient high-effort level. This pooling equilibrium has two important implications.
First, in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard, in addition to 
being communication devices, the securities issued are the means of providing the 
appropriate effort incentives. This double role stems from the interaction between 
adverse selection and moral hazard and provides an explanation for the issue of 
combinations of debt and equity even if the issue of equity implies an adverse 
selection cost. Firms are prepared to incur this cost because it is more than offset by 
the benefit from relaxing the moral hazard constraint. This result is consistent with the 
puzzling empirical observation that although equity issue announcements are 
associated with stock price drops, equity dominates debt as a source of outside 
financing (Frank and Goyal (2003)).
Second, adverse selection leads to the conversion of negative into positive NPV 
projects and so to an improvement in social welfare. This result contrasts with those
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of pure adverse-selection models. In Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection leads 
firms to forego positive NPV projects whereas in de Meza and Webb (1987) it 
encourages firms to undertake negative NPV projects. Hence, in either case social 
welfare is lower than under full information about types. The key to this difference is 
that in the presence of (effort) moral hazard the cross-subsidisation taking place in the 
pooling equilibrium relaxes this additional constraint and so it can be beneficial. On 
the contrary, given risk neutrality, in pure adverse selection models there is no 
channel through which the cross-subsidy can have positive effects but it may have 
negative ones.
The second part of the chapter analyses the role of warrants and provides two 
rationales for their use. A considerable fraction of the securities with option features 
issued by firms are debt-warrant (or equity-warrant) combinations rather than 
convertible debt. Existing models offer various explanations of why firms issue 
convertible debt (e.g. Green (1984), Stein (1992)). However, none of them justifies 
the necessity for the issue of warrants. Under pure adverse selection, warrants can 
serve as separation devices in cases where other standard securities cannot. In the 
presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard, warrants allow for the 
implementation of the socially efficient outcome even if this is not possible when we 
restrict ourselves to debt, equity and/or convertible debt. Finally, we show that, under 
certain conditions, a debt-warrant combination can implement the optimal contract as 
a competitive equilibrium.
In Chapter 2, we explore the implications of optimism in competitive insurance 
markets when neither the type nor the actions of the insurees are observable. Several 
recent empirical studies both by psychologists and economists, report that the 
majority of people tend to be overoptimistic about their ability and the outcome of 
their actions and underestimate the probability of various risks. For example, Rutter, 
Quine and Alberry (1998) find that, on average, motorcyclists in Britain both perceive 
themselves to be less at risk than other motorcyclists and underestimate their absolute 
accident probability. A large number of papers have investigated the implications of 
overconfidence and unrealistic optimism in securities markets and firm financing (See 
De Bondt and Thaler (1995) for a survey). In contrast, research concerning insurance 
markets has almost entirely been conducted in the context of the standard asymmetric 
information framework. Insurees know their true accident probability but insurance 
companies cannot observe the type and/or the actions of the insuree.
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In line with the empirical evidence, in this chapter we drop the assumption that all 
insurees have an accurate estimate of their accident probability. We assume that some 
agents, the optimists, underestimate it and explore the implications both for the 
optimists (henceforth Os) themselves and their realistic counterparts (henceforth Rs) 
in the context of an otherwise standard competitive asymmetric information 
framework. Except for their misperception of the accident probability, the Os are 
rational agents who aim at maximising their (perceived) utility and understand the 
nature and implications of market interactions.
The first part of the chapter is concerned with the positive implications of the 
interaction between the Os and the Rs. It is shown that if the degree of optimism is 
sufficiently high there exist separating equilibria where the Os not only take fewer 
precautions (high-risk type) but also purchase less insurance than the Rs and both 
types choose the contract they would have chosen if types were observable. That is, 
because the Os considerably underestimate their accident probability, their presence 
has no effect on the choices of the Rs. For lower levels of optimism, depending on 
whether the Os are more or less willing to take precautions, either the Os or the Rs are 
quantity-constrained. If optimism encourages precautionary effort, the Os themselves 
are quantity-constrained whereas the Rs make the same choices as under full 
information about types. If the Os put less effort into reducing their risk exposure, the 
roles of the two types are reversed.
Moreover, it is shown that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, optimism itself 
does not necessarily lead to the purchase of less insurance. If optimism encourages 
precautionary effort, the effect of the lower per unit price may more than offset the 
effect of the underestimation of the accident probability and result in the Os 
purchasing more insurance than the Rs.
The second part of the chapter deals with the welfare properties of the laissez-faire 
equilibria when some clients are optimists. We show that there exist intervention 
policies that yield strict Pareto gains. If the Rs are quantity-constrained, then a tax on 
insurance purchase would result in the Os going uninsured, relax their revelation 
constraint and potentially lead to a strict Pareto gain. If though the Os are quantity- 
constrained, this logic does not apply. Any attempt to drive out the Rs so as to 
mitigate the negative externality their presence creates would first drive out the Os. 
Thus, it would be harmful for the Rs who would pay the tax without gaining anything. 
However, if the proportion of the Os is sufficiently high, an intervention scheme
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involving a combination of minimum coverage requirements, taxes and subsidies 
would lead to a strict Pareto improvement. In the resulting pooling equilibrium the Os 
subsidise the Rs but purchase more insurance and both types are better off. Because 
the proportion of the Os is high, the improvement in their true welfare from the higher 
coverage more than offsets the welfare losses due to the higher per unit premium.
Although the positive results of the imposition of minimum coverage requirements 
in standard asymmetric information models are similar to ours, the welfare results are 
quite different. In our model, both types are better off in the pooling equilibrium 
arising after the intervention whereas in standard models the safe type (the quantity- 
constrained) is worse off. Therefore, our approach provides a more convincing 
justification for the imposition of minimum coverage requirements than standard 
models as well as a case for the use of taxes and subsidies in insurance markets. 
Finally, intervention schemes involving minimum coverage requirements can be used 
to create a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when otherwise none would exist.
Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship between the coverage offered by the 
insurance contract and the ex-post risk of its buyers. Most recent empirical studies 
find either negative or no correlation. For example, de Meza and Webb (2001) 
provide casual evidence for a negative relationship in the credit card insurance 
market. Cawley and Philipson (1999) study of life insurance contracts also shows a 
negative relationship which, however, is not statistically significant. These findings 
are at odds with the famous Rothschild-Stiglitz paper (1976) which, along with most 
other theoretical models of competitive insurance markets under asymmetric 
information, predicts a positive relationship. This implication is shared by models of 
pure adverse selection (e.g. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)), pure moral hazard (e.g. 
Amott and Stiglitz (1988)) as well as models of adverse selection plus moral hazard 
(e.g. Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997) and Chiappori et.al. (2002)). In fact, 
Chiappori et.al. (2002) argue that the positive correlation property is extremely 
general. However, in a recent paper, de Meza and Webb (2001) provide a model 
where agents are heterogeneous with respect to their risk aversion and face a moral 
hazard problem. Also, insurance companies pay a fixed administrative cost per claim. 
In this model, there exist a separating and a partial pooling equilibrium predicting a 
negative relationship but due to the fixed per claim cost the less risk-averse agents go 
uninsured.
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In this chapter we first show that these (seemingly) contradictory theoretical 
results can be reconciled. Given that fixed administrative costs are strictly positive, it 
is shown that the Chiappori et.al. argument holds necessarily true only if, in 
equilibrium, all agents purchase some insurance. If some agents choose zero 
coverage, then their assertion is not necessarily true. There can exist separating 
equilibria that exhibit negative or no correlation between coverage and risk. The 
presence of these costs results in some agents (the risk tolerant) choosing not to 
insure. The fact that the administrative costs are now incurred only by the insured 
agents changes the computation of the premiums which allowed Chiappori et.al 
(2002) to derive their result.
Therefore, competitive models of insurance markets under asymmetric information 
can explain the observed negative or no-correlation between coverage and risk in 
cases where some agents choose zero coverage. However, their prediction is not 
consistent with negative or no-correlation in insurance markets where all agents opt 
for strictly positive coverage and there are just two events (loss/no loss), (e.g. the 
Cawley and Phillipson (1999) findings).
Jullien, Salanie and Salanie (2001) show that if the insurer has monopoly power, 
negative correlation between risk and coverage is possible even if all agents purchase 
some insurance and there is just one level of loss. However, insurance markets seem 
to be fairly competitive and so monopoly is not a good approximation. More 
importantly, although in Jullien, Salanie and Salanie (2001) the low-risk type is better 
insured, more coverage is associated with a higher per unit price. Therefore, although 
they can explain the negative correlation between coverage and risk, the striking 
observation of Cawley and Phillipson (1999) that insurance premiums exhibit quantity 
discounts remains a puzzle.
This chapter, by introducing heterogeneity in risk perceptions in a competitive 
model of asymmetric information, provides an explanation to the puzzling empirical 
findings. The more optimistic agents (the Os) underestimate their accident probability 
both in absolute terms and relative to the less optimistic ones (the Rs) and so purchase 
less insurance. They also tend to be less willing to take precautions. This gives rise to 
separating equilibria exhibiting negative or no correlation between coverage and risk. 
Two examples of these equilibria are presented where both the Os and the Rs 
purchase some insurance.
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The first equilibrium predicts both negative correlation between coverage and risk 
and that per unit premiums fall with the quantity of insurance purchased. The Os not 
only take fewer precautions (high-risk type) but also purchase less coverage than the 
Rs. Competition among insurance companies then implies that the Os also pay a 
higher per unit premium. Because they underestimate their accident probability, the 
Os purchase low coverage at a high per unit price, although contracts offering more 
insurance at the same or even lower per unit price are available.
The second equilibrium exhibits no correlation between coverage and risk and 
involves the Rs being quantity-constrained. In order to reveal their type, the Rs accept 
lower coverage than they would have chosen under full information about types. 
Moreover, if we allow for fixed administrative costs, this equilibrium displays a 
negative relationship between coverage and per unit premiums. Since both types take 
precautions they have the same accident probability and so are charged the same 
marginal price. But the fact that the Os purchase less coverage implies that their total 
per unit premium is higher.
These results have several interesting implications. First, they explain both 
puzzling empirical findings reported by Cawley and Phillipson (1999): The negative 
or no correlation between coverage and risk and the fact that insurance premiums 
display quantity discounts. Second, Cawley and Philipson (1999), Chiappori and 
Salanie (2000) and Dionne et.al. (2001) argue that the no-correlation empirical 
findings imply that there is no (risk-related) adverse selection. Thus, there are no 
information barriers to trade in the life and automobile insurance markets under study. 
However, as our results suggest, their assertion is not generally true. If insurees differ 
with respect to their risk perceptions and types are hidden, there exist equilibria 
involving some agents being quantity-constrained even if the data show zero 
correlation between coverage and the accident rate. Furthermore, in these cases, there 
exist intervention policies that yield a strict Pareto improvement on the laissez-faire 
equilibrium. Third, these equilibria have testable implications that allow us to 
empirically distinguish our approach from standard asymmetric information models.
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Chapter 1
The Roles of Debt, Equity and Warrants 
Under Asymmetric Information
1.1 Introduction
Following the famous irrelevance proposition of Modigliani and Miller (1958), a vast 
literature has developed trying to explain the financial choices of firms when they 
seek outside funds.1 Despite this research effort, important puzzles remain. Some 
recent empirical studies find that neither of the two dominant theories of capital 
structure, the trade-off theory and the pecking-order theory, provides a satisfactory 
explanation for the observed financing patterns.2 Firms appear to issue surprisingly 
large amounts of equity, even after controlling for the various costs (due to financial 
distress, bankruptcy and agency problems between debtholders and shareholders) 
associated with debt issues.3 Moreover, although equity issue announcements are 
associated with stock price drops (due to adverse selection),4 equity dominates debt as 
a source of external financing.5 Myers and Majluf (1984) show that this adverse- 
selection problem may lead to underinvestment and so a loss in social welfare.
Furthermore, a considerable fraction of the securities with option features issued 
by firms are debt-warrant (or equity-warrant) combinations rather than convertible 
debt.6 Existing models offer various explanations of why firms issue convertible 
debt.7 However, none of them justifies the necessity for the issue of warrants.
1 See Harris and Raviv (1991) for a survey.
2 See, for example, Helwege and Liang (1996), Lemmon and Zender (2001) and Frank and Goyal 
(2003).
3 The tax benefits of debt are significant and firms’ decisions about financial policies appear to be 
affected by tax considerations (see, MacKie-Mason (1990) and Graham (1996) and (2000)). Although 
financial distress and other agency costs are important, they are not large enough to explain these 
conservative debt policies (see Andrade and Kaplan (1998) and Parrino and Weisbach (1999) and 
Lemmon and Zender (2001)).
4 See Lemmon and Zender (2001).
5 Frank and Goyal (2003) report that net equity issues follow the financing deficit more closely than 
debt issues.
6 For example, de Roon and Veld (1998) report that about 30 percent of the convertible securities 
issued by Dutch companies from 1976 to 1996 were debt-warrant combinations.
7 Convertible debt is a special case of a debt-warrant combination that obtains when the exercise price 
of the warrant equals the face value of debt. Green (1984), Constantinides and Grundy (1989), and 
Stein (1992) provide three different rationales for the use of convertible debt.
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This chapter abstracts from taxes, financial distress, bankruptcy and other agency 
costs and focuses on asymmetric information. We consider a model involving both 
adverse selection and (effort) moral hazard. There are two types of firms (projects): 
risky (R), safe (S). Given identical effort levels, the success probability of the safe 
project is higher but its return in case of success is lower. In the event of failure the 
return of both types is zero. The entrepreneur can increase the success probability by 
exerting costly effort. Regardless of the project’s type, if the entrepreneur exerts effort 
the net present value (NPV) of his project exceeds the cost of effort whereas if he 
shirks the project has negative NPV. That is, exerting effort is socially efficient for 
both types. Both the project’s type and the entrepreneur’s action are unobservable.
In this setting, we analyse the roles of debt, equity and warrants and make three 
contributions. First, we explain the issue of combinations of debt and equity as the 
outcome of the interaction between adverse selection and moral hazard. Some firms 
(the risky ones) issue equity even if under pure adverse selection they would have 
issued just debt. Second, we show that, in the presence of moral hazard, adverse 
selection may result in the conversion of negative into positive NPV projects and an 
improvement in social welfare. Third, we provide two rationales for the use of 
warrants. We also show that, under certain conditions, a debt-warrant combination 
can implement the optimal contract as a competitive equilibrium.
Two cases are considered: i) pure adverse selection and ii) adverse selection cum 
moral hazard. In the former case, a combination of securities is only used to convey 
socially costless information about the type of the project.8 In the latter case, in 
addition to transmitting information, the securities issued are the means of providing 
the appropriate effort incentives. Because of this second role, the introduction of 
moral hazard into an adverse selection framework has significant effects both on the 
combinations of securities issued in equilibrium and their pricing.
Regarding the pure adverse selection case, if firms have more information about 
the quality of their projects than their financiers, then they have an incentive to issue 
overpriced securities. To the extent that firms cannot credibly signal their type, the 
resulting adverse-selection problem may lead firms to forego a positive NPV project. 
Following Myers and Majluf (1984), a great deal of research effort has been devoted 
to exploring the extent to which this problem can be overcome if firms use different
8 In this case, we seek methods of financing that result in nondissipative equilibria (Bhattacharya 
(1980)). That is, equilibria that imply no deadweight losses relative to the full information equilibrium.
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combinations of financial instruments to transmit information. It has been shown that 
debt or equity repurchases in conjunction with the issue of some other security (e.g. 
equity or convertible debt respectively) may allow for the existence of fully revealing 
equilibria where the securities issued are correctly priced.9
In this chapter, we do not allow for debt or equity repurchases. Firms try to reveal 
their type by issuing debt-equity or debt-warrant combinations. Equity (warrant) is a 
convex claim and so its value increases with the variability of returns. In contrast, 
debt is a concave claim and so its value falls with risk. That is, in relative terms, debt 
is more valuable for the safe type and equity (warrant) for the risky one. Thus, by 
issuing more of the less valuable for him security, an entrepreneur can credibly signal 
his type and reduce the underpricing of his securities. However, the existence of an 
equilibrium where the securities issued are fairly priced requires that debt is more 
valuable for the S-type and equity (warrant) for the R-type not only in relative10 but 
also in absolute terms. Otherwise, the type whose securities are more valuable can 
only minimise the underpricing of his securities by issuing just the relatively less 
valuable for him security.
If the risky projects are mean-increasing or mean-preserving spreads of the safe 
ones or the risky projects dominate the safe ones by first-order stochastic dominance 
both conditions are met. In the first case, separation requires the issue of both debt and 
equity (Heinkel 1982). In the two remaining cases, the adverse-selection problem can 
be solved (mitigated) by issuing either just equity (mean-preserving spreads) or just 
debt (first-order stochastic dominance).11 However, if the risky projects are mean- 
reducing spreads of the safe ones, both the debt and equity issued by the S-type are 
more valuable than those issued by the R-type. Thus, the S-type cannot reveal his type 
and inevitably subsidises the R-type through the mispricing of the relatively less 
valuable for him security (equity) at individual level.
9 See, for example, Brennan and Craus (1987), Constantinides and Grundy (1989) and Heider (2001). 
However, models that use debt (or equity) repurchases to obtain fully revealing equilibria have a 
serious shortcoming. They do not explain why firms issued debt (equity) in the past.
10 Provided the returns of the two types in case of success are different, this (the single-crossing) 
condition is satisfied regardless of the distributional assumption or the combination of the securities 
issued. On the contrary, if the safe projects dominate the risky ones by first-order stochastic dominance 
(the returns of both types in case of success are equal), both conditions are violated. In this case, the 
equality of returns prevents us from extracting any information about the type of the project. There can 
exist only pooling equilibria where the S-type provides the R-type with the same amount of subsidy 
regardless of the securities issued. Notice that if firms have assets in place, the use of collateral could 
be a solution. However, this solution may not be costless, it may imply deadweight losses (e.g. 
Besanko and Thakor (1987) and Bester (1987)).
11 These results are well-known (see de Meza and Webb (1987) and Nachman and Noe (1994)).
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The use of warrants, through the appropriate choice of their exercise price,12 
allows for the achievement of full separation even in this case. Since the return of the 
R-type in case of success is greater, a given increase in the exercise price of the 
warrant implies that the project’s return constitutes a smaller proportion of the total 
payment to the financier if the warrant is issued by the S-type. That is, as the exercise 
price rises, the value of the warrant issued by the S-type falls faster. As a result, for a 
sufficiently high exercise price, the warrant issued by the R-type can be more valuable 
than that of the S-type even if the S-type equity is more valuable.
This mechanism provides a rationale for the use of warrants. Warrants are issued 
because they can serve as separation devices when other standard securities (debt, 
equity and/or convertible debt) cannot.13
The introduction of moral hazard into an adverse selection framework has 
significant effects both on the combinations of the securities issued in equilibrium and 
their pricing. The distinguishing feature of this part of the chapter is the existence of 
pooling equilibria involving cross subsidisation across types and the issue of both debt 
and equity (warrants). These pooling equilibria reflect a trade-off between information 
revelation and effort incentives. The securities issued by the R- and S-type are priced 
as a pool. Although, because of perfect competition, debt and equity (warrants) are 
fairly priced collectively, at individual level they are mispriced. In fact, it is precisely 
this mispricing that provides the more prone to shirking type with the subsidy 
necessary to induce him to choose the socially efficient high-effort level.14
Consider, for example, the case where the S-type is more prone to shirking and we 
restrict ourselves to debt and equity. In this case, in the pooling equilibrium the R- 
type subsidises the S-type through the mispricing of equity. In the absence of moral 
hazard, the R-type would have issued more debt and less equity. Since, in doing so, he 
would reduce the subsidy and increase his expected return. However, in the presence 
of moral hazard, the S-type always mimics the R-type and such a deviation would
12 It is set such that, in case of success, the option is exercised regardless of the issuer type. Also, the 
proceeds (from the exercise of the option) are distributed as dividends to the shareholders.
Notice that convertible debt cannot play this role. The mechanism described above works only if the 
exercise price of the warrant increases while the face value of debt is fixed (in equilibrium, the exercise 
price of the warrant is strictly greater than the face value of debt). If the two coincide, the increase in 
the exercise price is exactly offset by the increase in the face value of debt. Hence, the value of 
convertible debt is strictly greater if it is issued by the S-type regardless of the face value of debt or 
whether conversion takes place.
14 If funds are offered at fair terms, the more prone to shirking type chooses the low effort level. Hence, 
his project NPV is negative and so, if his type is revealed, no rational financier offers funds to him.
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destroy his effort incentives. As a result, both the collective and the R-type’s net 
expected return would fall. Since he cannot reveal his type, the R-type accepts to issue 
just enough equity to induce the S-type to exert effort because the resulting increase in 
his net expected return (due to the lower interest rate on debt) more than offsets the 
cost of the incremental subsidy (the adverse selection cost of issuing equity). That is, 
this pooling equilibrium involves the minimum subsidy consistent with the S-type 
exerting effort. In any pooling equilibrium involving more than this minimum 
subsidy, the R-type can still profitably deviate by issuing more debt and less equity.
That is, in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard, in addition to 
being communication devices, debt and equity play a second role. That of 
incentivising the more prone to shirking type through their mispricing at individual 
level. This double role stems from the interaction between adverse selection and 
moral hazard and provides an explanation for the issue of combinations of debt and 
equity even if the issue of equity implies an adverse selection cost. What is more, in 
contrast with the pure adverse selection case, the cross-subsidisation is socially 
beneficial. It converts negative into positive NPV projects and improves social 
welfare.
However, if firms can only issue debt and equity, it may be the case that, at any 
given debt level, the proportion of equity issued consistent with exerting effort is 
strictly lower for the S-type. That is, the pooling equilibrium where both types exert 
effort may collapse although the R-type would have exerted effort even if a higher 
proportion of equity was issued (more subsidy was given to the S-type). Because the 
warrant value falls with the exercise price faster for the S-type, the S-type is willing to 
increase faster the proportion of equity offered to the financier than the R-type while 
still exerting effort. As a result, through the appropriate choice of their exercise price, 
warrants allow for the implementation of the socially efficient outcome even if this is 
not possible when we restrict ourselves to debt, equity and/or convertible debt. This 
result provides a second rationale for their use. Finally, we show that, under certain 
conditions, a debt-warrant combination can implement the optimal contract as a 
competitive equilibrium.
This chapter is related to three strands in the literature: agency models, pure 
adverse selection models and models combining adverse selection and moral hazard.
In the celebrated Jensen and Meckling (1976) paper firms issue both debt and 
equity to minimise the sum of agency costs of these two securities. The agency cost of
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equity arises from the conflict of interest between management and outside 
shareholders. The agency cost of debt stems from the conflict of interest between 
existing shareholders (managers) and would-be debtholders. The issue of debt induces 
the managers to undertake riskier projects that reduce the value of debt and transfer 
wealth from debtholders to shareholders (asset substitution problem).15
Related to that is the debt overhang problem described by Myers (1977). The 
existence of risky debt implies that shareholders (managers) may not undertake 
positive NPV projects because they will incur the total cost of the project but obtain 
only part of the returns. In fact, if the increase in the value of the outstanding risky 
debt exceeds the NPV of a project, investment in the project would result in a fall in 
the shareholders net return.
Therefore, in agency models, the reduction in the agency cost of equity resulting 
from the issue of debt is offset at the margin by the increase in the agency costs of 
debt. This trade-off determines the optimal debt-equity ratio (capital structure).
In this context, Green (1984) focuses on the asset substitution problem and 
develops a rationale for the use of convertible debt (warrants). Convertible debt 
reverses the convex shape of levered equity over the upper range of the firm’s returns 
(where conversion takes place). As a result, it alters the incentives of the shareholders 
to take risk and so mitigates the asset substitution problem.
More recently, Biais and Casamatta (1999) consider a model similar to Jensen and 
Meckling but they completely endogenise the contractual form. Nevertheless, they 
show that if the risk-shifting problem is more severe, a debt-equity combination (or 
convertible debt) can implement the optimal contract whereas if the effort problem is 
more severe stock options are also needed.
Pure adverse selection models emphasise the signalling role of the financing 
decisions of the firm.16 If firms have no assets in place and there are no bankruptcy or 
financial distress costs, by using debt and equity, we can obtain fully revealing
15 Notice that in our model there is no conflict of interests between shareholders and debtholders (no 
asset substitution problem) which, given the agency cost of equity, is the driving force of the 
coexistence of debt and equity in Jensen and Meckling. In our case, moral hazard concerns the choice 
between different effort levels rather than the choice between a safe and a risky project (the source of 
the asset substitution problem).
16 The pure adverse selection part of this chapter belongs to a class of models that seek methods of 
financing that lead to nondissipative equilibria (Bhattacharya (1980)). Other examples include Heinkel 
(1982), Brennan and Kraus (1987), and Constantinides and Grundy (1989). Early examples of 
signalling models in the corporate finance literature are: Leland and Pyle (1977), Ross (1977), 
Bhattacharya (1979).
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equilibria when the risky projects are mean-increasing or mean-preserving spreads of 
the safe ones or they dominate the safe projects by first-order stochastic dominance.
Moreover, if firms have debt and equity outstanding and debt and equity 
repurchases are allowed, there potentially exist fully separating equilibria under a 
wider range of distributional assumptions.17 Brennan and Kraus (1987) allow only for 
debt repurchases and consider two cases: first-order stochastic dominance and mean- 
preserving spreads. They show that fully revealing equilibria can be obtained by 
issuing equity and repurchasing debt in the first case and by issuing convertible debt 
in the second. Constantinides and Grundy (1989) allow only equity repurchases and 
prove that, under first-order stochastic dominance, the issue of convertible debt 
coupled with equity repurchases leads to full information revelation.
Stein (1992) introduces financial distress costs and provides another justification 
for the use of convertible debt as well as the issue of debt and equity. In a three-type 
model, he obtains a fully separating equilibrium where the good type issues debt, the 
medium type issues convertible debt that is always converted into equity, and the bad 
type issues equity directly to avoid incurring the distress costs. In this separating 
equilibrium all firms invest and no distress costs are borne in equilibrium. If 
convertible debt were not used, this separating equilibrium would not, in general, 
exist and a situation similar to that described in Myers and Majluf (1984) would arise.
The justifications provided by Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987), and 
Constantinides and Grundy (1989) for the use of convertible debt rely on the fact that 
its payoff is concave in the firm’s returns for low values of returns and convex for 
higher values. In Stein (1992), the usefulness of convertible debt stems from the 
presence of financial distress costs and the inability of a bad firm to force conversion. 
In our model, the mechanism at work is different. First, it does not depend on 
financial distress costs. Second, in our case, convertible debt does not improve on a 
debt-equity combination. Our mechanism relies on the fact that the warrant exercise 
price can be greater than the face value of debt. By appropriately choosing the 
exercise price, we can exploit the difference between the returns of the two types of 
projects and satisfy the revelation or effort incentive constraints under weaker 
conditions than if warrants were not available.
17 If both debt and equity repurchases are allowed, there potentially exist fully separating equilibria 
under any assumption about the ordering of the distributions of returns as demonstrated by Heider 
(2001) in a two-type model.
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This chapter is most directly linked to models involving both adverse selection and 
(effort) moral hazard. Darrough and Stoughton (1986) provide such a model where 
entrepreneurs are risk averse and can issue combinations of debt and equity. However, 
they only consider separating equilibria where the securities issued are fairly priced. 
As a result, neither cross-subsidisation across types occurs nor the issue of equity 
when it implies adverse selection costs can be explained. In contrast, in Vercammen 
(2002) firms cannot signal their type. Because of his distributional assumption and the 
fact that firms are restricted to issue only debt a unique pooling equilibrium arises. He 
shows that the cross-subsidisation that takes place through the mispricing of debt at 
individual level raises aggregate surplus. Because the low-quality firms are more 
severely affected by the moral hazard, the cross-subsidisation results in a higher 
overall effort level and so a lower average failure probability.18
In our model, we allow for a wider range of distributional assumptions and firms 
can use combinations of securities to reveal information about their type. In our case, 
the pooling equilibrium involves the issue of both debt and equity (warrants) and the 
minimum subsidy consistent with S-type (the more prone to shirking) exerting effort. 
In any pooling equilibrium involving more than this minimum subsidy, the R-type 
(the subsidiser) can profitably deviate by issuing more debt and less equity. However, 
because the S-type always mimics him, the R-type issues just enough equity to induce 
the S-type to exert effort because the resulting increase in the R-type’s net expected 
return more than offsets the cost of the incremental subsidy. In other words, if both 
types exert effort the collective expected return increases so much that both are 
strictly better off than the case where just debt is issued and the S-type shirks.19
Notice that if types were observable, the S-type would not receive financing and so 
both investment and social welfare would be lower. These results contrast with those 
of pure adverse-selection models. In Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection leads 
firms to forego positive NPV projects whereas in de Meza and Webb (1987) it 
encourages firms to undertake negative NPV projects.20 Hence, in either case social 
welfare is lower than under foil information about types. The key to this difference is 
that in the presence of (effort) moral hazard the cross-subsidisation taking place in the 
pooling equilibrium relaxes this additional constraint and so it can be beneficial. On
18 Although our mechanism is similar, it was independently discovered.
19 If just debt is issued the S-type does not receive enough subsidy to induce him to exert effort.
20 De Meza and Webb (1999, 2000) also demonstrate that hidden types may lead to socially excessive 
lending.
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the contrary, in these two pure adverse selection models there is no channel through 
which the cross-subsidy can have positive effects but it may have negative ones.
However, as de Meza (2002) argues, assuming that agents are risk averse, hidden 
types may result in an improvement in social welfare even in the absence of moral 
hazard. If types are observable, the low-quality agents have lower income and so 
higher expected marginal utility in all states. Therefore, if adverse selection leads to a 
pooling equilibrium where the high-quality agents subsidise the low-quality ones, the 
welfare gains of the subsidisees more than offset the welfare losses of the subsidisers 
and so aggregate welfare rises.
This chapter is organised as follows. Next section describes the basic framework 
and develops the analytical tools. Section 3 provides some general results about the 
existence and the type of the equilibria where funds are offered. Section 4 analyses the 
roles of debt and equity under pure adverse selection and adverse selection cum moral 
hazard. The roles and the usefulness of warrants are explored in Section 5. In Section 
6, we show that, in the adverse selection cum moral hazard case, a debt-warrant 
combination can implement the optimal contract as a competitive equilibrium. Some
brief concluding remarks are provided in Section 7.
1.2 The Model
We consider a simple static (one-period) model of financing involving both adverse 
selection and effort moral hazard. There are two dates, 0 and 1, and one homogeneous 
(perishable) good which can be used either for consumption or investment purposes. 
There are also two groups of agents: entrepreneurs (henceforth Es) and financiers
(henceforth Fs). Both the Es and the Fs consume only at date 1.
Each E has an indivisible project but no initial wealth. All projects require the 
same fixed initial investment I, at date 0. Since the Es have no initial wealth, they 
need to raise (at least) I from the market.
Each F has a very large amount of initial wealth and can lend at zero interest rate. 
For simplicity, we assume that there are just two Fs involved in Bertrand competition.
Both the Es and the Fs are risk neutral. The Fs are only interested in the monetary 
returns of the project. The Es, however, care not only about the pecuniary returns but 
also about a private benefit Bl . Also, there are no taxes, no bankruptcy or financial
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distress costs. Finally, there is no conflict of interest between managers and 
entrepreneurs. In fact, firms are run by entrepreneurs.
Investment takes place at date 0. Returns are realised at date 1 and are observable 
and verifiable. There are two states of nature: Success, Failure. If a project succeeds it 
yields X .t . In case of failure, all projects yield 0 regardless of the type of the E.
The probability of success of a project, denoted by ^ (5 ,), is related to both the
type of the E (project) and the effort level that each E chooses privately. There are two 
types of Es (projects), R (risky) and S (safe), with respective proportions in the 
population X and 1 - A ,  0 < X < \ .  Given identical effort levels, the success
probability of the safe project is higher but its return in case of success is lower: 
X R > X s 21 and n* > ic*. There are two effort levels: Low (shirking), High
(working). Bi is a binary variable which denotes the private benefit, in terms of 
utility, corresponding to each effort level. If the E chooses to shirk, then Bi = B and 
7r(B.) = k ‘0, if the high effort level is chosen, then Bt =b and 7r{Bt) = n lc where 
B > b >  0 and 1 > n'c > x'Q > 0. The difference B - b  = C can be interpreted as the 
cost of effort.
If the high effort level is chosen, the NPV of both types of projects exceeds the 
cost of effort. In contrast, if shirking is chosen, neither project is economically viable 
(both types of projects have strictly negative NPV). That is,
Assumption 1: 7i'cX i -  I  >C>  0 > /rj X, - 1 , / = R,S
Assumption 1 also implies {nlc -  )X l > C , (/ = R,S).  That is, the choice of the
high effort level by either type leads to an increase in the net social surplus and so is 
socially efficient.
For expositional purposes, we begin by restricting the contract space to debt and 
outside equity. That is, the Es can borrow by issuing a combination of debt and 
equity. Debt claims are zero-coupon bonds that are senior to equity.
21 The remaining case where X R = X s and n s. > n R (the safe projects dominate the risky ones by 
first-order stochastic dominance) is not considered explicitly below. See Footnote 10.
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A contract Z = (a,D) provides the E with the required amount of funds, I, in 
return for a combination of debt of face value D and a proportion of equity of the 
project a ,  0 < a < \ ,  D >  0.
Therefore, given risk neutrality and limited liability, the Es seek to maximise:
where Ut is the expected utility of an E of type i when choosing the contract
Z, = (af,D, ) . That is, the expected utility of an E consists of two components: i) the
expected monetary return and ii) the private benefit, represented by the first and 
second term respectively in Eq. (1.1).
At date 0, when the contract is signed, the Es know their own type but the Fs 
cannot observe either the type of each individual E or verify the actions (choice of 
effort level) of the Es applying for funds. The Fs do, however, know the proportion of 
each type in the population of Es and the nature of the investment and moral hazard 
technology. The Fs also wish to maximise their expected profit. The expected 
profit, P p , of an F offering a contract (a, D) , given limited liability, is given by:
1.2.1 Effort Incentive Constraints
Let us first consider the moral hazard problem an E of type i faces. A given contract 
(a,D) will induce the high effort level if
PF = 7t{Bt){Max[a(Xi - £>),0] + Min{Xi,£>)}-1, i = R,S (1.2)
( 4  - )(1 - a)(Xi - D ) > C , i = R,S (1.3)
or (1 -  a)(X. - D ) >  ci , where c{ (1.3’)
22 Whenever the Max or Min operators are irrelevant they will be suppresed.
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The left-hand side of (1.3) is the increase in the E’s net expected return from exerting 
effort and the right-hand is the cost of effort. The contracts (a ,D ) satisfying (1.3) or 
(1.3*) are called (effort) incentive compatible. Let ICi be the set of effort incentive 
compatible contracts and /CFJ its frontier. The equation of ICFt is:
The constant c(. tells us how much it costs an E, in utility terms, to increase his 
success probability by a given amount {n'c - t f j ) .  Notice that this cost depends, in 
general, on the E’s type and is inversely related to the “productivity” of effort 
{7z'c — jTq). However, the fact that, at any given identical effort level, the safe type’s
success probability is higher does not imply that it changes more when another effort 
level is chosen. It may well be true that the risky type is more “productive” in this 
sense. Thus, cs can be greater, equal or less than cR. In combination with X , , c, 
describes the moral hazard “technology”. Lemma 1 summarises its key features.
Lemma 1: In the (a,D ) space:
a) ICFj are downward sloping and strictly concave with slope
b) ICFr and ICFS intersect at some (l> a  >0,D >0) if cR/ X R >cs / X s and 
X R- c R > X s - c s . Otherwise, either ICR <z ICS or ICS <z ICR.
c) Neither ICR nor ICS is empty.
Proof: See Appendix 1A.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the case where ICFR and ICFS intersect.
(1 - a ) { X i - D )  = cn i = R,S (1.4)
I — cx < 0. That is, at any (a,D) pair, ICFR is flatter than ICFS.
X t — D
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Figure 1.1
1.2.2 Indifference Curves and Revelation Constraints
The family of indifference curves of type i can be derived from Eq. (1.1). It should be 
noted that the shape of the indifference curves is independent of the probability of 
success.23 As a result, no indifference curve of type i crosses ICFj and therefore the 
indifference curves do not exhibit kinks in the (a ,D ) space. For each type, one of the 
indifference curves coincides with the corresponding ICF.
Lemma 2: Let U± denote the family of indifference curves of type i, and w,- denote a 
member of this family. In the (a ,D ) space, for 0 < a  < 1 and 0 < D < X,
f da \  I - a <0
d D ) u X , - D
a) Uj are downward sloping and concave with slope
b) The indifference curves of R and S cross only once
Proof: See Appendix 1A.
That is, the marginal rate of substitution of debt for equity of the R-type is greater 
than that of the S-type. Intuitively, regardless of the assumption about the ordering of
This is due to fact that in the event of failure the return is zero.
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the distributions of returns, at any given (a,D) pair, equity is more valuable for the 
R-type and debt for the S-type (even if, in absolute terms, both debt and equity issued 
by the S-type are more valuable).24 As a result, the R-type is willing to accept a
greater increase in D in exchange for a given reduction in a  than the S-type.
Technically, the single-crossing condition is satisfied.
Notice also that, due to limited liability, any contract (a ,D ) above (to the right of)
u°s (u°R) provides the (R)- S-type with the same level of expected utility as those on 
u°s (u°R). Clearly, the closer to the origin an indifference curve, the higher the 
expected utility (see Figure 1.2).
For any given pair of contracts Z R = (a R,DR) and Z s = (a s ,Ds ) the revelation 
constraints are:
UR(ZR) > U R(ZS) (1.5)
US{ZS) >US{ZR) (1.6)
where U{, i = R , S , is given by Eq. (1.1).
a
1
0 D
Figure 1.2
24 Equity is a convex claim and so its value increases, whereas debt is a concave claim and its value 
falls with the variability of returns, given the expected PV of the project.
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1.2.3 Zero-profit Lines
The expected profit of an F offering a contract (a ,D ) is given by Eq. (1.2). It is clear 
that the expected profit depends crucially on the effort level chosen (through the 
success probability of the project). Thus, if a zero-profit line crosses the 
corresponding effort incentive frontier IC F , it will exhibit a discontinuity because the 
success probability changes discontinuously when the Es change their effort level. 
However, given limited liability and the assumption that both types of projects have 
negative NPV when the low effort level is chosen ( 7t'QX i 1 < 0), the zero-profit lines
corresponding to shirking (/r' = n'Q) do not exist. Any contract (a,D) financing a
shirking E is loss-making and no rational F will offer it. Therefore, zero-profit lines 
can exist only if the high effort level is chosen (by at least one of the two types of Es). 
More specifically, the zero-profit line corresponding to the i-type (ZP,) exists only
if the i-type chooses the high effort level (his effort incentive constraint is satisfied) 
when he receives funds at fair terms.25 In other words, the existence of a zero-profit 
line (ZP,) requires that it belong to the corresponding set of effort incentive
compatible contracts (IC,). Given the investment and moral hazard technology, if
both types receive funds at fair terms three different cases may arise: i) the effort 
incentive constraint is not binding for either type, ii) it is not binding for the one type 
but is violated for the other, and iii) it is violated for both types. Conditional on the 
choice of the high effort level there exist three zero-profit lines: that corresponding to 
the R-type (ZPR), to the S-type ( ZPS), and the pooling zero-profit line (PZPH ).26
Lemma 3 summarises the key properties of the zero-profit lines and their relationship 
with the corresponding indifference curves and effort incentive frontiers. 
Subsequently, Lemma 4 provides the conditions for the existence of the individual 
zero-profit lines ZPR and ZPS.
25 By assumption 1, both types of projects have strictly positive NPV when the high effort level is 
chosen and negative NPV when the Es opt for shirking.
26 There can also exist another pooling zero-profit line corresponding to the case in which one type 
opts for the high effort level and the other shirks (PZPL).
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Lemma 3: In the (a , D ) space,
a) All ZPt , PZPW are downward sloping and strictly concave with slopes:
( d a \  1- a
—  =  <0
[d.D)ZPi X , - D
d a )  ( l - a ) [Zx£+( l -X)xsc } , Q
d D X x Rc ( XK- D)  + ( \ - Z ) nsc(Xs - D )
where > ( d a ) > r d a '|
VdD)*, \dD ) pZP„ <dDJZPg
b) ICFi , Uj, and ZP; never cross each other, i = R,S
Proof: See Appendix 1A.
Since all three, zero-profit lines, indifference curves, and effort incentive frontiers 
corresponding to type i have the same slope, they never cross. One of the indifference 
curves coincides with the corresponding zero-profit line. However, the location of the 
zero-profit line relative to the corresponding effort incentive frontier is the key 
determinant for the existence of the former.
Lemma 4: Suppose both types obtain funds at fair terms, then
a) If n'cX i -  I  >7clccn i = R ,S , then both ZPS and ZPR exist.
b) If n ^ X R- l > n ^ c Ri n scX s - l  < n sccs , then only ZPR exists.
c) If 7tscX s - 1 > n sccs , 7ZqX r ~ I  < n ccR > then only ZPS exists.
d) If n lcX i -  I  < 7Tlcci , i = R ,S , then neither ZPS nor ZPR exists.
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Proof: If iricX i -  I  > then the intersection point of ZP, with the vertical axis, 
( 11 n lcX i ), lies (weakly) below that of ICF, , ( \ - c J X , ). By Lemma 3, ZP, and ICF, 
never intersect (they may coincide). Therefore, ZP, belongs to IC, and hence it 
exists. Conversely, if 7r'cX , -  I  < n'cc, , then ZP, lies outside IC, and so it does not 
exist. In the latter case, if the i type obtains funds at fair terms, his effort incentive 
constraint is violated and so he opts for shirking contradicting the condition {n ’ = ttic) 
on which ZP, is constructed. Q.E.D.
Case (a) corresponds to pure adverse selection. Although, moral hazard is present, 
because for both types the NPV {n'cX, -  I )  exceeds the “effective” cost of effort
(n'cc,), it has no bite. If either type obtains funds at fair terms, he exerts effort and so
the corresponding zero-profit line exists. In Case (b), financing at fair terms implies 
that the effort incentive constraint of the R-type is satisfied but that of the S-type is 
violated ( ZPR belongs to ICR but ZPS lies outside ICS). As a result, the R-type
exerts effort and so ZPR exists whereas the S-type opts for shirking and ZPS does not 
exist. In the third case the reverse is true ( ZPS belongs to ICS but ZPR lies outside 
ICR). In Case (d), the NPV of the project falls short of the “effective” cost of effort 
for both types. Thus, both types opt for shirking and so no zero-profit line exists. 
Figure l .3 provides an illustration for Case (b).
a a
ICF,I - c s / X,
IC,
a 4
l - c J X
l / x iX t
IC,
ICF,
0 D
Figure 1.3
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1.2.4 Equilibrium
It is well-known that, in most cases, the equilibrium outcome in competitive markets 
with asymmetric information depends crucially on the game-theoretic specification of 
the strategic interaction between the informed and uninformed agents. Yet, no 
agreement has been reached on which game structure is the most appropriate. It is a 
difficult task to determine the game specification that fits best the case at hand. Here, I 
assume that the Fs and the Es play the following three-stage game due to Hellwig 
(1987):
Stage 1: The two Fs simultaneously offer contracts (a ,D ). Each F may offer any 
finite number of contracts.
Stage 2: Given the offers made by the Fs, the Es apply for (at most) one contract from 
one F. If an E’s most preferred contract is offered by both Fs, the E chooses each F’s 
offer with probability 1/2. In the light of the contract chosen, the E decides whether 
to work or shirk.
Stage 3: After observing the contracts offered by his rival and those chosen by the Es, 
each F decides which applications will accept or reject. If an application is rejected, 
the applicant does not receive funds.
This game structure rationalises a Wilson equilibrium (1977) as a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium. Unlike the two-stage screening game, it allows for the existence of a 
(interior) Nash pooling equilibrium when this pooling equilibrium Pareto-dominates 
any other equilibrium. That is, this equilibrium concept allows agents to exploit all the 
gains from trade and is a necessary condition for the implementation of the optimal 
contract as a competitive equilibrium in the adverse selection cum moral hazard case.
We only consider pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria. A pair of contracts 
( Z R, Z s ) is an equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:27
• No contract in the equilibrium pair implies negative (expected) profits for the F. In 
other words, the Fs’ participation or IR constraints are satisfied:
27 Given limited liability and the strictly positive private benefit, the Es’ participation constraints are 
always satisfied.
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7r{Bi ){Max[a(Xi -  Z)),0] + Min{Xi, Z))} > I , i = R,S (1.7a)
• Revelation constraints:
UR(ZR)> U R(ZS)
(1.7b)
US(ZS) >US(ZR)
• Effort incentives constraints:
B ,= b  if (1 - a \ X i - D ) > c i
B, = B if (1 -  a){Xl -D )<  c, (1.7c)
B, = 0 if the project is not undertaken.
• Profit maximisation: No other set of contracts, if offered alongside the equilibrium 
pair at Stage 1, would increase an F’s expected profit.
To begin with, because of Bertrand competition, any equilibrium involves zero 
profits for the Fs. Lemma 5 formalises this argument.
Lemma 5: In any equilibrium whether pooling or separating, both Fs must have zero 
expected profits.
Proof: Let (aR,DR) and (as ,Ds ) be the contracts chosen by the R and S-type 
respectively (they could be the same contract). Suppose that the two Fs’ aggregate 
expected profits are PF > 0. Then the expected profit of one of the Fs must be no
more than PF /2 . This F has an incentive to deviate and offer contracts (aR - e ,D R)
and {as - e ,D s ), or alternatively (aR,DR - s) and (as ,DS - e ) ,  for e > 0 .  By
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doing so, he will attract all Es. Since s  can be chosen arbitrarily small, this deviation 
will yield the deviant F an expected profit arbitrarily close to P p . Thus, if Pp > 0 (at 
least) one of the Fs has an incentive to deviate and increase his expected profit. This 
implies that in any equilibrium it must be true that Pp < 0. However, since Fs have
always the option to offer no contracts (or reject all the applications) and make zero 
profits, in any equilibrium, they cannot make (expected) losses. Therefore, in any 
equilibrium, both Fs make zero expected profits. Q.E.D.
1.3 Types of Equilibria and Provision of Funds: General Results
An important implication of Lemma 5 is that any equilibrium contract must lie on one 
of the zero-profit lines. This, in turn, implies the following result:
Lemma 6: A separating equilibrium can exist only if both ZPR and ZPS exist. If 
either ZPS or ZPR or both do not exist, then no separating equilibrium exists.28
Proof: First, given limited liability and the strictly positive private benefit, if funds 
are offered (whatever the terms they are offered at) both types of Es will always 
accept them and undertake their project. Thus, there cannot exist a separating 
equilibrium where only one type invests. Suppose now there is a separating 
equilibrium in which the R-type chooses contract (a R,DR) and the S-type chooses 
contract (a s , Ds ). By Lemma 5, the contract chosen by the R-type must lie on the R- 
zero-profit line (ZPR) and that chosen by the S-type on the S-zero-profit line (ZPS). 
Therefore, a separating equilibrium can exist only if both zero-profit lines exist. If one 
(or both) of the zero-profit lines does not exist, a separating equilibrium cannot exist. 
Q.E.D.
Lemma 6 implies that in cases where one (or both) of the zero-profit lines does not 
exist, if there exists an equilibrium, it must be pooling. Proposition 1 summarises 
these results.
28 Given that the Es’ participation constraints are always satisfied, the result in Lemma 6 holds true 
regardless of the form of the contracts.
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Proposition 1: A separating equilibrium can exist only if n lcX i -  I  > 7rlccj , i = R,S  . 
If 7ricX i -  I  < 7rlccn for either i = R ,  or i = S ,  or i = R ,S ,  then the resulting 
equilibria must be pooling.
The next general result concerns the conditions under which funds are provided.29 
Proposition 2:
a) If n'cX i -  I  > n icci , i = R ,S , then both types of projects receive financing.
b) If n icX i -  I  > n icci , 7tkcX k -  I  < n kcck , i = R ,S , k = R ,S , then funds are offered 
to both types only if (a part of) either PZPH or PZPL exists.
c) If 7i'cX i -  I  < n icci , i = R ,S , there exists a unique pooling equilibrium where no 
E obtains funds (no project is undertaken).
Proof: By Lemma 5, in any equilibrium, funds are offered only along the zero-profit 
lines. Thus, in any equilibrium, the Fs will offer funds only if (a part of) a zero-profit 
fine exists.
a) By Lemma 4, both ZPS and ZPR exist. As a result, PZPH also exists. Hence,
regadless of the type of the equilibrium (separating or pooling) funds are offered.
b) By Lemma 6, in this case, only pooling equilibria can exist. However, the 
existence of pooling equilibria where funds are offered requires that (a part of) a 
pooling zero-profit line exist. Thus, (a part of) either PZPH or PZPL must exist.30
c) By Lemma 4, neither ZPR nor ZPS exists. As a result, by Lemma 6, no separating
equilibrium exists. Moreover, since neither ZPR nor ZPS exists, no pooling zero-
profit line exists. If an F offers funds to any E, he will make losses. Therefore, no 
rational F will do so (the Fs’ participation constraints are violated). Q.E.D.
29 Under the proposed game structure, in all cases, there exists a pooling equilibrium where funds are 
not offered.
30 (A part of) PZPH exists if it belongs to the intersection of ICR and ICS. Contracts offered along it 
are effort incentive compatible for both types. Thus, both types choose the high effort level and so it 
actually exists. If PZPH does not belong to the intersection of ICR and ICS, it does not exist. In such 
a case, (at least) one of the two types shirks contradicting the condition on which PZPH is drawn. (A 
part of) PZPL exists if the following two conditions are satisfied: i) (A part of) it belongs to either ICS 
or ICR and ii) (1 -  X)7tscX s + Xn*XR > I or (1 -  X)nlXs + Xn£XR > I .
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Notice that even in Case (c), if either type had chosen the high effort level he would 
have enjoyed a strictly positive expected utility (the sum of two positive components: 
i) the difference between the NPV of the project and the cost of effort, and ii) the 
private benefit) instead of zero. However, due to moral hazard, the inducement of this 
choice is not feasible.
1.4 Types of Equilibria and Methods of Financing: Specific Results
Thus far, no assumption has been made about the ordering of the distributions of 
returns. However, if an equilibrium exists where funds are provided, then both the 
type of the equilibrium (pooling or separating) and the method of financing depend, in 
general, on these assumptions. To proceed further with the analysis, we consider four 
different assumptions. The risky projects: i) dominate the safe ones by first-order 
stochastic dominance with respect to returns, ii) are mean-preserving spreads, iii) 
mean-reducing spreads, and iv) mean-increasing spreads of the safe projects. These 
distributional assumptions determine the location (intersection) of both the zero-profit 
lines ZPR and ZPS (if they exist) and the effort incentive frontiers ICFR and ICFS in 
the (a ,D ) space. This, in turn, determines the type of the equilibrium and the method 
of financing. Lemmas 7 and 8 describe analytically the location of the zero-profit 
lines and effort incentive frontiers respectively under each assumption.
Lemma 7: If the risky projects
a) dominate the safe projects by first-order stochastic dominance ( n* = n s} ), then 
ZPR and ZPS intersect at a  = 0. For a  > 0, ZPR lies entirely below ZPS.
b) are mean-preserving spreads of the safe ones (tt*Xr = 7Tj X s), then ZPR and ZPS 
intersect at D = 0. For D > 0, ZPS lies entirely below ZPR.
c) are mean-increasing spreads of the safe ones (7t*XR > 7tSj X s \  then ZPR and ZPS 
intersect at some (a > 0, D > 0).
d) are mean-reducing spreads of the safe projects (7Tj X r <7Tj X s ), then ZPR and 
ZPS do not intersect at any (1 > a  > 0,D > 0). ZPS lies entirely below ZPR.
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Proof: See Appendix 1A.
Intuitively, in Part (a), since both have the same success probability, given its face 
value, the debt issued by both types is equally valuable. Thus, if both issue only debt, 
zero profit for Fs requires the issue of the same level of debt. However, if equity is 
also issued, since the R-type equity is more valuable, an F who just breaks even 
would ask for a lower proportion of equity if he offered funds to the R-type than to 
the S-type (given the face value of debt). That is, ZPR lies below ZPS at any strictly
positive level of equity issued. Under mean-preserving spreads, the equity issued by 
both types is equally valuable but the debt issued by the S-type is more valuable for 
the financiers. Thus, the S-type would be asked for the same proportion of equity but 
a lower face value of debt. Under mean-increasing spreads, equity is more valuable if 
it is issued by the R-type (its expected return is higher) and debt of given face value if 
it is issued by the S-type. As a result, a lower proportion of equity and a higher face 
value of debt is demanded by the R-type. Finally, under mean-reducing spreads, since 
both debt and equity issued by the S-type are more valuable, a lower proportion of 
equity and face value of debt is demanded by the S-type.
Lemma 8: If the risky projects
a) dominate the safe projects by first-order stochastic dominance { n R = n Sj ), then 
ICFr lies entirely above ICFS ( ICS c= ICR).
b) are mean-preserving spreads of the safe ones ( n RX R = 7TjXs ), then ICFR and 
ICFS intersect at D = 0. For D > 0 , ICFR lies above ICFS ( ICS <z ICR).
c) are mean-increasing (n * X R > n*X s ) or mean-reducing {k rX r < f f jX s ) spreads 
of the safe ones, then three cases may arise: i) ICFR and ICFS intersect at some 
(a > 0,D > 0), ii) ICFS lies above ICFR ( ICS z> ICR), and iii) ICFR lies above 
ICFS (ICS a  ICR).
Proof: See Appendix 1A.
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That is, only the first two assumptions about the ordering of the distributions of 
returns restrict the location (intersection) of the effort incentive frontiers. These 
restrictions have the following implications:
Corollary 1: If the risky projects
a) dominate the safe projects by first-order stochastic dominance (a* = n Sj )  and the
effort incentive constraint for the R-type is violated, then it is also violated for the 
S-type (but not necessarily vice versa).
b) are mean-preserving spreads of the safe ones (7Tj X r = n s}X s ) and one of the 
effort incentive constraints is violated, then the other one is also violated.
Proof: a) By Lemma 7, ZPR lies (weakly) below ZPS . Also, by Lemma 8, ICFR lies 
entirely above ICFS . Therefore, if ZPR lies above ICFR (the effort incentive 
constraint for the R-type is violated), then ZPS lies necessarily above ICFS (the effort 
incentive constraint for the S-type is also violated).
b) By Lemma 7, ZPR and ZPS intersect at D = 0 and for D > 0 , ZPS lies entirely 
below ZPR. By Lemma 8, ICFR and ICFS intersect at D = 0 and for D > 0, ICFR 
lies above ICFS . Also, by Lemma 3, ZPi and ICFn i = R,S  , have the same slope. 
Thus, if ZPR (ZPS) lies above ICFR ( ICFS), then ZPS ( ZPR ) lies also above ICFS 
(ICFr ). That is, if one effort incentive constraint is violated, the other one is also 
violated. Q.E.D.
Now that we have developed the analytical apparatus, we can go on to prove the main 
results of this chapter. Subsection 1.4.1 examines the pure adverse selection case. In 
subsection 1.4.2 we consider the case where both adverse selection and moral hazard 
play a crucial part in the determination and nature of the equilibrium outcome.
1.4.1 The Pure Adverse Selection Case
We first consider the case where the NPV of the project exceeds the “effective” 
cost of effort for both types (Case (a) of Lemma 4). In this case, as we have seen, no
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effort incentive constraint is binding if funds are offered at fair terms and so both 
zero-profit lines ZPR and ZPS exist. This, in turn, implies that the pooling zero-profit
line PZPH also exists. Therefore, both separating and pooling equilibria can exist. 
Moreover, given that the single-crossing condition is satisfied, a “reasonable” pooling 
equilibrium where both debt and equity are issued can exist only if, in equilibrium, 
there is no cross-subsidisation across types.
Under pure adverse selection, debt and equity are only used to convey socially 
costless information about the type of the project. Hence, in any pooling equilibrium 
where cross-subsidisation takes place, the subsidiser has an incentive to deviate by 
issuing more of the less valuable for him security. By doing so, he can credibly signal 
his type, reduce the cross-subsidisation and increase his expected return (utility). As a 
result, no pooling equilibrium involving cross-subsidisation can sustain. Notice, 
however, that the breaking of such a pooling equilibrium is possible only if it involves 
the issue of either both debt and equity or only the more valuable for the deviant 
security. If only the less valuable for the subsidiser security is issued, such a deviation 
is not possible and so the equilibrium cannot be broken (comer solution). In such a 
case, the subsidy is simply minimised (this is the case under mean-reducing spreads).
Therefore, under pure adverse selection, debt and equity can coexist in a pooling 
equilibrium only if both securities are fairly priced not only collectively but also 
individually. This, in turn, can occur only if this pooling equilibrium lies at the 
intersection of the individual zero-profit lines ZPR and ZPS (when they intersect at 
some (a > 0,D > 0)). That is, only under mean-increasing spreads. More formally,
Proposition 3: If n'cX. -  I  > n'cc ., / = R ,S , both types of projects obtain funds but
the type of the equilibrium (separating or pooling) and the equilibrium method of 
financing depend on the ordering of the distributions of returns. In particular,
a) If the risky projects dominate the safe ones by first-order stochastic dominance, 
there exists a pooling equilibrium where both types issue only debt as well as a 
continuum of separating equilibria where the risky type issues only debt whereas 
the safe type issues a combination of debt and equity.
b) If the risky projects are mean-preserving spreads of the safe ones, there exists a 
pooling equilibrium where both types issue only equity as well as a continuum of
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separating equilibria where the safe type issues only equity whereas the risky type 
issues a combination of debt and equity.
c) If the risky projects are mean-increasing spreads of the safe ones, there exists a 
continuum of separating equilibria (as well as a pooling equilibrium) where both 
types issue a combination of debt and equity. The risky type issues (weakly) more 
debt and less equity.
d) If the risky projects are mean-reducing spreads of the safe ones, there exists a 
unique pooling equilibrium where both types issue only equity.
Proof: By Lemma 4, in this case, ICFt lies above ZP., i = R, S , and so we can
proceed with the analysis ignoring the effort incentive constraints. Let (AR,AS) be the
equilibrium pair of contracts (in a pooling equilibrium AR =AS = A ). We test
whether the pair (AR, As ) or A is an equilibrium by considering deviations.
We begin with the case of mean-increasing spreads (Part (c)). First, we have to 
show that there cannot exist a pooling equilibrium except that at the intersection of 
ZPS and ZPR (point A ). By Lemma 5, if there exists a pooling equilibrium it must lie
on the pooling zero-profit line (PZPH ). Suppose that the pooling equilibrium contract 
is contract B that lies on PZPH to the left of point A (see Figure 1.4c). Consider now 
the following deviation. An F offers a contract just below B in the area between the 
indifference curve of the two types through B. Given contract B is still offered, the 
deviant contract will reasonably attract only an R-type and so is profitable (since it 
lies above ZPR). At the same time, contract B becomes loss-making and so any 
application for it would be rejected at Stage 3. Thus, contract B (any contract on 
PZPH to the left of point A ) cannot be a pooling equilibrium. By a similar argument, 
any contract along PZPH to the right of point A cannot be a pooling equilibrium. 
However, it is easy to see that there is no profitable deviation from contract A. 
Therefore, contract A is a pooling equilibrium.
We also have to show that no contract along ZPR to the left of A and along ZPS 
to the right of A can be an equilibrium. All these contracts attract both types and so 
are loss-making for the financiers (since they lie below PZPH). Therefore, no rational 
financier will offer any of them.
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Finally, any pair (AR,AS), where AR lies on ZPR to the right of A and As lies on 
ZPS to the left of A, is a. separating equilibrium. Clearly, all these pairs satisfy the
revelation and effort incentive constraints of both types as well as the zero-profit 
conditions. Furthermore, all separating pairs are equally preferred by both types of Es 
as well as the Fs and so there is no way to rule any of them out.
In Part (a), clearly, offers below ZPR are unprofitable. Also, any offer along ZPR 
(to the left of point A ) would attract both types and so is loss-making. Thus, there 
cannot exist a separating equilibrium where the R-type issues equity. By an argument 
similar to that used in Part (c) above, in Part (a) there cannot exist a pooling
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equilibrium where equity is issued. Consider now an F who deviates by offering a 
contract in the area between ZPS and ZPR. Given contract A is still offered, at Stage
3, the deviant F will reasonably infer that his contract will be chosen by an S-type. As 
a result, the deviant contract is unprofitable (loss-making) and so any application for it 
will be rejected at Stage 3. Actually, anticipating the rejection of this application, no 
S-type would make it at Stage 2. Therefore, contract A which involves both types 
issuing only debt is a pooling equilibrium (see Figure 1.4a). Finally, any pair 
(Ar,As ), where AR = A and As lies on ZPS to the left of A,  is a separating 
equilibrium. Because debt issued by both types at A is fairly priced, the S-type is 
indifferent between issuing debt and any debt-equity combination along ZPS. Also, 
given contract A , the financiers are equally well off by offering any contract along 
ZPS because, given contract A , any such an offer is going to be taken only by the S-
type. Thus, none of these separating pairs can be ruled out.
By similar reasoning, we can show that under mean-preserving spreads (Part (b)) 
there exist a pooling equilibrium where only equity is issued as well as a continuum 
of separating equilibria where the S-type issues just equity whereas the R-type issues 
a debt-equity combination along ZPR (see Figure 1.4b). Similarly, under mean- 
reducing spreads (Part (d)) there exists a unique pooling equilibrium that involves 
both types issuing only equity (see Figure 1,4d).31 Q.E.D.
Three remarks should be made here. First, regardless of the distributional assumption, 
the NPV of all projects (given the high effort level is chosen) exceeds the cost of 
effort, C , and all projects receive financing. That is, investment is at its optimal level. 
Second, although under most distributional assumptions a pooling equilibrium exists, 
with the exception of mean-reducing spreads, the securities issued by both types are 
fairly priced both collectively (because of perfect competition) and individually. That 
is, there is no cross-subsidisation across types. On the contrary, under mean-reducing 
spreads because, in absolute terms, both the debt and equity issued by the S-type are 
more valuable, in the resulting pooling equilibrium the S-type inevitably subsidises 
the R-type through the mispricing of equity at individual level (the S-type equity is 
underpriced and the R-type overpriced). However, because debt is relatively more
31 These equilibria also obtain in a two-stage signalling or screening game.
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valuable than equity for the S-type, in the resulting all-equity pooling equilibrium the 
cross-subsidisation is minimised. Third, full separation requires that, in absolute 
terms, debt issued by the S-type and equity issued by the R-type be weakly more 
valuable for the financiers.
1.4.2 The Adverse Selection cum Moral Hazard Case
In this subsection, we examine the case where the S-type NPV falls short of his 
“effective” cost of effort (Case (b) of Lemma 4). That is, if the S-type is offered funds 
at fair terms, his effort incentive constraint is violated and so the corresponding zero- 
profit line does not exist. Thus, only pooling equilibria can exist. Because the choice 
of the high effort level is socially efficient, here we focus on pooling equilibria where 
both types exert effort. These equilibria involve cross-subsidisation across types and 
Pareto-dominate any other equilibrium. Through the mispricing of equity at individual 
level, the S-type receives the subsidy necessary to induce him to work.
That is, in the presence of both adverse selection and (effort) moral hazard, in 
addition to conveying information, debt and equity play a second role. That of 
incentivising the more prone to shirking type. This double role stems from the 
interaction between adverse selection and moral hazard and provides an explanation 
for the issue of combinations of debt and equity even if the issue of equity implies an 
adverse selection cost. What is more, in contrast with the pure adverse selection case, 
the cross-subsidisation is socially beneficial. It converts negative into positive NPV 
projects and improves social welfare.
To illustrate this point, we consider the case where, at any identical effort level, the 
risky projects dominate the safe ones by first-order stochastic dominance. The 
remaining cases are analysed in Appendix IB.
Proposition 4: Suppose the risky projects dominate the safe ones by first-order 
stochastic dominance ( X R > X s , it* -  n] -  n }, j  = C,0) and n * X R - I >  n*cR,
k scX s - 1  <7tsccs , l / i t* X R < l - c s / X s . Then if A> X] there exists a unique
pooling (funding) equilibrium where both types choose the socially efficient high 
effort level and obtain funds by issuing a combination of debt and equity.
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where \  = I  7tc (X  s cs )
{7CRcX r -7TScX s ){\ - C S / X S )
The equilibrium contract, A = (a* ,D *), lies at the intersection of ICFS and PZPH
Proof: We test whether the contract at A is an equilibrium by considering 
deviations.32 Offers below ZPR are clearly loss-making. Any offer in the area between
uR (the R-type indifference curve through the equilibrium contract) and ZPR to the 
left of ICFS is going to be taken by both types and so is unprofitable. Thus, we only 
need to consider the following two deviations: i) Suppose that an F deviates by 
offering a contract, say A ' , in the area between uR and ZPR to the right of ICFS.
with a* and D* given by:
( 1.8)
(1.9)
0 D
Figure 1.5
32 In Appendix IB, we also provide mathematical proofs for our results.
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Given that contract A is still offered, the deviant contract, contract A', will 
reasonably attract only the R-type. This, in turn, implies that contract A is taken only 
by the S-type and so it becomes loss-making. As a result, at Stage 3, any application 
for that contract will be rejected. Anticipating that, the S-type will also choose A ' , at 
Stage 2, and hence A' becomes also loss-making (since to the right of ICFS, PZPH
does not exist, and PZPL lies to the right of uAR). Therefore, there is no profitable 
deviation to the right of A. ii) Consider now an F who deviates by offering a contract, 
say A" , in the area between ICFS and uR to the left of (above) A. Given contract A
is still offered, contract A” will reasonably attract only the S-type and so is loss- 
making. Thus, any application for contract A" will be rejected at stage 3. Actually, 
anticipating the rejection of that application at Stage 3, no S-type would make it at 
Stage 2. Therefore, the pooling equilibrium at A is the unique equilibrium where 
funds are provided.33 Q.E.D.
The pooling equilibrium at A reflects a trade-off between information revelation and 
effort incentives. The securities issued by the R- and S-type are priced as a pool. 
Although, because of perfect competition, debt and equity are fairly priced 
collectively, at individual level they are mispriced. Not surprisingly, it is precisely this 
mispricing that provides the more prone to shirking type with the subsidy necessary to 
induce him to exert effort. More specifically, in the pooling equilibrium of 
Proposition 4 the R-type subsidises the S-type through the mispricing of the more 
valuable for him security (equity). Hence, given that the single-crossing condition is 
satisfied, the R-type has an incentive to deviate by choosing a contract involving more 
debt and less equity than the equilibrium contract. By doing so, he can credibly signal 
his type, reduce the cross-subsidisation and increase his expected return.
However, his attempt will be fruitless. If the R-type chooses such a contract, the 
equilibrium contract becomes loss-making for the financiers and so any application 
for that will be rejected. As a result, the S-type will always mimic the R-type 
preventing him from revealing his type and obtaining funds in better terms. What is
33 It should be noted that uniqueness follows from the application of the “intuitive criterion”. All 
contracts along (the relevant part of) PZPH correspond to pooling perfect Bayesian equilibria under 
abritrary out-of-equilibrium beliefs. However, contract A is the only one that survives the “intuitive 
criterion” (Cho and Kreps, 1987).
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more, the deviant contract gives the S-type less subsidy and so destroys his effort 
incentives. The S-type shirks and the collective expected return falls significantly. A 
financier who offers a contract involving less equity than the equilibrium contract can 
break even only if he asks for a considerably greater face value of debt (higher interest 
rate on debt). But neither type prefers such a deviant contract to the equilibrium 
contract. Hence, no financier has an incentive to offer a contract involving less equity 
than the equilibrium contract and so the R-type stays in equilibrium and provides the 
S-type with just enough subsidy in order to induce him to work.
Loosely speaking, the R-type accepts to issue some equity and induce the S-type to 
exert effort because the increase in his net expected return (due to the lower interest 
rate he pays on debt) more than offsets the cost of the incremental subsidy (the 
adverse selection cost of issuing equity). That is, the R-type is better off in the pooling 
equilibrium of Proposition 4 where both debt and equity are issued and both types 
exert effort than in a pooling equilibrium where only debt is issued and so the S-type 
shirks.34
Moreover, the role of debt and equity as communication devices implies that no 
financier can make a profit by offering a contract involving more equity (subsidy) and 
less debt than the equilibrium contract. Given that the equilibrium contract is still 
offered, the deviant contract will not be taken by any E at Stage 2. If an E chooses this 
contract, the financier will infer that he is an S-type. As a result, the deviant contract 
is loss-making and any application for that will be rejected at Stage 3. Anticipating 
that, no E will apply for it at Stage 2.35
That is, the existence of the socially efficient pooling equilibrium relies on two 
factors: i) the endogenous (discrete)36 choice of the effort level and ii) the three-stage 
game structure that allows for an (interior) pooling perfect-Bayesian equilibrium even 
if cross-subsidisation across types takes place and the single-crossing condition is
34 Notice that in the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 4 the R-type is worse off compared to the case 
where types are observable and he obtains funds at fair terms. However, social welfare exceeds that 
under full information about types (see also the discussion in Subsection 1.4.2.2 below).
35 A similar argument applies if the subsidiser is the S-type. The only difference is that the cross­
subsidisation now takes place through the mispricing of the more valuable for the S-type security 
(debt). That is, in this latter case, the equilibrium contract involves more debt and less equity than the 
S-type would wish.
36 We conjecture that, under certain restrictions on the probability and cost functions, this pooling 
equilibrium exists even if the effort level is a continuous variable.
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met.37 Due to the presence of the third stage agents behave less myopically than in a 
two-stage screening game and so the non-existence problem is resolved.
If it exists, the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 4 has two interesting 
implications: First, it provides an explanation for the issue of combinations of debt 
and equity even if the issue of equity implies an adverse selection cost. Firms issue 
some equity even if under pure adverse selection they would have issued just debt. 
Second, in contrast with the pure adverse selection case, the cross-subsidisation is 
socially beneficial. It converts a negative into a positive NPV project and improves 
social welfare.
1.4.2.1 Implications for the Issue of Securities
To fix ideas, let us compare the adverse selection cum moral hazard case with the 
pure adverse selection and pure moral hazard cases. As we have already seen, under 
pure adverse selection, the securities issued are only used to convey socially costless 
information about the type of the project. Therefore, firms issue combinations of debt 
and equity only if both securities are fairly priced not only collectively but also 
individually. Pooling equilibria involving cross-subsidisation can exist only if the less 
valuable for the subsidiser security is issued (comer solution). In this case, there is no 
channel through which the cross-subsidy can have positive effects for the subsidiser. 
As a result, the subsidiser maximises his return by minimising the subsidy he provides 
the other type.
In contrast, in the presence of effort moral hazard, if the subsidiser cannot reveal 
his type, it may be in his interest to incur the adverse selection cost of issuing some of 
the more valuable for him security. By doing so, he provides the more prone to 
shirking type with the subsidy necessary to induce him to work and so the collective 
expected return rises. If the resulting increase in his expected return exceeds this 
adverse selection cost, the subsidiser’s welfare improves. For example, in Proposition 
4 the benefit (due to the lower interest rate he pays on debt) for the R-type from
37 In a two-stage signalling game, such a pooling equilibrium cannot exist. Behaving myopically, the R- 
type tries to reveal his type by issuing more debt and less equity. However, the S-type always mimics 
and, more importantly, his effort incentives are destroyed. Therefore, there can exist either pooling 
equilibria where only debt is issued (comer solution) and the R-type works whereas the S-type shirks or 
pooling equilibria where both types shirk and so no funds are provided. In either case, the resulting 
pooling equilibria are Pareto-inferior to that of Proposition 4.
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accepting to issue some equity and inducing the S-type to exert effort exceeds the
• ,  *50adverse selection cost associated with the equity issue.
In the pure moral hazard case, the Fs observe the type of each individual E. As a 
result, each type is offered contracts along the corresponding zero-profit line, 
provided it exists. In the context of our simple model, the mode of financing is 
irrelevant.39 All combinations of debt and equity along the existing zero-profit line are 
offered and are equally preferred by the corresponding type.
1.4.2.2 Implications for Investment and Social Welfare
Under the conditions in Proposition 4, if types were observable only the R-type would 
receive financing. If the S-type receives funds at fair terms he shirks and so his project 
NPV is negative. Moreover, financiers have no incentive to transfer resources from 
the R-type to the S-type to induce the latter to exert effort. Thus, no rational financier 
will be willing to offer him the required for the investment funds and so the S-type 
project is not undertaken. That is, under full information about types a potentially 
positive NPV investment opportunity is forgone. Furthermore, because when the S- 
type works his project NPV exceeds the cost of effort, the social welfare also worsens.
These results are in sharp contrast with the pure adverse selection case. In Myers 
and Majluf (1984) adverse selection leads firms to forego positive NPV projects 
whereas in de Meza and Webb (1987) it encourages firms to undertake negative NPV 
projects. Hence, in either case social welfare is lower than under full information 
about types. The key to this difference is that in the presence of (effort) moral hazard 
the cross-subsidisation taking place in a pooling equilibrium relaxes this additional 
constraint and so it can be beneficial.40 On the contrary, given risk neutrality, under
38 Notice that, although the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 4 involves cross-subsidisation across 
types of Es, it does not involve cross-subsidisation across debt and equity. Once the equilibrium is 
determined, the value of these two contracts can be calculated independently and so debt and equity 
could be traded separately in a secondary market. In fact, the same equilibrium obtains even if instead 
of one F offering both debt and equity, the Fs specialise in one of the two contracts and debt and equity 
markets are perfectly competitive (see Appendix 1C for a proof).
39 This result is due to the assumption that in case of failure the project yields zero regardless of its 
type. If instead we assume that in case of failure the return is strictly positive then debt becomes the 
optimal contract (Innes (1990)). All the main results go through under the latter assumption. However, 
the zero-retum assumption simplifies considerably the analysis without losing any insight.
40 Notice that the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 4 may exist even if the NPV of the S-type project 
is negative regardless of the effort level. Obviously, in such a case, adverse selection results in 
overinvestment and a fall in social welfare. Moreover, the pooling equilibrium can exist if there exist
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pure adverse selection there is no channel through which the cross-subsidy can have 
positive effects but it may have negative consequences.
1.5 The Roles of Warrants
So far, the available financial instruments have been debt and equity. The discussion 
of the previous section illustrated the roles of these two financial contracts as 
separation devices and means of incentivising the more prone to shirking type. In this 
section, we introduce financing instruments with option features. More specifically, 
the Es can borrow the required amount I by issuing a debt-warrant combination.
The warrant gives its holder the right to purchase a prespecified proportion of the 
firm’s equity, 77, at an agreed price K (exercise price). The proceeds from the exercise 
of the option, K, are distributed as dividends to the shareholders. Therefore, a warrant 
holder will exercise if
+ * 1) * * / .  K; >0 ,  i = R,S  (1.10)
This can be rewritten as
i = R,S  (1.10’)
1-7 ,
So, given risk neutrality and limited liability, the Es seek to maximise:
U,(X,. . D,,B„K,) = n(B,)Min{(\- tj,)(X ,-D , + K,),Max[(X, -D,),0]} + 5 ,(U 1 )
where Ui is the expected utility of an E of type i when choosing the contract 
E, = (77,, D{ ,K i). Similarly, given limited liability, the expected profit of an F 
offering the contract E, = {rji, Di, Ki) is given by:
more than two types. In this case, it is possible that adverse selection leads to overinvestment but an 
improvement in social welfare.
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PF =x(B,)Max{?1,(X ,-D ,  + K ,) -K ,  + D„Mm(X„Dl) } - I  (1.12)
To make the analysis interesting, we assume that the exercise price is set such that, in 
case of success, the option is exercised regardless of the type of the project. That is, 
the exercise price is given by:
K, = - ^ — (l-(/,)(X s -D ,)  where <//, e [0 ,1], i = R,S  (1.13)
! - V,
Eq. (1.13) is a sufficient condition for the warrants issued by both types to be 
exercised in case of success.41 Furthermore, without loss of generality, we assume 
V r =Vs = V Z  [0.1].42 Basically, this assumption reduces the choice variables 
(signals) from three (tj,D,K) to two (rj,D). The choice of 77 and D completely 
determines K . By doing so, we considerably simplify the analysis without losing any 
insight.43 Using (1.13) and the assumption about y /, the utility and profit functions 
simplify respectively to:
Ul(X„T,l,Dl,B„K,) = x(B,)[(l-nl) ( X , - D l) + ntQ -V ') (X s -D lj\+B, (1.14)
PF = - D , ) - ( \ - ¥ )(Xs -£> ,)]+ /> ,}-/ (1.15)
1.5.1 Indifference Curves, Effort Incentive and Revelation Constraints
A given contract will induce the high effort level if
(1-  l)(Xi - D  + K)>c,  (1.16)
41 This condition is imposed for simplicity. All results go through if instead of X s in Eq. (1.13) we
had X R or even if we specified a different function for the exercise of the warrant issued by each type. 
However, these modifications would complicate the analysis without adding any insight.
42 A combination of debt and equity is a special case of a debt-warrant combination that obtains for 
y/R=y/s = 1.
43 No more than two choice variables are necessary for our purposes. Clearly, all the results go through 
if we increase their number to three by allowing for y/ R ^ y/ s .
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So, the equations of the effort incentive frontiers ICFS and ICFR are given 
respectively by:
(1 - V, tj) ( X s - D )  = cs (1.17)
(1 -  \f/r]){XR - D ) -  7(1 -  y/)(XR - X s ) = cR (1.18)
The family of indifference curves of type i can be derived from (1.14). The 
indifference curves have the same slope as the corresponding effort incentive 
frontiers. As a result, no indifference curve of type i crosses ICFj and therefore the 
indifference curves do not exhibit kinks in the (rj,D) space. For each type, one of the 
indifference curves coincides with the corresponding ICF.
Finally, for any given pair of contracts ER = (rjR, DR ) and Es = (rjs , Ds ) the 
revelation constraints are:
where Ut , / = R ,S , is given by Eq. (1.14).
Lemma 9: In the (rj,D) space:
a) ICFr and ICFS are downward sloping and strictly concave with slopes:
Ur(Er)> U r(Es ) (1.19)
Us (Es )> U s (Er ) ( 1.20)
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That is, at any (i j ,D) pair, ICFR is flatter than ICFS.
b) If cR > cs and X R- c R > X s -  cs , then for myy/ g  [0,min|y ,1]], ICFR and ICFS 
intersect at some (1 > rj > 0, D > 0). Otherwise, either ICR a  ICS or ICS <z ICR.
where W m V ' - x , » - c s / x s )
( X , - c , ) - ( . X s - c s)
c) The indifference curves of the R- and S-type have the same slope as the 
corresponding effort incentive frontiers.
Proof: See Appendix 1A.
Since X R > X s , one of the conditions (cR >cs ) for the intersection of ICFR and 
ICFS to occur at some admissible value of the two choice variables {if and D)  in this 
case, is weaker than under a combination of debt and equity (cR/ X R > cs / X s ) .
Intuitively, since X R > X s , at any given (if,D) pair, a given fall in y/ (increase in 
the exercise price) implies that the project’s return constitutes a smaller proportion of 
the total payment to the warrantholder if the warrant is issued by the S-type. That is, 
as the exercise price rises, the warrant value falls faster for the S-type and so the S- 
type is willing to increase faster the proportion of equity, i f , offered to the financier 
than the R-type while still exerting effort.44 As a result, for y/ sufficiently low 
(y/ <y/), ICFS and ICFR intersect at some positive face value of debt, D, even if
this is not possible when we restrict ourselves to debt and equity.
As far as the indifference curves are concerned, in the (if,D) space, that of the R- 
type is flatter. Intuitively, regardless of the assumption about the distribution of 
returns, at any given pair, the warrant is more valuable for the R-type and debt 
for the S-type (even if, in absolute terms, both debt and the warrant issued by the S- 
type are more valuable). As a result, the R-type is willing to accept a greater increase
44 Diagrammatically, in the (1],D) space, as y/ falls ICFS becomes steeper faster than ICFR.
49
in D in exchange for a given reduction in 77 than the S-type. That is, the single­
crossing condition is satisfied.
1.5.2 Zero-profit Lines
The expected profit of an F offering a contract (rj,D) is given by (1.15). Given 
Assumption 1, the zero-profit line corresponding to the i-type ( ZP() exists only if the 
i-type exerts effort when he receives funds at fair terms.45 In other words, the 
existence of a zero-profit line (ZP,) requires that it belong to the corresponding set of 
effort incentive compatible contracts (/C,). Conditional on the choice of the high 
effort level there exist three zero-profit lines: that corresponding to the R-type ( ZPR), 
to the S-type ( ZPS), and the pooling zero-profit line (PZPH ).The equations of the 
zero-profit lines ZPS and ZPR are respectively:
Lemma 10 summarises the key properties of the zero-profit lines and their 
relationship with the corresponding indifference curves and effort incentive frontiers.
Lemma 10: In the (77, D) space,
a) All ZPR, ZPS, PZPH are downward sloping and strictly concave with slopes:
45 By Assumption 1, the NPV of both types of projects is strictly positive if the high effort level is 
chosen whereas it is strictly negative if shirking is chosen.
[ W (X S - D )  + D] = I (1.21)
- D )  + (X r - X s )]+D} = I ( 1.22)
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dr) l-yn j
\  dD )  zp y/ (X  s D)
<0
dr£ |  = ___________ {\-y/i])[X7tc + ( \ -X  )n R]___________
KdD)PZPH Zk r[{Xr - X s) + yr{Xs -D)]+{\-X)7rscy,{Xs - D)
< 0
where ( d a ] ( dCX)
(da
> >
\dD) ZPS I dDJPZP„ IdD , ZPR
b) If X R - i / j tr > X s - I / k ^ , then for any y/ e [0,min[^,l]] ZPR and ZPS intersect 
at some (0 < 77 < \,D > 0).
x * (X R- X s )where y /= _ _
{xsc - n Rc )X s
c) ICFi , Uj, and ZPt never cross each other, i = R ,S .
Proof: See Appendix 1A.
That is, the intersection of the zero-profit lines ZPR and ZPS can occur at some 
admissible value of the choice variables (rj and D)  even under mean-reducing 
spreads. Recall that this is not possible if we restrict the contract space to debt and 
equity (see Lemma 7). Intuitively, since X R > X s , at any given (rj,D) pair, a given 
fall in y/ (increase in the exercise price) implies that the project’s return constitutes a 
smaller proportion of the total payment to the warrantholder if the warrant is issued by 
the S-type. That is, as the exercise price rises, the net payoff of a financier offering 
funds to the S-type falls faster. As a result, the increase in the proportion of equity, rj, 
required in order for the financier to just break even is greater if the warrant is issued 
by the S-type.46 For y/ sufficiently low (y/ <y/), ZPS and ZPR intersect at some 
positive face value of debt, D , even if this is not possible when we restrict ourselves
46 Diagrammatically, in the {tj ,D )  space, as y/ falls ZPS becomes steeper faster than ZPR.
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to debt and equity. In other words, for a sufficiently high exercise price the warrant 
issued by the R-type becomes more valuable than that of the S-type even if the S-type 
equity is more valuable.
In general, the intersection of the effort incentive frontiers and the zero-profit lines 
of the two types at some admissible value for both choice variables requires weaker 
conditions under debt coupled with a warrant than under a combination of debt and 
equity. This has important implications for the fair pricing of the securities issued 
under pure adverse selection and the restrictions on the parameter values required for 
the existence of the socially efficient pooling equilibrium under adverse selection and 
(effort) moral hazard. Below we consider each case separately.
1.5.3 The Pure Adverse Selection Case
In this case, as we have seen, no effort incentive constraint is binding and so all 
three zero-profit lines ZPR, ZPS and PZPH exist.47 Therefore, both separating and 
pooling equilibria can exist. Moreover, given that the single-crossing condition is 
satisfied and, by appropriately choosing y/ , ZPS and ZPR can intersect at some
admissible value of the choice variables, a “reasonable” pooling equilibrium can exist 
only if it does not involve cross-subsidisation across types.
Under pure adverse selection, the face value of debt and the proportion of equity 
(or exercise price) jointly serve as signals conveying socially costless information 
about the type of the project. Hence, in any pooling equilibrium where cross- 
subsidisation takes place, the subsidiser has an incentive to deviate by issuing more of 
the less valuable for him security. By doing so, he can credibly signal his type, reduce 
the cross-subsidisation and increase his expected return. As a result, no pooling 
equilibrium involving cross-subsidisation can sustain. That is, in any equilibrium 
(pooling or separating) the securities issued are fairly priced not only collectively but 
also individually. Moreover, by choosing y/ < min(^,l), we can achieve full 
separation under mean-preserving, mean-increasing and mean-reducing spreads. 
However, if the risky project dominates the safe one by first-order stochastic 
dominance, regardless of the value of y/ , there exists a pooling equilibrium where
47 It can be easily shown that the results of Lemmas 4, 5, and 6 and Propositions 1 and 2 hold true 
regardless of the form of the contract.
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both types issue only debt as well as a continuum of separating equilibria where the 
R-type issues only debt whereas the S-type issues a debt-warrant combination. More 
formally,
Proposition 5: If 7uicX i -  I  > n'ccn i = R,S  and X R - i / ^ c  > %s ~ ^ l7Cc » ^ en f°r 
any y/ e [0 ,min[(/>,l]] there always exist equilibria (pooling or separating) where both 
types of projects obtain funds and the securities issued are fairly priced regardless of 
the distributional assumption. In particular,
a) If the risky projects dominate the safe projects by first-order stochastic 
dominance, there exists a pooling equilibrium where both types issue only debt as 
well as a continuum of separating equilibria where the R-type issues only debt 
whereas the S-type issues a debt-warrant combination.
b) If the risky projects are mean-preserving, mean-increasing, or mean-reducing 
spreads of the safe ones, there exists a continuum of separating equilibria (as well 
as a pooling equilibrium) where both types issue a debt-warrant combination with
1R ^ Is  and Dr >Ds .
Proof: Similar to Proposition 3 (see Figure 1.6).
Intuitively, full revelation requires that debt be more valuable for the S-type and the 
warrant for the R-type not only in relative but also in absolute terms.48 If these two 
conditions are met the S-type can credibly reveal his type by choosing a contract 
involving low face value of debt and a warrant with very high exercise price (a high 
proportion of equity is offered to the financier). The R-type has no incentive to mimic 
because the cost from the underpricing of such a warrant exceeds the gains from 
issuing a little overpriced debt. The first condition is satisfied under all four 
distributional assumptions. By appropriately choosing the warrant exercise price, the 
second condition can also be satisfied even under mean-reducing spreads.
48 The first (single-crossing) condition allows agents to send a credible signal while the second rules 
out pooling equilibria where only the less valuable for the subsidiser security is issued (comer 
solutions).
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If the risky projects dominate the safe ones by first-order stochastic dominance, 
debt of given face value issued by both types is equally valuable but the warrant 
issued by the R-type is more valuable. Hence, in order to avoid subsidising the S-type, 
in any equilibrium, the R-type issues only debt and debt issued is fairly priced. As a 
result, the S-type is indifferent between issuing just debt (pooling equilibrium) and 
any debt-warrant combination along ZPS (separating equilibria). Therefore, there can
exist a pooling equilibrium where only debt is issued as well as a continuum of 
separating equilibria where the R-type issues just debt whereas the S-type issues a 
debt-warrant combination along ZPS.
In summary, under pure adverse selection, a debt-warrant combination allows us to 
obtain equilibria (pooling or separating) where the securities issued are fairly priced 
even if it is not possible when we restrict ourselves to debt, equity and/or convertible 
debt.49 This result provides a rationale for the use of warrants.
1.5.4 The Adverse Selection cum Moral Hazard Case
In this subsection, we show that a debt-warrant combination allows for the existence 
of the socially efficient pooling equilibrium under weaker restrictions on parameter 
values than a debt-equity combination. For expositional simplicity, we only consider
49 Recall that if we restrict ourselves to debt and equity under mean-reducing spreads there exists a 
unique pooling equilibrium where only equity is issued and the S-type subsidises the R-type through 
the mispricing of equity at individual level.
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the case where, at any given identical effort level, the risky project dominates the safe 
one by first-order stochastic dominance (see Appendix IB for a generalisation of 
Proposition 6 ). Also, if both types are offered fimds at fair terms, the S-type shirks 
whereas the R-type exerts effort.
Proposition 6: Suppose the risky projects dominate the safe ones by first-order 
stochastic dominance ( X R > X s , n* -  n s} = n} , j  = C,0) and n ^ X R -  I  > n*cR,
n scX s - 1 < n sccs . Then for any y/ < yr and A>A2 , then there exists a unique
pooling (funding) equilibrium where both types exert effort and obtain funds by 
issuing a debt-warrant combination (see Figure 1.7b).
where ^  7  cs)-------
x Z ( X , - c , ) - x sc ( Xs - c s)
The equilibrium contract, A = lies at the intersection of ICFS and PZPH
with rj* and D* given by:
(. = I - U x ' + Q - Q r i l X s - c , )  . .
X ^ ( X S - X S)
D' = X s - c s l ( \ - ¥ n ')  (1.24)
Proof: Similar to Proposition 4 (see Figure 1.7b).
To illustrate the role of warrants, we graphically compare the case where the firms can 
issue a debt-equity combination with the case they issue a debt-warrant combination 
(see Figures 1.7a and 1.7b). By Lemma 8 , if firms can only issue debt and equity, 
under this distributional assumption, ICFS lies entirely below ICFR. Also, because 
the R-type equity is more valuable, as his proportion in the population of 
entrepreneurs, A , decreases the pooling zero-profit line PZPH becomes steeper and 
intersects ICFS at points corresponding to a higher proportion of equity. A necessary
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condition for the existence of the efficient pooling equilibrium is that PZPH both 
intersects ICFS and lies below ICFR (PZPH is constructed conditional on both types 
exerting effort). If X falls below Xl , PZPH lies entirely above ICFS and so it is not 
relevant (see Figure 1.7a). As a result, the socially efficient pooling equilibrium 
collapses although the R-type would exert effort even if a higher proportion of equity 
was issued.
Because the warrant value falls with the exercise price faster for the S-type, as the 
warrant exercise price rises both ICFS and PZPH become steeper but ICFS becomes 
so at a higher rate. As a result, for a sufficiently high exercise price, ICFS and PZPH 
meet again and the existence of the socially efficient pooling equilibrium is restored 
(see Figure 1.7b). That is, a debt-warrant combination allows for the existence of the 
efficient pooling equilibrium even if it collapses when firms can issue only debt and 
equity.
Intuitively, in this case, if firms can only issue debt and equity, at any given debt 
level, the proportion of equity issued consistent with exerting effort is strictly lower 
for the S-type. That is, the pooling equilibrium where both types exert effort may 
collapse although the R-type would have exerted effort even if a higher proportion of 
equity was issued (more subsidy was given to the S-type). Because the warrant value 
falls with the exercise price (proportionately) faster for the S-type, the S-type is 
willing to increase faster the proportion of equity offered to the financier than the R-
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type while still exerting effort. Thus, because in absolute terms the warrant issued by 
the S-type is less valuable than his equity, the warrant payoff function between X R 
and X s can be steeper than the equity payoff function without violating the S-type
effort incentive constraint. This implies that the difference between the value of the 
warrants issued by the R- and S-type exceeds the corresponding difference of equity 
values consistent with both types working. This larger difference allows for the 
provision of the subsidy necessary to induce the S-type to work when the proportion 
of the R-type is so low that the socially efficient pooling equilibrium breaks if a debt- 
equity combination is used.
The mechanism at work here relies on the fact that the warrant exercise price can 
be chosen independently of (and be greater than) the face value of debt. By choosing a 
sufficiently high exercise price, we can create a sufficiently convex claim which 
allows us to exploit the difference between the returns of the two types of projects and 
satisfy the S-type effort incentive constraint under weaker conditions than if warrants 
were not available. In other words, through the appropriate choice of their exercise 
price, warrants allow for the implementation of the socially efficient outcome even if 
this is not possible when we restrict ourselves to debt, equity and/or convertible 
debt.50 51 This mechanism provides another rationale for their use.
1.6 Optimal Financial Contracts under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
If both the type and the actions of the entrepreneurs were observable (and verifiable), 
both types would exert effort if they were offered funds at fair terms. As a result, the 
net social surplus (social welfare) would be maximised (first best). However, if the 
choice of the effort level is not observable and one of the two types (the S-type) shirks 
if he receives funds at fair terms, the implementation of the socially efficient outcome
50 In our model, convertible debt does not improve on a debt-equity combination. If convertible debt is 
used , the exercise price of the option coincides with the face value of debt. This implies that if debt is 
converted into equity, the payment to the shareholders consists only of the project’s return. As a result, 
the maximum proportion of equity offered to the financiers consistent with the S-type working is 
exactly the same as under a debt-equity combination. In contrast, if a debt-warrant combination is used, 
the total payment to the shareholders, if the option is exercised, consists of two components: i) the 
project’s return and ii) the difference between the warrant exercise price and the face value of debt 
(which can be positive). Hence, the maximum proportion of equity issued consistent with the S-type 
working can be greater than under a debt-equity combination.
51 If the roles of the two types reverse and so the required cross-subsidisation takes place through the 
mispricing of debt, a debt-warrant combination does not improve on a debt-equity combination.
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requires cross-subsidisation across types. In this section, we address the following 
question: Can competitive financial markets implement the socially efficient outcome 
under the same conditions as a benevolent central authority (social planner) who aims 
at maximising social welfare?
Competitive financiers have no incentive to transfer resources from the R-type to 
the S-type to induce the latter to exert effort. Therefore, if types are observable or can 
be credibly revealed, they offer funds only to the R-type and so competitive markets 
cannot maximise social welfare. In a competitive environment, the implementation of 
the first-best solution can be achieved only in a pooling equilibrium where the 
required cross-subsidisation takes place through the mispricing of the R-type’s more 
valuable security (equity). We begin by characterising the social planner’s solution 
(the optimal contract) under adverse selection and effort moral hazard.
1.6.1 The Social Planner’s Solution: The Optimal Contract
The social planner’s objective is to induce both types to exert effort whenever 
feasible. Hence, the social planner will offer the S-type the required subsidy even if he 
can distinguish the two types, provided the R-type effort incentive constraint is not 
violated. Since the returns of the two types in case of success are different, observable 
and verifiable, the social planner can ex post distinguish the two types and promise to 
offer them funds at fair terms. Moreover, he can commit to making direct lump-sum 
transfers, r , from the R-type to the S-type so that the S-type effort incentive 
constraint and the social planner feasibility constraint are just binding, and the R-type 
effort incentive constraint is not violated. Mathematically,
(X s - I / x sc - ts ) = cs (1.25)
(X R — If' 7UC —tr) > cr (1-26)
Jlx£rR + (1 -  X)ttscts = 0 (1.27)
Solving (1.25) and (1.26) for rs and xR respectively and substituting into (1.27), we 
obtain:
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X>  /  n c ( ^ 5  cs )____
n C  i - ^ R  ~ c r) ~  * c  i - ^ s  ~ C s )
rn Xsp = /L ( 1.28)
Where Xsp is the minimum proportion of the R-type (subsidiser) in the population of 
entrepreneurs consistent with both types exerting effort. In fact, it is the only 
restriction on the parameter values the social planner faces in his attempt to 
implement the socially efficient outcome. That is, the optimal contract involves the 
resolution of the adverse selection problem and lump-sum transfers.
1.6.2 Implementing the Optimal Contract with Debt, Equity and Warrants
Now that we have characterised the optimal contract, we examine its implementation 
as a competitive equilibrium using financial instruments observed in the real world. 
By Proposition 6 , we know that, if the risky project dominates the safe one by first- 
order stochastic dominance, for any X > X2 = Xsp there exists a pooling equilibrium 
where both types exert effort and receive funds by issuing a debt-warrant 
combination. That is, the only restriction on parameter values required for the 
existence of the socially efficient pooling equilibrium is that the social planner also 
faces. Therefore, under this distributional assumption, debt coupled with a warrant 
can implement the optimal contract as a competitive equilibrium.
This really strong result relies on two factors: First, the fact that warrants allow for 
the intersection of the two effort incentive frontiers at some admissible value of the 
two choice variables, the proportion of equity, 77, and the face value of debt. This, in 
turn, implies that the socially efficient pooling equilibrium exists until the proportion 
of the R-type becomes so low that it is impossible to satisfy both effort incentive 
constraints. This is exactly the constraint the social planner faces. Second, the specific 
distributional assumption which ensures that the socially efficient pooling equilibrium 
Pareto-dominates any other equilibrium even if both effort incentive constraints are 
just binding. In other words, the R-type’s benefit from inducing the S-type to exert 
effort through the mispricing of warrants more than offsets the incremental subsidy 
(relative to the all-debt equilibrium where the S-type shirks) even if the total subsidy 
is so high that the R-type effort incentive constraint is just binding.
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Under any other distributional assumption and/or a debt-equity combination, the 
existence of the socially efficient pooling equilibrium requires additional restrictions 
on the parameter values (see Propositions 1B.1 and IB.2). If the two effort incentive 
frontiers, ICFS and ICFR, intersect at some admissible value of the choice variables
(see Lemmas 1 and 9) X > X2 = Xsp is still a necessary condition for the existence of 
the socially efficient pooling equilibrium. However, for some X > X2 = Xsp this 
equilibrium collapses because the cost for the R-type of providing the S-type with a 
higher subsidy exceeds the benefit from inducing him to exert effort. The resulting 
pooling equilibrium involves the issue of just debt (comer solution) and the S-type 
shirking.
Notice, however, that because the social planner does not face the latter constraint, 
whenever ICFS and ICFR, intersect at some admissible value of the choice variables,
he can implement the optimal contract using a debt-equity or a debt-warrant 
combination.
1.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analysed and discussed the roles of debt, equity and warrants 
under adverse selection and (effort) moral hazard. Several interesting results were 
obtained. First, we explained the issue of combinations of debt and equity as the 
outcome of the interaction between adverse selection and moral hazard. Firms accept 
to incur the adverse selection cost of issuing equity because this cost is more than 
offset by the benefit from relaxing the moral hazard constraint. Second, we showed 
that, in the presence of moral hazard, adverse selection may result in the conversion of 
a negative into a positive NPV project and an improvement in social welfare. Third, 
we provided two rationales for the use of warrants. Under pure adverse selection, 
warrants can serve as separation devices in cases where other standard securities 
cannot. Under adverse selection cum moral hazard, warrants allow for the 
implementation of the socially efficient outcome even if this is not possible when we 
restrict ourselves to debt, equity and/or convertible debt. Finally, we showed that, 
under certain conditions, a debt-warrant combination can implement the optimal 
contract as a competitive equilibrium.
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Our focus on a two-type model allowed us to illustrate the effects of the interaction 
between adverse selection and moral hazard and the mechanism that necessitates the 
use of warrants in the simplest possible way. Under certain conditions, most results 
should obtain if we extend the model to allow for more than two types. For example, 
under pure adverse selection, a debt-warrant combination allows for the existence of 
equilibria (separating, partial separating or pooling) where the securities issued are 
fairly priced even if there exist three or more types.
Also, the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 4 (Proposition 6) can obtain if a third 
type is added. What is more, it may exist even if the NPV of the third type project is 
negative regardless of whether he exerts effort or not. However, in such a case, the 
welfare properties of the pooling equilibrium are different. Adverse selection results 
in overinvestment and possibly in a fall in social welfare. This latter result does not 
depend on the number of types, it may obtain even with two types if the project of one 
of them has negative NPV regardless of the effort level.
Another natural extension of the model is to allow for more than two effort levels 
(possibly a continuum) and check the robustness of the results in the adverse selection 
cum moral hazard case. We conjecture that under certain distributional assumptions 
and restrictions on the cost and probability functions, a pooling equilibrium similar to 
those described in Propositions 4 and 6 should obtain. However, the combination of 
financial contracts required for its existence as well as the implementation of the 
optimal contract in this case are interesting open questions.
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Appendix 1A: Proofs of Lemmas 1-3 and 7-10
Proof of Lemma 1
a) By totally differentiating (1.4), we obtain:
- (X, - D ) d a - ( \ - a ) d D  = 0 f do^  
\dD j
1 - a
ICF, Xj D
<0
Taking into account that ICF, implicitly defines a  as a fimction of D , we obtain:
da
'  d 2a \^ 1 - a  t dD _ 2(1 - a )
( X , ~ D f  X >~D { X . - D f
Hence, ICF, is downward sloping and strictly concave. Also, since X R > X s , ICFS 
is steeper than ICFR.
b) The effort incentive frontiers of the R- and S-type are respectively:
(1 - a ) ( X R- D )  = cR (1A.1)
(1 - a ) { X s - D )  = cs (1A.2)
Using (1A.1) and (1A.2) and solving for a  and D we obtain:
Also, D > 0  <=> cR/ X R >cs / X s => cR >cs
Therefore, 1 > a > 0 and D > 0 <=> X R - cR > X s - cs and cR/ X R >cs / X s .
If X R - c R < X s - cs , (the intersection of ICFS with the horizontal axis hes to the 
right of that of ICFR), then because ICFS is steeper than ICFR, at any 0 < a  < 1, 
ICFS lies entirely above ICFR in the (a,D)  space. That is, ICR c  ICS.
If cR/ X R <cs / X s , (the intersection of ICFS with the vertical axis lies below that of 
ICFr ), then because ICFS is steeper than ICFR, at any 0 < a  < 1, ICFS lies entirely 
below ICFr in the (a,D) space. That is, ICS c  ICR.
c) ICF. meets the vertical axis at a t = \ - c j/ X i and the horizontal axis at 
Dt = X, - c j . By Assumption 1, X t > ct and 1 > c J X . . Also, by Part (a) of this 
Lemma, ICF{ is downward sloping and strictly concave. Therefore, ICi cannot be 
empty (See Figure 1.1). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
a) For any 0 < a < l ,  0 < D < R n Eq. (1.1) becomes:
(1A.4)
Differentiating (1A.4), we obtain:
m; = u implicitly defines a  as a function of D and so:
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f— ) 2(l ~ a )
w w  { x t - D y -
Hence, the indifference curves of both the R- and the S-type are downward sloping 
and concave.
b) Since X R > X s , at any (a,D) pair, uR is flatter than us and hence they cross 
only once. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
a) The equations for ZPi and PZPH are respectively:
x ‘c [a(X, -D )  + D] = I , i = R,S  (1A.5)
XnRc [ a ( X K -  D) + D]+ (1 -  X)nsc [a(Xs - D )  + D] = l  (1 A.6)
Differentiating (1A.5) and (1A.6) we obtain the slopes of ZPt and PZPH respectively. 
Since X R > X s and 0 < X < 1, it is obvious that at any given {a, D) pair,
b) By Lemmas 1,2, and 3
d a '| _ f  da^
v dD JiCFj I dD;
'da'] 1 - a  d c-  —  = ------------ < 0 , i = R , S
(=B- {dD)ZPi X.t - D
(1A.7)
Hence, ICFi , ui , ZPt ( i = R,S)  never intersect. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 7
Using (1A.5) and solving for a  and D , we obtain the values of a  and D where 
ZPR and ZPS intersect in the (a,D) space.
£. _ ^(V71c ~ V*c) f) _ ______ 71 c X r - n cx s_______  /'1A8')
X , - X s  ' (Xk - X s) x Z 4 / I - ( 4 - x *)
Notice that X R > X s and n sc > n* imply a  > 0. Also, a  < 1 <=>
(x r - x s ) x £ 4 / i  > n sc -7tc '  Given X R > X s , this condition may be violated only 
under mean-reducing spreads.
That is, in the range of parameters where a  takes on an admissible value, the 
denominator of the equation for D is positive. Hence, D>  0 <=> n * X R '2.7tscX s . 
More analytically,
a) If the risky project dominates the safe one by first-order stochastic dominance 
(;r£ = n sc = n c , X R > X s ), then a -  0, D = / / ^ c > 0. Also, ZPR is flatter than 
ZPS. Hence, for a  > 0 ZPR lies below ZPS in the {a,D) space.
b) If the risky project is a mean-preserving spread of the safe one {n*XR = n scX s), 
then cl — I  I  7TqX  r , D = 0. Hence, since ZPR is flatter than ZPS, for D > 0 ZPS 
lies below ZPR in the (a,D) space.
c) If the risky project is a mean-increasing spread of the safe one {n*XR > n scX s\  
then a > 0, D>  0.
d) If the risky project is a mean-reducing spread of the safe one (7r*XR < 7tscX s ), 
then a >  0 but D < 0. Hence, since ZPR is flatter than ZPS, for D > §  ZPS lies 
below ZPR in the (a,D) space. That is, ZPS and ZPR do not intersect at any 
admissible value of the two choice variables. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 8
C Cа) In this case, n R = / r j , j  = C,0. Hence, cR = — --------= —------   s  cs . Using
— —
(1A.3) we obtain: a  =1, D =-<x>. Also, since ICFS is steeper than ICFR, 
7CS c  7C , .
б ) Here, n RX R - n sj X Si j  = C,0. Hence, csX R =cRX s . Then, (1A.3) implies
0 < a  <1, D =0.  Also, since ICFS is steeper than ICFR, ICS a  ICR. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 9
The equations of the effort incentive frontiers ICFS and ICFR are given respectively 
by:
<\-yni)(Xs - D )  = cs (1A.9)
(1 - yn j XXR- D) - r j { \ - y / ) { XR- X s ) = cR (1A.10)
a) By totally differentiating (1A.9) and (1A.10), we obtain the slopes of ICFS and 
ICFr respectively (the equations are provided in the text). Since X R > X s , at any 
given (tj, D )  pair, ICFS is steeper than ICFR.
b) Solving (1A.9) and (1A.10) for rj and D , we obtain:
—  _ ( ^ R  C R ) ( X s  C s )
X r - * s
(1A.11)
^  (Xs - c s )[XR- ( \ - y , ) X s \ - v ( X R- CR)Xi  
0 ~ W)(.XR — X s ) + y/(cR ~cs )
So, 7j >0 X R cR > X S cs 
ij < 1 <=> cR > cs
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Notice that 77 is independent of y/ . Also, for y/ = 1 the expression for D in (1A.11) 
becomes identical to that in (1A.3). Moreover, for any admissible value of 7 7 , the 
denominator in the expression for D is positive. Hence,
1 > 77 > 0 and D > 0.
If X R- c R < X s -  cs , (the intersection of ICFS with the horizontal axis lies to the 
right of that of ICFR ), then because ICFS is steeper than ICFR, at any 0 < 77 < 1, 
ICFS lies entirely above ICFR in the (77, D) space. That is, ICR <= ICS.
If cR <cs , the intersection of ICFS and ICFR occurs at some 77 > 1 regardless of 
the value of y / . Hence, because ICFS is steeper than ICFR, at any 0 < 77 < 1, ICFS 
lies entirely below ICFR in the (rj,D) space. That is, ICS c: ICR.
c) Setting the utility (Eq. (1.14) in the text) of an E of type i equal to a constant and 
differentiating, we obtain the slopes of the indifference curves which are identical 
to the corresponding slopes of the effort incentive frontiers. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 10
The equations of the zero-profit lines ZPS and ZPR are respectively:
D>  0 o  (Xs - c s)[XR- ( \ - y / ) X s ]>y/(XR- CR)Xs <=>
(X  R cR ) (X  s cs )
(1A.12)
Therefore, if X R - c R > X s - c s and cR >cs , then for any y/ e [0,min[^,l]]
[ w ( X s - D )  + D]=I (1A.13)
{r,]u,(Xs -D )  + ( X k - X sj[+D} = I (1A.14)
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a) By totally differentiating (1A.13) and (1A.14), we obtain the slopes of ZPS and 
ZPR respectively (the equations are provided in the text). Since X R > X s , at any 
given pair, ZPS is steeper than ZPR. Also, since 0 < X < 1,
(rfor'l ( d a '> >
ZPS [dD, PZPH [dD) zp „
b) Solving (1A.13) and (1A.14) for rj and D , we obtain:
/ ( l / ^ - l / ^ )  t _ x rc(X r - X s ) - V(k sc - „ rc )Xs 
X R- X S ’ (Xr - X s ) x * ck scI I - ¥ (x sc - x rc )
a  = (1A.15)
Notice that X R > X s and n sc > n * imply a  > 0. Also, a  <, 1 <=>
X R -  i f  7t* > X s - 1/7tc . Given X R > X s , this condition may be violated only under 
mean-reducing spreads. Also, in the range of parameters where a  takes on an 
admissible value, the denominator of the equation for D is positive. Hence,
D> 0 <=> tt*(Xr - X s) .w < ■ c,v  — = w
(7TSC- 7T*)XS
(1A.16)
Therefore, if X R - 1/7t* > X s -  / / 7tsc , for any y/ e [0,min[^,l]] ZPS and ZPR 
intersect at some admissible value of the two choice variables (0 < tj < 1, D > 0) under 
all four assumptions about the ordering of the distributions of returns.
c) By Lemmas 9 and 10,
'd r £
ydDj ICF, \
f drj 
dD
drA
dD)™
i — R , S , (1A.17)
Hence, ICFi, u,, ZPt ( i = R , S ) never intersect. Q.E.D.
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Appendix IB: Generalisation of Propositions 4 and 6
Proposition 1B.1 (Generalisation of Proposition 4): Suppose the following are true 
k c ^ r  -  I  > n ccR» n c X s ~ l  < nccs » l l nc X R < 1 -  Cs/Xs . Then there exists a 
unique pooling (funding) equilibrium where both types choose the high effort level 
and obtain funds by issuing both debt and equity if either
a) ICS a  ICR, X>Xl and n sc / /r05 > X R/ X S (it is possible if the risky projects
dominate the safe ones by first-order stochastic dominance or they are mean- 
increasing spreads) or
b) X  R- c R > X s - c s , cR/ X R >cs / X s ( ICFr and ICFS intersect), X> X2 and 
n sd n l  > (XR - cR)/{Xs - c s ) (it’s possible only under mean-increasing spreads).
where A, * -- - 1 fv  —  1 ^  Cs)
( ^ X R- x scX s )Q.-cs/ X s ) x * c(.Xr - cr) - x sc(Xs - cs )
The equilibrium contract, A = (a*,£>*), lies at the intersection of ICFS and PZPH 
with a* and D* given by:
. = I - [ u * + Q - X ) x * l x , - c , )  
X x £ ( X „ - X s )
D' = X s - c J ( \ - a ' )  (1B.2)
Proof:
The pooling equilibria described in this proposition exist if the following two 
conditions are satisfied: i) PZPH belongs to the intersection of ICS and ICR for
X < 1 and ii) the R-type indifference curve through the equilibrium contract, uR , does 
not intersect PZPL.
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a +a
ic f ;
ICF,
ICF,
ZP,
>
D 0 D0
lB .la  ICs <zICk
Mean-increasing spreads
lB .lb  /CF» and jCFr intersect
Figure 1B.1
a) In this case, since ICS a  ICR the first condition is satisfied if PZPH crosses 
ICFS . Provided ZPR intersects ICFS { l j n * X R <1 - c s / X s ), by Figures 5 and 
IB. 1, it is clear that PZPH crosses ICFS if the intersection point of PZPH with 
the vertical axis lies below that of ICFS . That is, if
________ I_________  ^  ^  > _____ I  n c (Xs cs)_____ = X,
X s Xn*cX R +( \ - Z ) x scX s {ttrcX r - ttscX s ) ( \ - cs / X s) ~ ^
I  - n sc (Xs - c s ): Minimum subsidy required to induce the S-type to exert effort. 
n * X K -  7tscX s : Expected return differential (given the high effort level is chosen).
1 - c s / X s : Maximum a  e ICS
Regarding the second condition, since X R > X s and 0 < X < 1, at any given (<z,Z>) 
pair, uR is flatter than PZPL. Therefore, it suffices to show that the intersection point 
of uR with the horizontal axis lies to the left of that of PZPL .
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The intersection point of PZPL with the horizontal axis is given by:
D =
Xtt* + (1 -  X )tt{
(1B.3)
Moreover, the expected utility of the R-type in equilibrium is given by:
u ;  =(1 - a ' ) x Rc {XR - D ' )  + b (1B.4)
At a  = 0, the R-type’s expected utility is:
t =*Z(XR- D )  + b (1B.5)
Setting UR = (UR ) gm0 and using the expressions for a* and D *, we obtain:
D = I - ( 1 - Z ) ttsc ( X s - cs )
Xttrc
(1B.6)
Hence, the second condition is satisfied if:
XnR + (l -  X)x{
I - { \ - X ) 7 t sc {Xs - c s )
XnRc
(1B.7)
Let f {k )  = 1 (1 Cs~>
and g(x)  =
XnR + (l -  X)x{
then / ' W  = - l ^ r [ ' - * c ( * s - cs ) ]< 0 , f"(X)  = - ^ T [ l - 4 ( X s - es )]> 0X 71
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Since, by assumption, /  -  n sc (Xs -  cs ) > 0.
Also, g'(;l) = -  °- g .(x}= >0
L^c +( ! “ f  L^c  +( ! “ I
Assuming /r* > > both /(A) and g(X) are strictly decreasing and strictly convex.
Furthrermore, /(A) < g(A) => A < 1 and A > ---- -—Kq----- —— -----= A
( * c  ~ ^ ) ^ y ( x s  ~ c s )  7tn
Since 0 < A < 1, both / ( a )  and g(X) are continuous, strictly decreasing and strictly 
convex, /(A) < g(X) for A > A and /(A ) > g(A) for A < A , then /(A) < g(X) for all 
A g [A,l]. Therefore, uR does not cut PZPL for any A g [a,,i] if and only if:
\  > A o  n l X R <, n scX s (1B.8)
Notice that if the risky projects dominate the safe ones by first-order stochastic 
dominance {n* = n s} ), j  = C,0, this condition is automatically satisfied (by 
Assumption 1). However, under mean-increasing spreads it may be violated. In such a 
case, A, < A and hence the socially efficient pooling equilibrium exists only if 
A > A > Aj.
b) In this case, since PZPH is flatter than ICFS and steeper than ICFR, the first 
condition is satisfied if
a > a  o  l >  „ 1 **c(Xs cs)------- a J  (1B.9)
X c ( X r - c r ) - X c ( X s ~ c s )
Repeating the steps in Part (a), one can show that, for any A g [A2,l], the second 
condition is satisfied if and only if
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Proposition 1B.2 (Generalisation of Proposition 6 ): Suppose the following are true 
tu^ X  R- 1  > x£cR, n scX  s - 1 < k sccy and X R- c R > X s - c s , cR >cs . Then, for
any^ e [0,min|y ,1]], X > and n sc ! n l  ^ (XR - c R) / (Xs - c s ),  then there exists a
unique pooling (funding) equilibrium where both types exert effort and obtain funds 
by issuing a debt-warrant combination (it is possible if the risky projects dominate the 
safe ones by first-order stochastic dominance or they are mean-increasing spreads).
where L m  1 Cs)
Xc ( X r cr ) cs )
The equilibrium contract, A = (rj',D*), lies at the intersection of ICFS and PZPH 
with rj* and D* given by:
. .  I - [ x ^ + ( l - X ) ^ c \ x s - c s )
Z x *( Xs - X s )r,-= 1 c, l , „  (IB.11)
D- = X „ - c J ( \ - Vn1-) (IB.12)
Proof: Similar to Proposition 1B.1.
Notice that if the risky projects dominate the safe ones by first-order stochastic 
dominance we have X R > X s , tt* = k s} = k j , j  = C,0. This implies:
* x r c r  > X s cs
• A  1*1 ^ ( X r ~ cr )KX s ~ cs) x scX s - tt*Xr >C  (always true by
Assumption 1).
Hence, all the conditions, except for X>X2 = Zsp, required for the existence of the 
socially efficient pooling equilibrium are automatically satisfied. The remaining 
condition ( Z > Z 2 = Zsp) is identical to that the social planner faces.
Appendix 1C: Separate Bond and Equity (Warrant) Markets
The analysis in the text assumed that the required amount of funds I is provided by the 
same financier who purchases both debt and equity (warrant). In this appendix, I show 
that all the results go through even if the buyer of debt and the buyer of equity 
(warrant) are different (debt and equity (warrant) markets are separate). It suffices to 
show that the zero-profit lines of an equity-buyer (a warrant-buyer), a bond-buyer and 
a financier purchasing both debt and equity (warrant) coincide. The following 
assumptions are made:
i) The project is indivisible.
ii) Es have no storage technology (cannot lend) and the consumption good is 
perishable.
iii) Bond and equity (warrant) markets are perfectly competitive.
The first assumption implies that the Es borrow at least I. The second implies that no 
E will borrow more than I. Therefore, Es borrow just I. Given these three 
assumptions, we have:
/ „ + / * = /  (1C.1)
P„F = [/Itt* + (1 - /t);zf ] d - / 8  = 0 , j  -  C,0, k = C,0, (1C.2)
PEF = a [ ^ j ( X R - D )  + ( \ - ? ~ ) 4 {X s - D ) ] - I e = 0 (1C.3)
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where I B: Amount the E borrows from the bond-fmancier 
I E: Amount the E borrows from the equity-financier 
PBF : Expected profit of the bond-financier
P E F : Expected profit of the equity-financier 
PF : Expected profit of a financier purchasing both debt and equity
That is, the zero-profit lines of an equity-financier, a bond-financier and a financier 
purchasing both debt and equity coincide. Therefore, the pooling equilibrium of 
Proposition 4 obtains regardless of whether the same investor purchases both debt and 
equity and provides the required amount I or the debt-financier and the equity- 
financier are different (bond and equity markets are separate).
Similar results can be derived for the individual zero-profit lines. Also, all the 
results go through if debt and warrants are issued instead of debt and equity.
Separate Bond and Warrant Markets
The expected returns of the warrants issued by the R- and S-type are respectively 
(using Eq. (1.13) in the text):
Using (1C.1), (1C.2) and (1C.3) we obtain:
l.[aXj(XR -D)  + **£>]+(1 - A)[a^(Xs -D )+^t D]-I
(1C.4)
7 * «[¥ (Xs - D )  + (Xs - X s) l  j  = C,0 (1C.5)
m t v ( x s ~D) ,  k = C,0 (1C.6)
Using Assumptions (i)-(iii) and (1C.5), (1C.6), we have:
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IB + I\V ~~ I (1C.7)
Pbf = [^ y  + ( l - A K 5 ]D - / 5 =0,  j  = C, 0, * = C,0 (1C.8)
-i> ) + (A's - X S) ] + ( 1 - ^ K V ( ^ S --D )} -^  =0  (1C.9)
where I B: Amount the E borrows from the bond-financier
I w : Amount the E borrows from the warrant-financier 
PBF : Expected profit of the bond-financier 
Pur : Expected profit of the warrant-financier 
PF : Expected profit of a financier purchasing both debt and warrants
Using (1C.7), (1C.8) and (1C.9), we obtain:
Axf{ri [¥ ( X s - D )  + (X„  - A j ) ] + £ > } + ( 1 - A)x*[r,¥ ( X s - D )  + D ] - I
That is, the zero-profit lines of a warrant-financier, a bond-financier and a financier 
purchasing both debt and warrants coincide. Therefore, the pooling equilibrium of 
Proposition 6  obtains regardless of whether the same investor purchases both debt and 
the warrant and provides the required amount I or the debt-financier and the warrant- 
financier are different (bond and warrant markets are separate).
The above results show that although the pooling equilibria of Propositions 4 and 6  
involve cross-subsidisation across types, they do not involve cross-subsidisation 
across assets (debt and equity or debt and warrants respectively). That is, in 
equilibrium, the securities issued are fairly priced collectively (because of perfect 
competition). Therefore, a financier will just break even regardless of whether he 
holds one of the securities issued or a combination of them.
(1C.10)
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Chapter 2
Optimism and Insurance 
under Asymmetric Information:
Positive and Welfare Implications
2.1 Introduction
More than two centuries ago in The Wealth o f Nations Adam Smith argued that “The 
chance of gain is by every man more or less over-valued and the chance of loss is by 
most men undervalued” (Smith (1776) Book I, Chapter X). Several recent empirical 
studies both by psychologists and economists validate his claim. They find that the 
majority of people tend to be overoptimistic about their ability and the outcome of 
their actions and underestimate the probability of various risks.52 For example, 
Svenson (1981) finds that 90 percent of the automobile drivers in Sweden consider 
themselves “above average”. Similar results are reported by Rutter, Quine and 
Alberry (1998) for motorcyclists in Britain. On average, motorcyclists both perceive 
themselves to be less at risk than other motorcyclists and underestimate their absolute 
accident probability.53
A large number of papers have investigated the implications of overconfidence and 
unrealistic optimism in securities markets and firm financing.54 In contrast, research 
concerning insurance markets has almost entirely been conducted in the context of the 
standard asymmetric information framework. Insurees know their true accident 
probability but insurance companies cannot observe the type and/or the actions of the 
insuree.55
52 However, there is some evidence that people overestimate their accident probability when it is 
objectively very small (Kahneman and Tversky, (1979)). Also, Viscusi (1990) finds that more 
individuals overestimate the risk of lung-cancer associated with smoking than underestimate it and on 
average they greatly overestimate it. However, the analysis for the case of pessimism is similar and is 
omitted.
53 See Weinstein and Klein (1996) for a survey.
54 See De Bondt and Thaler (1995) for a survey.
55 A notable exception is Villeneuve (2000). He assumes that the insurance company (monopoly) 
knows better the insuree’s accident probability than the insuree himself. The insurer makes a personal
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In line with the empirical evidence, this chapter drops the assumption that all 
insurees have an accurate estimate of their accident probability. It assumes that some 
agents, the optimists, underestimate it and explores the implications both for the 
optimists themselves and their realistic counterparts in the context of an otherwise 
standard competitive asymmetric information framework. More specifically, both the 
optimists (henceforth Os) and the realists (henceforth Rs) are risk averse and have the 
same utility function but differ with respect to their perception of the accident 
probability. All agents can affect their true accident probability by undertaking 
preventive activities. A higher precautionary effort level implies both a lower accident 
probability and a higher utility cost (moral hazard). Except for their misperception of 
the accident probability, the Os are rational agents who aim at maximising their 
(perceived) utility and understand the nature and implications of market interactions.
The first question we seek to address is under what conditions the presence of the 
Os affects the choices of the Rs and vice versa? It is shown that if the degree of 
optimism is sufficiently high there exist separating equilibria where the Os not only 
take fewer precautions (high-risk type) but also purchase less insurance than the Rs 
and both types choose the contract they would have chosen if types were observable. 
That is, because the Os considerably underestimate their accident probability, their 
presence has no effect on the choices of the Rs. For lower levels of optimism, 
depending on whether the Os are more or less willing to take precautions,56 either the 
Os or the Rs are quantity-constrained.57 If optimism encourages precautionary effort, 
the Os themselves are quantity-constrained whereas the Rs make the same choices as 
under full information about types. If the Os put less effort into reducing their risk 
exposure, the roles of the two types are reversed.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, optimism itself does not necessarily lead to 
the purchase of less insurance. If types are observable and optimism encourages 
precautionary effort, the effect of the lower per unit price may more than offset the 
effect of the underestimation of the accident probability and result in the Os 
purchasing more insurance than the Rs. However, if types are hidden, the presence of
offer conveying information to the insuree. The insuree interprets the signal and can accept or reject the 
offer.
56 Although, the Os underestimate their accident probability, they may either overestimate or 
underestimate its decrease from taking precautions and so be more or less willing to take precautions.
57 If a type is “quantity-constrained” in equilibrium, it means that he purchases less insurance than he 
would have purchased under full information about types.
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the Rs makes this choice infeasible. The amount of insurance offered at the low per 
unit price is restricted by the Rs’ revelation and effort incentive constraints.
The second part of the chapter deals with the welfare properties of the laissez-faire 
equilibria described above. Because some of the insurees, the Os, underestimate their 
accident probability, the definition of the efficiency of the equilibrium is not 
straightforward. The very presence of the Os raises the question of what is the 
appropriate efficiency criterion. Should we employ objective probabilities (true 
expected utility) or subjective probabilities (perceived expected utility)? The answer 
depends crucially on the origin of the agents’ biased estimate. In our environment, the 
different estimates of the same risk arise because of different perceptions not because 
of different underlying preferences. Both the Os and the Rs have identical 
preferences. Hence, the preferences revealed by the insuree’s choices coincide with 
the true underlying preferences. Therefore, the appropriate efficiency criterion seems 
to be objective rather than subjective probabilities.
Given this criterion, it is possible to find intervention policies that yield strict 
Pareto gains. If the Rs are quantity-constrained, then a tax on insurance purchase 
would result in the Os going uninsured, relax their revelation constraint and 
potentially lead to a strict Pareto gain. In contrast, if the Os are quantity-constrained, 
this logic does not apply. Any attempt to drive out the Rs so as to mitigate the 
negative externality their presence creates would first drive out the Os. Thus, it would 
be harmful for the Rs who would pay the tax without gaining anything.
However, if the proportion of the Os is sufficiently high, an intervention scheme 
involving a combination of minimum coverage requirements, taxes and subsidies 
would lead to a strict Pareto improvement. In the resulting pooling equilibrium the Os 
subsidise the Rs but purchase more insurance and both types are strictly better off. 
Because the proportion of the Os is high, the improvement in their true welfare from 
the higher coverage more than offsets the welfare losses due to the higher per unit 
premium. If neither type is quantity-constrained in the laissez-faire equilibrium, the 
latter policy can result in the Os purchasing more insurance, at the same per unit price, 
while the Rs being unaffected. Because the Os were underinsured, they become better 
off and so a strict Pareto improvement is achieved.
These results provide a justification for the imposition of minimum coverage 
requirements in insurance markets. However, the imposition of minimum standards 
only may not achieve the desired outcome. Because the Os underestimate their
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accident probability, their perceived utility in the pooling equilibrium may be lower 
than at the allocation without insurance. As a result, they may go uninsured and so be 
worse off than in the laissez-faire equilibrium. In contrast, a combination of minimum 
standards, taxes and subsidies would result in the Os purchasing the pooling contract 
and so being strictly better off. In fact, Finkelstein (2002) finds that the imposition of 
minimum standards in the US private health insurance market resulted in a decline in 
the proportion of people with coverage of about 25 percent. Our results suggest that in 
order for minimum coverage requirements to achieve their objective, they should be 
accompanied by a mix of taxes and subsidies.
Finally, intervention schemes involving minimum coverage requirements can be 
used to create a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when otherwise none would exist. The 
imposition of the minimum standards renders contracts involving less coverage 
unattractive and so the equilibrium sustains.
Most obviously, our model is closely related to the standard competitive 
asymmetric-information models of insurance markets. Following the seminal 
Rothschild-Stiglitz paper (1976), a huge literature has developed including models of 
pure moral hazard (e.g. Amott and Stiglitz (1988)) as well as models of adverse 
selection cum moral hazard (e.g. Stewart (1994), Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997), 
de Meza and Webb (2001) and Chiappori et.al. (2002)). Despite the large number of 
characteristics our model shares with these models, there are important differences in 
their predictions.
First, if, in equilibrium, all agents purchase strictly positive coverage, standard 
models predict a positive relationship between coverage and the (average) ex post risk 
of the buyer of the contract. On the contrary, if optimism discourages precautionary 
effort, in our framework there exist separating equilibria where the Os not only take 
fewer precautions and so have a higher accident probability but also purchase less 
insurance at a higher per unit price. Thus, our approach can simultaneously explain 
both puzzling empirical findings of Cawley and Philipson (1999): i) that insurance 
premiums display quantity discounts and ii) the negative correlation between 
coverage and risk, while standard models cannot.58
Second, although the positive results of the imposition of minimum coverage 
requirements in standard asymmetric information models are similar to ours, the
58 See Chapter 3 for a extensive treatment of this issue.
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welfare results are quite different. In the standard model, social welfare may be higher 
in the resulting pooling equilibrium but the safe type (the quantity-constrained) is 
strictly worse off. In contrast, in our model, both types are strictly better off in the 
pooling equilibrium arising after the intervention. Therefore, our approach provides a 
more convincing justification for the imposition of minimum coverage requirements 
than standard models as well as a case for the use of taxes and subsidies in insurance 
markets.
Many applications of optimism and overconfidence can be found in the burgeoning 
field of behavioural finance. DeLong et al. (1990, 1991) show that optimistic noise- 
traders can make higher profits than rational traders. If traders are risk averse, the 
unpredictability of noise traders’ beliefs deters rational traders from betting against 
them even if prices diverge significantly from fundamental values. De Meza and 
Southey (1996) and Manove and Padilla (1999) analyse the credit-market problems 
arising from the presence of overoptimistic entrepreneurs. Barberis, Schleifer, and 
Vishny (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) explore the 
implications of investor overconfidence in securities markets.
We proceed as follows: In Section 2, we present the basic framework. Section 3 
develops the analytical tools. Section 4 provides some examples of the pooling and 
separating equilibria that exist in this framework. Section 5 deals with the welfare 
properties of these equilibria. Section 6 explores the possibility of restoring the 
existence of equilibrium by intervening in cases where the non-existence problem 
arises. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2.2 The Model
There are two states of nature: good and bad. In the good state there is no loss 
whereas in the bad state the individual (insuree) suffers a gross loss of D. Before the 
realisation of the state of nature all individuals have the same wealth level, W. Also, 
all individuals are risk averse and have the same utility function but differ with 
respect to their perception of the probability of suffering the loss. There are two types 
of individuals, the Rs and the Os. The Rs have an accurate estimate of their true loss 
probability whereas the Os underestimate it.
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Furthermore, all agents can affect the true loss probability by undertaking 
preventive activities. Given the level of precautionary effort, the true loss probability 
is the same for both types. We examine the case where agents either take precautions 
or not (two effort levels). If an individual of type i, (i = 0,R) ,  takes precautions 
(Fi =F),  he incurs a utility cost of F  and his true probability of avoiding the loss 
p(Ft) is p F. If he takes no precautions (Ff =0), his utility cost is 0 but his true 
probability of avoiding the loss p(Ft) is p 0, where p F > p 0.
Now, let p ‘ = p{Fi,Ki) be the (perceived) probability function. Where K t is the 
degree of optimism and takes two values: 1 for the Rs (KR = 1), and K  > 1 for the 
Os (K0 = K > 1). This probability function is assumed to be strictly increasing both 
in Fj and K r  As a result, the following relationships are true:
P j  = P( f r >k r) = P( f r >!) = P( f r ) = P j > j  = F >0 (2.1)
P °  = P(Fo , K 0 ) = P (Fo>K ) >  P(Fo) = Pj> j  = F $  (2.2)
where pj  is the true probability of avoiding the loss.
In this environment, the (perceived) expected utility of an agent i is given by:
EUt(Ft,K, ,y , , A, , W) = p]U{W - y) + (1 -  p))U(W - D  + ( A -  l)y) - Ft ,
j  = F, 0 i = 0 , R  (2.3)
where W: insuree’s initial wealth
D : gross loss 
y: insurance premium 
(A -1  )y : net payout in the event of loss, A > 1
Ay : coverage (gross payout in the event of loss)
Hence, the increase in (perceived) expected utility from taking precautions is:
^ = ( p ‘F - p l0\ ^ - y ) - U { W - D  + ( X - l ) y ) \ - F ,  i = 0,R  (2.4)
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where U is strictly concave and W - y , W - D  +(A- 1 )y are the wealth levels in the 
good and the bad state respectively.
There are two risk neutral insurance companies involved in Bertrand competition. 
Insurance companies know the true accident probability (given the precautionary 
effort level) and the perceived accident probabilities of the Os and Rs but they can 
observe neither the type nor the actions of each insuree. They also know the cost for 
the insuree corresponding to each precautionary effort level, the utility function of the 
insurees and the proportion of the Os and Rs in the population.
The insurance contract (y, Ay) specifies the premium y  and the coverage Ay. As 
a result, since insurance companies have an accurate estimate of the true accident 
probability, the expected profit of an insurer offering such a contract is:
x  = P j y - ( l -  Pj X* ~ i)y > j  = F >° (2'5>
Equilibrium
Insurance companies and insurees play the following two-stage screening game:
Stage 1: The two insurance companies simultaneously make offers of sets of
contracts (y, Ay) . Each insurance company may offer any finite number of contracts. 
Stage 2: Given the offers made by the insurers, insurees apply for at most one contract 
from one insurance company. If an insuree’s most preferred contract is offered by 
both insurance companies, he takes each insurer’s contract with probability 'A. The 
terms of the contract chosen determine whether the insuree will take unobservable 
precautions.
We only consider pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). Depending 
on parameter values, three kinds of equilibria can arise: separating, full-pooling and 
partial-pooling.59
A pair of contracts z0 = (y0 ,A0y 0) and zR = (yR,A,Ry R) is an equilibrium if the 
following conditions are satisfied:
59 In some cases, a non-existence problem similar to that in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) arises.
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i) The revelation constraints
(2.6a)
(2.6b)
EUR(zR)> EUR(z0)
EU0(z0) > EU0(zr )
ii) The effort incentive constraints 
F  if A, > 0, i = 0 ,R  
0 otherwise
with A; defined in (2.4).
iii) The participation (or IR) constraints of both types:
E U f a ^ E U f a ) ,  i = 0,R  (2.6c)
where z0 = (y, Ay) = (0,0)
iv) Profit maximisation for insurance companies:
■ No contract in the equilibrium pair (z0, zR) makes negative expected 
profits.
■ No other set of contracts introduced alongside those already in the 
market would increase an insurer’s expected profits.
2.3 Diagrammatic Analysis
Let H = W - y  and L = W -  D + (X -  l)y denote the income in the good and bad 
state respectively of an insuree who has chosen the contract (y,Xy). Let also H  = W
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and L = W - D  denote the endowment of an insuree after the realisation of the state 
of nature.
2.3.1 Effort Incentive Constraints
Let us first consider the moral hazard problem an insuree of type i faces. A given 
contract (y,Ay) will induce an agent of type i to take precautions if
( p ‘ f- P ‘A U ( H ) - U ( L ) ] > F  o  a , s o ,  i = 0 ,R (2.7)
Let PjP' be the locus of combinations (L, H) such that A; = 0. Since F , U' > 0, 
the P,P/ locus lies entirely below the 45° line in the (L, H) space. This locus divides 
the (L, H) space into two regions: On and below the P,P/ locus the insurees take 
precautions (this is the set of effort incentive compatible contracts) and above it they 
do not. The slope and the curvature of PtPl in the (L, H) space are given respectively 
by:
dL
dH
U'jH)
U'(L)
>0 since U’>0 (2 .8)
d 2L U \ H )
p,p; U'(L)
(2.9)
U”(L)where A(L) = -----------is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
U\L)
Since both types have the same utility function, it is clear from the above formulas 
that the shape of P.P’ is independent of the type of the insuree. In addition, P.P,' is 
upward sloping. Also if £/(•) exhibits either increasing or constant absolute risk 
aversion P(P! is strictly concave. If U(•) exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, it
85
can be either concave or convex. (See Appendix 2A for a necessary and sufficient 
condition in order for P t f  to be strictly convex).
However, the position of P,P/ does depend upon the insuree’s type. Above we
assumed that the perceived probability of avoiding the accident is strictly increasing 
in both the degree of optimism and the precautionary effort level. That is, at any given 
preventive effort level, the higher the degree of optimism, the greater the 
underestimation of the true accident probability. Also, given the degree of optimism, 
the higher the preventive effort level, the lower the perceived accident probability. 
However, these two restrictions do not imply that a given increase in the preventive 
effort level will have a greater effect on the perceived accident probability if the 
degree of optimism is higher. In other words, although the Os underestimate their 
accident probability at any given precautionary effort level, they may either 
overestimate or underestimate the decrease in that probability from choosing a higher 
preventive effort level. If the Os underestimate the decrease in their accident 
probability from taking precautions, that is, if
Pf - P o >P°f - P o (Case 1)
then, PRP'R lies to the left of P0P'0 . In other words, the Rs’ set of effort incentive 
compatible contracts is strictly greater than that of the Os. If
P f ~ Po < P ° -  Po (Case 2)
PRP'R lies to the right of P0P'0 and the Rs’ set of effort incentive compatible contracts
is smaller.60 Intuitively, given the incremental utility cost of a higher precautionary 
effort level, the greater the increase in the perceived probability of avoiding the loss 
from doing so, the more willing one would be to take precautions.
60 Here, we implicitly assume that the Os either underestimate (case 1) or overestimate (case 2) the 
decrease in their accident probability from taking precautions regardless of the degree of optimism. 
However, it is also possible that the Os may underestimate the decrease in their accident probability 
from taking precautions if the degree of optimism is low and overestimate it at higher levels of 
optimism or vice versa. The comparative statics with respect to the degree of optimism in Section 2.4 
below are conducted under the assumption that the direction of the inequality in cases 1 and 2 does not 
change as the degree of optimism changes. The analysis for the two cases where the direction of the 
inequality reverses as the degree of optimism changes is similar and is omitted as it does not produce 
any new insight.
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Some empirical findings suggest that the former case is, in practice, more 
relevant.61 However, in principle, both cases are possible and are analysed below.
To make the analysis more interesting, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: (pF - p'0)\u(H)-U(L)]> F ,  i = 0 ,R
Assumption 1 implies that both PRP'R and P0P'0 pass above the endowment point, and
so the effective set of effort incentive compatible contracts is not empty for either 
type. If Assumption 1 is violated for either type, the corresponding type never takes 
precautions. Under this assumption, in principle, both types may take precautions in 
equilibrium, although this is not always the case as we will see below.
2.3.2 Indifference Curves
The indifference curves, labelled 7., are kinked where they cross the corresponding 
7)7)' locus. Above 7)7)', insurees of the the i-type do not take precautions, their 
perceived probability of avoiding the loss is p '0, and so the slope of 7. is:
dL
dH 1 ~Pi U \L )
Po U( H)  i = o,R (2.10)
On and below 7)7)/ insurees of the i-type do take precautions, their perceived 
probability of avoiding the loss rises to p ‘F and so the slope of 7(. becomes:
dL
dH ,,,-Pr I - P 1,  U'(L)
^  U '(H) i = 0 ,R  (2.11)
Hence, just above 7)7)/ the i-type indifference curves become flatter.
Furthermore, because the Os underestimate their accident probability, at any given 
identical preventive effort level and ( L , H ) pair, the Os indifference curve is steeper
61 For example, Viscusi (1990) finds that those who perceive a higher risk are less likely to smoke. The 
less optimistic agents take more precautions.
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in the ( L ,H)  space. Intuitively, the Os are less willing to exchange consumption in 
the good state for consumption in the bad state because their perceived probability of 
the bad state occurring is lower than that of the Rs.
2.3.3 Insurers’ Zero-profit Lines (Offer Curves)
Using the definitions H = W - y  and L = W -  D + (X -  l)y , and the fact that 
insurance companies have an accurate estimate of the true accident probabilities, 
given the precautionary effort level, the insurers’ expected profit function becomes:
Conditional on the preventive effort level chosen by the two types of insurees, there 
are three zero-profit lines with slopes:
7t = Pj { W - H ) - { \ - P j ) { L- W + D) (2.12)
The zero-profit lines are given by:
(2.13)
dL _ p 0 (EN’ line) (2.14)
k-o 1 ~Po
dL P f (EJ’ line) (2.15)
1 ~ P f
dL _ q (EM’ line (pooled -line)) (2.16)
dH o I " ?
where q = ppj + (1 -  p )pk , j  = F,0, k = F,0, and p  is the proportion of the Rs in 
the population of insurees.
Also, at H = H = W , Eq. (2.13) becomes:
L = L = W - D (2.17)
Eq. (2.17) is independent of the value of P j . This implies that all three zero-profit 
lines have the same starting point (the endowment point, E).
2.4 Positive Implications
As we have already mentioned, although the Os underestimate their accident 
probability, they may either underestimate or overestimate its reduction from taking 
precautions. We first consider the case where the Os underestimate it. Formally,
Casel: P* -  p* > p°  -  p°
In identifying equilibria, if the degree of optimism is sufficiently high, there exist 
separating equilibria where the Os go uninsured whereas the Rs take the contract they 
would have chosen if types were observable. For lower degrees of optimism, 
depending on parameter values, three kinds of equilibria can arise: separating, full- 
pooling and partial-pooling where the presence of the Os, in most but not all cases, 
results in Rs buying less insurance than under full information about types. Below, we 
present some interesting examples of separating and full-pooling equilibria.62 We 
begin with the configuration yielding a separating equilibrium where, although the Os 
buy some insurance, their presence has no effect on the choice of the Rs.
Proposition 1: If the Os’ indifference curve tangent to EN ', / * , passes above the
intersection of EJ' and PRP'R and meets P0P'0 above EJ', then there exists a unique
separating equilibrium (zR, z0) where the Rs take precautions whereas the Os do not.
Both types choose strictly positive coverage but the Rs purchase more insurance than 
the Os (see Figure 2.1).63
62 We do not present partial-pooling equilibria because, from our perspective, they do not exhibit any 
novel feature. However, note that, because of the discreteness of the model, there potentially exist 
partial-pooling equilibria exhibiting strictly positive profits (see de Meza and Webb (2001)).
63 This is true if (p F — p 0 ) is sufficiently small (precautions do not increase considerably the true 
probability of avoiding the loss), the degrees of optimism and risk aversion are sufficiently large,
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Proof: We test whether (zR,zQ) is an equilibrium by considering deviations.
Clearly, the Os strictly prefer z0 to zR. Offers above EJ ' are clearly loss-making. 
Similarly, offers above PRPR either do not attract any type or, if they do, are 
unprofitable. Below EJ' and below PRPR there is no offer that attracts the Rs but 
there are some offers that attract the Os and so are unprofitable (given the equilibrium 
contract zR, the Rs are attracted only by contracts that lie above EJ’ which are, of 
course, loss-making). So, there is no profitable deviation and the (zR, z0) pair is the 
unique separating equilibrium. The fact that I*0 passes above zR rules out any 
pooling equilibrium. Therefore, (zR,z0) is the unique equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Given the contracts offered, because the Os considerably underestimate the 
reduction in their accident probability from taking precautions, they choose to take no 
precautions. Also, although insurance is offered at actuarially fair terms, because they 
underestimate their accident probability, the Os underinsure choosing a contract with 
low coverage while contracts with higher coverage are available at the same or even 
lower per unit premium. In other words, the Os not only purchase less coverage and
P f ~ Po sufficiently larger than p°F — p °  (the distance between PRP'R and P0Pq is 
sufficiently large) and PqPq lies sufficiently close to the endowment point, E.
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than the Rs but also the take fewer precautions and so their accident probability is 
higher. Competition among insurers then implies that they also pay a higher per unit 
premium. Thus, this equilibrium is consistent with both the negative correlation 
between coverage and risk and the fact that insurance premiums display quantity 
discounts as reported by Cawley and Phillipson (1999). Standard asymmetric 
information models cannot simultaneously explain both empirical findings.
Proposition 2: Assume the following are true: i) between PRP'R and P0Pf0i I R is
steeper than 10 , ii) the 10 tangent to EN , V0 , intersects EJ  above the intersection
of EJ  and PQP ’0 and passes below the intersection of EJ and PRPR and iii) below
PRPR, EM' does not cut the I R passing through the intersection of V0 and EJ .64
Then there exists a unique separating equilibrium (zR,z0) where the Rs take
precautions whereas the Os do not. Both types choose strictly positive coverage but 
now the Rs buy less than the Os (see Figure 2.2).65
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Figure 2.2
64 Ceteris paribus, if condition (iii) is violated, then there exists no subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. 
However, there exists a Wilson pooling equilibrium (Wilson (1977)).
65 This separating equilibrium obtains under the conditions described in Footnote 59 above but for a 
lower degree of optimism.
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Proof: Offers above EJ'  are clearly loss-making. Similarly, offers above PRP’R either 
do not attract any type or, if they do, are unprofitable. Below EJ' and below PRP'R 
there is no offer that attracts only the Rs but there are some offers that attract only the 
Os and so are unprofitable. Thus, there is no profitable deviation and the (zR,z0) pair
is the unique separating equilibrium. The fact that below PRPR, EM  does not cut the 
I R passing through the intersection of I*0 and EJ  rules out any pooling equilibrium. 
Therefore, (zR ,z0) is the unique equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Notice that the separating equilibrium in Proposition 2 is qualitatively similar to that 
in standard adverse-selection models. The high-risk type (the Os) purchase more 
insurance than the low-risk type (the Rs) and the Rs are quantity-constrained. 
Compared to Proposition 1, because the Os underestimate less their accident 
probability (the degree of optimism is lower), they prefer the low-price contract the 
Rs would have been offered if types were observable to the high-price contract they 
are offered. Under full information about types, the Rs would have purchased the 
contract at the intersection of PRPR and EJ ' , instead of zR, which involves more 
insurance. However, in the presence of the Os, this contract is not offered because it 
violates the Os’ revelation and effort incentive constraints and so is loss-making for 
the insurance companies. In order to reveal their type, the Rs accept lower coverage 
than they would have chosen if types were observable.
The separating equilibrium in Proposition 1 differs from that in Proposition 2 in 
two respects: First, in the latter proposition the Rs are quantity-constrained because of 
the presence of the Os whereas in the former they take the contract they would have 
chosen under full information about types. Second, the latter equilibrium exhibits 
positive correlation between the coverage offered by the insurance contract and the 
accident probability of its buyer whereas the former negative. Both differences are 
due to the fact that in the latter case the Os’ degree of optimism is lower.
If the Os underestimate less the decrease in their accident probability from taking 
precautions, separating equilibria arise where the Os do take precautions. For the very 
same reasons as above, the degree of optimism determines whether the Rs are 
quantity-constrained. If the degree of optimism is sufficiently low, there arises a
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pooling equilibrium where both types take precautions but the Rs are quantity- 
constrained (see Appendix 2B).
To summarise, the comparative statics of our model as the degree of optimism 
changes are as follows. At low levels of optimism there exist pooling equilibria where 
both types take precautions and buy the contract lying at the intersection of P0P'0 and
E J ' . For higher degrees of optimism, the type of the resulting equilibrium depends 
crucially on the extent to which the Os underestimate the decrease in their accident 
probability from taking precautions as well as on the effectiveness of the 
precautionary effort.
If the configuration yielding the separating equilibria in Propositions 1 and 2 is 
relevant, then as the degree of optimism rises, separating equilibria similar to that in 
Proposition 2 arise. For higher levels of optimism, partial-pooling equilibria may 
arise.66 As the degree of optimism increases even further, separating equilibria similar 
to that in Proposition 1 arise. Under the configuration yielding the equilibria in 
Proposition 2B.1 (Appendix 2B), as the level of optimism rises, separating equilibria 
similar to that in Proposition 2B.1 arise. In either case, for a sufficiently high degree 
of optimism, separating equilibria arise where the Os go uninsured but take 
precautions whereas the Rs take the contract they would have chosen if types could be 
observed.
That is, if the Os are sufficiently optimistic, their presence has no effect on the 
choice of the Rs. However, for low and intermediate levels of optimism, if types are 
not observable, the presence of the Os results in equilibria where the Rs are quantity- 
constrained. In order to reveal their type, the Rs accept lower coverage than they 
would have chosen under full information about types.
Let us now consider the case where the Os, although underestimate their accident 
probability, they overestimate its reduction from taking precautions. Formally,
Case 2: p f  -  < p°F -  p°
Graphically, PRP'R lies to the right of P0P'0 and so the Rs’ set of effort incentive 
compatible contracts is smaller. Intuitively, given the incremental utility cost of a
66 This occurs if between PRP'R and P0P'0 , I R is flatter than 10 .
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higher preventive effort level, the greater the decrease in the perceived accident 
probability from doing so, the more willing one would be to take precautions.
In this case, there exist only separating and full-pooling equilibria.67 For low levels 
of optimism, if an equilibrium exists, it is a pooling one, the equilibrium contract lies 
at the intersection of PRP'R and EJ' and the Os are quantity-constrained. As the 
degree of optimism rises, separating equilibria arise where, depending on parameter 
values, the Rs either take precautions and purchase partial insurance or they do not 
and purchase full insurance.
In the former case, both types take the contracts they would have chosen under full 
information about types. However, in the latter case, if the degree of optimism is not 
very high, the resulting separating equilibrium involves the Os, rather than the Rs, 
being quantity-constrained. Because the Os are more willing to take precautions, their 
true accident probability is lower and so they are offered insurance at a lower per unit 
premium. At this lower unit price, because the Os are not very optimistic, they would 
like to purchase a contract involving a considerable amount of insurance. However, 
such a contract is not offered because it violates the Rs’ revelation and effort incentive 
constraints and so is loss-making for the insurance companies. In order to reveal their 
type, the Os accept lower coverage than they would have chosen under full 
information about types. The following two propositions summarise these results.
Proposition 3: Assume that I R , the Rs’ indifference curve through the intersection of 
PRPR and EJ' (point Z p), lies above EN ' . Then, i) if the degree of optimism is 
sufficiently low so that the Os’ indifference curve through Z p, /£ , is flatter than EJ'  
and, between PRPR and P0P '0 , EM' does not cut /£ , there exists a unique pooling 
equilibrium at Z p (see Figure 2.3)68, ii) if the degree of optimism is sufficiently high 
so that I q is steeper than EJ ' , there exists a unique separating equilibrium {zR, zQ)
67 The fact that between PRPR and PqP'q , I 0 is steeper than I R implies that there exist offers
involving less coverage which profitably only attracts the Os and rule out any pooling subgame-perfect 
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in the area between these two curves. However, there exist Wilson pooling 
equilibria that Pareto-dominate the (constrained) efficient outcome under realism (the contract at the 
intersection of PRP'R and EJ ' ). This latter contract is the unique pooling SPNE in this case.
68 If, between PRP'R and PqPq , EM' cuts I q , then there exists no SPNE (see also the previous 
footnote).
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where both types take precautions and the Os purchase less insurance than the Rs (see 
Figure 2.4).69
Proof: i) Clearly, offers above EJ' are loss-making. The same is true for offers above 
P0Pq . Between PRP'R and P0P'0 and below EJ' there is no offer that attracts the Os
and does not attract the Rs, although there are some offers that attract only the Rs. 
Thus, any offer in this region is unprofitable. Given the equilibrium contract, below 
EJ' and below PRP'R there is no offer that is attractive to either type. Therefore, the 
pooling contract zp is the unique equilibrium, ii) Using similar arguments, one can 
show that the separating pair (zR,z0) is the unique equilibrium (see Figure 2.4). 
Q.E.D.
69 These results hold true if (p F — p 0) is sufficiently large (preventive efforts are sufficiently 
“productive”), and p* — is not much smaller than p °  — p ° .
95
LM'
L
0
H H
Figure 2.4
Proposition 4: Assume the Rs’ indifference curve tangent to EN' at its intersection
with the 45-degree line, I R, meets PRP'R above EJ' .10 Then, if the degree of 
optimism is sufficiently low so that the Os’ indifference curve through the intersection 
of I*R and EJ' is flatter than EJ' and EM' does not cut I Q passing through Z Q, 
there exists a unique separating equilibrium (zR,z0) where the Rs take no
precautions and buy full insurance whereas the Os take precautions, purchase partial 
insurance and are quantity-constrained (see Figure 2.5).
Proof: i) Offers above EJ'  are clearly loss-making. In the area below EJ'  and above 
PRP'R there is no offer that attracts the Os and does not attract the Rs, although there 
are some offers that attract only the Rs. Thus, any offer in this region is unprofitable. 
Given the equilibrium contracts, below EJ' and below PRPR there is no offer that is 
attractive to either type. Hence, the pair (zR,z0) is the unique separating equilibrium. 
Furthermore, the fact that EM'  does not cut 10 below (to the right of) P0P'0 rules out 
any pooling equilibrium.71 Therefore, the pair (zR,z0) is the unique equilibrium (see 
Figure 2.5).72 Q.E.D.
70 This holds true if (p F — p 0 ) is sufficiently small (preventive efforts are not sufficiently effective).
71 In fact, if between PRPR and PqPq , EM' cuts I Q, then there exists no subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium. However, there exist Wilson pooling equilibria.
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Note that, under the configuration yielding the pooling equilibrium illustrated in 
Figure 2.3, if types were observable but their actions were not, the Os would have 
purchased more insurance than the Rs. That is, contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
optimism itself does not necessarily lead to the purchase of less insurance. If the Os 
overestimate the positive effect of their precautionary efforts on the probability of 
avoiding the accident, optimism, by relaxing the effort incentive constraint, leads to 
more precautions and so lower per unit premia. This effect may more than offset the 
effect of the underestimation of the accident probability and result in the purchase of 
more insurance. However, under both adverse selection and moral hazard, the 
presence of the Rs makes this choice infeasible. The amount of insurance offered at 
the low per unit premium is restricted by the Rs’ revelation and effort incentive 
constraints.
In summary, if neither the type nor the actions of the insurees are observable, the 
presence of the Os may restrict the choice of the Rs only if the Os not only 
underestimate their accident probability but also its reduction from taking precautions. 
If the Os overestimate the decrease in their accident probability from taking 
precautions, then the presence of the Rs may restrict the choice of the Os but not vice
72 As the degree of optimism rises, there arises a separating equilibrium where the Rs make the same 
choices as in Figure 2.5 whereas the Os, whether they purchase insurance or not, they are not quantity- 
constrained.
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versa. More specifically, first, if the degree of optimism is sufficiently high, both 
types purchase the contract they would have chosen under full information about 
types. Second, for intermediate and low levels of optimism there exist equilibria 
where one of the two types of insurees is quantity-constrained. If the Os 
underestimate the decrease in their accident probability from taking precautions, then 
the Rs are quantity-constrained whereas if the Os overestimate it, the Os themselves 
are quantity-constrained.
Finally, two points should be stressed here. First, if all agents purchase some 
insurance, optimism is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the existence of a 
separating equilibrium exhibiting negative correlation between coverage and the 
accident probability (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion). The negative 
correlation result also requires that: i) optimism discourage precautionary effort73, ii) 
the degree of optimism be sufficiently high (the Os underestimate their accident 
probability significantly) and iii) preventive effort be not very “productive” (the per 
unit premium on the contracts offered to the Rs is not significantly lower than that 
offered to the Os). Second, optimism itself does not necessarily result in the purchase 
of less insurance. For example, under the configuration yielding the pooling 
equilibrium in Proposition 3, if types were observable, the Os would have purchased 
more insurance than the Rs.
2.5 Welfare Implications
In the previous section, we explored the impact of the presence of the Os on the 
equilibrium outcome when neither the type nor the actions of the insurees are 
observable. This section deals with the welfare properties of the equilibria described 
above. In this framework, because some of the insurees, the Os, underestimate their 
accident probability, the definition of the efficiency of the equilibrium is not 
straightforward. The very presence of the Os raises the question of what is the 
appropriate efficiency criterion. Should we employ objective probabilities (true 
expected utility) or subjective probabilities (perceived expected utility)? The answer 
depends crucially on die origin of the agents’ biased estimate. In our environment, the 
different estimates of the same risk (accident probability) arise because of different
73 If optimism encourages precautionary effort, there can only exist equilibria exhibiting either negative 
or zero correlation (see the analysis of case 2 above).
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perceptions not because of different underlying preferences. Both the Os and the Rs 
have identical preferences. As a result, the preferences revealed by the insuree’s 
choices coincide with the true underlying preferences. Therefore, the appropriate 
efficiency criterion seems to be objective rather than subjective probabilities.
Given that, it is possible to find intervention policies that yield strict Pareto gains. 
Below, we employ two different intervention schemes. If the Os or neither type is 
quantity-constrained in the laissez-faire equilibrium, then only Policy 2 may be 
effective. On the contrary, if the Rs are quantity-constrained, then only Policy 1 can 
potentially lead to a strict Pareto improvement.
Policy 1: Imposition of a lump-sum tax, r , per contract sold (paid by the insurers), 
with the proceeds returned as a lump-sum subsidy of s to the whole population.
Under Policy 1, the perceived expected utility of an agent i choosing contract 
(y,Ay) is given by:
EUi(Fi,Ki, y i,Ai,W,s) = p i/U(JV-y + s) + ( l - p ‘)U(JV-D + ( A - l ) y  + s ) - F i ,
j  = F,0, i = 0 ,R  (2.18)
Similarly, the actual expected utility is given by:
EUi(Fi,Ki, y i,Ai,W,s) = p JU ( W - y  + s) + ( l - p J) U ( W - D  + ( A - l ) y  + s ) - F i
j  = F,0, i = (2.19)
Eq. (2.19) defines the dashed indifference curve I T0 in Figure 2.9.
Also, the expected profit of an insurance company offering contract (y, Xy) is:
*  = Pjy  “ ( ! - Pj )& "  1 )y~*> j  = F,0 (2.20)
Using (2.19) and the definitions H = W - y  and L = W -  D + (A, -  l)y , we obtain:
n  = P j { W - H - T ) - ( \ - p j ) { L - W  + D - T ), j  = F,0 (2.21)
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So, the zero-profit lines are now given by:
L = j  = F,  0 (2.22)
1 ~Pj  1 - P /
The slopes of the zero-profit lines are still given by Eqs. (2.14)-(2.16). However, the 
tax per contract sold shifts the origin of the zero-profit lines down the 45° line by the 
tax amount, r  (point J  in Figure 2.9).
To make the analysis interesting, we assume that the tax amount is chosen such 
that at least one type purchases insurance. Then, from the balanced budget condition, 
the amount of the subsidy is:
r  if both types purchase insurance
s  =  -i j u t  if only the Rs purchase insurance (2.23)
(1 -  ( i ) t  if only the Os purchase insurance
The subsidy shifts both the endowment point, E, up the 45° line by the amount s 
(point E  in Figure 2.9) and the origin of the lines along which the insured can 
consume (consumption zero-profit (offer) lines) up the 45° line by the same amount 
(from J  to J  in Figure 2.9). That is, the consumption zero-profit lines are given by:
L = — !—  ( W - T  + S )  - t— H - D  (2.24)
1 ~ Pi  1 - P j
Policy 2: Imposition of a lump-sum tax, r , per person paid only by those going 
uninsured and per contract sold (paid by the insurance companies), with the proceeds 
distributed to agents (potential insurees) as follows:
i) Those going uninsured receive nothing.
ii) Those buying a contract implying at least a minimum amount of wealth in the 
bad state, m , receive a subsidy only if the bad state realises. In the good state, 
they receive no subsidy.
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Under Policy 2, the perceived expected utility of an agent i choosing contract 
(y,Ay) is given by:
EUi(Fi,Ki, y i,Ai,W,s,T) = 
r p'jU (W -  r) + (1 -  Pj)U(W - D - t) -  Fn  if agent i does not buy insurance
J p ijU { W - y )  + ( \ - p iJ)U{W- D + {X- \ )y  + s ) - F i if W - D  + ( A - l ) y > m
p ijU { W - y )  + { \ - p ij ) U( W- D + ( X - \ ) y ) - F i if W - D  + (X-Y)y < m
j  = F,0 , i = 0 ,R  (2.25)
If instead of the perceived probabilities p'j we employ the true probabilities p j , we 
obtain the true expected utility given by:
E U t f ' K ^ y ^ W , * ,  t) =
PjU (W -  t) + (1 -  pj  ) U ( W - D - T ) - F n  if agent i does not buy insurance
J p j U ( f r - y )  + ( l - p j ) U( JV - D + (A- l ) y  + s ) - F i if W - D  + ( X - l ) y > m
p jU ( W - y )  + { \ - p j )U{W- D + ( X - \ ) y ) - F i if W - D  + ( X - \ ) y  < m
j  = F,0, i = 0 , R  (2.26)
Eq. (2.26) defines the dashed indifference curve 1T0 in Figures 2.6-2.8 and 2.10, 2.11.
Because under Policy 2 the tax is also paid by those going uninsured, the 
endowment point shifts down the 45 line by the tax amount, x (point E  in Figures 
2.6-2.8 and 2.10, 2.11). Policy 2 has exactly the same effects on the insurers profit
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function and zero-profit lines as Policy 1. That is, the zero-profit lines are given by 
Eq. (2.22). Also, because the tax paid by those going uninsured is the same as the tax 
per contract paid by insurance companies, the origin of the zero-profit lines coincides 
with the endowment point after the intervention, E .
To make the analysis interesting, we assume that the tax is sufficiently high so that 
all agents purchase a contract implying at least a minimum amount of consumption 
(wealth) m in the bad state. Then, from the balanced budget condition the subsidy is:
t/  (1 - p F) if precautions are taken 
s = < r/(l -  p 0) if no precautions are taken74 (2.27)
t/ (1 - q )  if a pooling equilibrium arises
where q = ypj  +(1 ~M)Pk’ J = F>®> k = F ,0 and p  is the Rs’ proportion in the
population of insurees. Because of perfect competition, the insurees pay the tax x 
through a higher insurance premium. However, they receive a subsidy of the same 
expected amount {s = ( \ -  p j ) x / { \ -  pj )  = x). Therefore, the consumption zero-profit
lines are given by:
L = - ^ — ( W - x  + s )— ^ - H - D  = — !— W  H - D  (2.28)
1 - p j  1 P j l - P j  l - P j
Eq. (2.28) is identical to (2.13). That is, the consumption zero-profit lines after the 
implementation of Policy 2 coincide with the zero-profit lines that obtain without any 
intervention. In other words, the subsidy shifts the origin of the lines along which the 
insured can consume (consumption zero-profit (offer) lines) up the 45° line by the 
same amount as the tax shifts the insurers’ zero-profit lines down the 45° line. As a 
result, the origin of the consumption zero-profit lines after the intervention coincides 
with the endowment point before the intervention, E.
For expositional purposes, we begin with the case where there is just one type, the 
Os. The Os’ choice in the laissez-faire equilibrium is driven by their perceived utility. 
However, as we have argued, the appropriate efficiency criterion is their true utility.
74 Whether an insuree takes precautions or not can be inferred by the contract he chooses.
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Thus, to conclude that the Os are better off after an intervention, we construct a curve 
along which the Os’ true rather than perceived welfare is constant, given their 
precautionary effort level choice (the / J  curve in Figure 2.6). If the I T0 through the
Os’ consumption allocation after the intervention passes above that in the laissez-faire 
equilibrium, the intervention has lead to an improvement in the Os true welfare. 
Moreover, l rQ allows us to determine the Os’ optimal (second-best) contract. Because
the Os underestimate their accident probability, although insurance is offered at 
actuarially fair terms, in all but one cases they are underinsured in the laissez-faire 
equilibrium.75 Application of Policy 2 can always implement the Os’ optimal contract.
Proposition 5: i) If the I T0 tangent to the without-precautions full-insurance contract 
passes above the intersection of P0Pq and EJ ' , C q , then the optimal contract 
involves full-insurance (see Figure 2.6).76 If it passes below C q , then Cq is the
second-best contract (see Figure 2.7). ii) In either case, application of Policy 2 would 
result in the Os taking the optimal contract.77
Proof: i) Suppose that in the laissez-faire equilibrium the Os take precautions and 
choose contract Z0 which involves less insurance than the contract offering the
maximum amount of insurance consistent with taking precautions, Cq (the contract
at the intersection of PQP'0 and EJ').  To determine the optimal contract, we employ
I T0 and compare the without-precautions full-insurance contract, Cq , with Cq . If
the I T0 tangent to Cq passes above Cq , then there exist no feasible contract that can
increase the Os’ true utility. All contracts along EJ ' that could improve the Os’ true 
welfare violate their effort incentive constraint and so are loss-making for the 
insurance companies. On the contrary, if the I T0 through Cq passes above Cq , Cq
75 The only exception is when the Os choose the contract at the intersection o f PqP'q and E J ' and
the I T0 through this contract lies above the without-precautions full-insurance contract. In this case, the 
former contract is the Os’ optimal (second-best) contract.
76 This is true if  (p F — p 0 ) is small (preventive efforts are not very “productive”), and the degree of 
risk aversion and the perceived cost of precautionary effort are high (the distance between P0P'Q and 
the 45-degree line is large).
77 Notice that mandatory coverage requirements would also work.
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is the optimal contract. Since the I T0 through Cq lies strictly above EN ' , there exists 
no feasible contract to the left of P0P'0 that can improve the Os’ true welfare. Also, 
since at Cq the Os are partially insured, any contract along E J ' to the right of P0P'0 
implies lower coverage and so lower true utility for the Os.
ii) The tax shifts both the endowment point and the origin of the zero-profit lines 
down the 45° line to E . Also, in order to receive the subsidy, the insurees must 
purchase a contract implying at least a minimum consumption (wealth) of m in the 
bad state. Consider, for example, Figure 2.6. After the application of Policy 2, the Os’ 
consumption bundles, Cq1, consist of two components: the insurance contract, Z0 , 
and the subsidy, r/(l - p 0) . Because the Os underestimate their accident probability, 
their perceived utility at the laissez-faire allocation Z0 exceeds that at Cq . However, 
since the I T0 tangent to Cq passes above Z0 , their true utility is higher at Cq . In 
either case, since the Os’ (perceived) indifference curve through the optimal contract, 
I*o, passes above E , a combination of minimum coverage requirements, taxes and 
subsidies can implement the optimal contract. Q.E.D.
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Notice that the imposition of minimum standards only may have the opposite 
than the desired outcome. Suppose that the regulator requires that the insurance 
contracts offered imply at least the minimum amount of consumption m' in the bad 
state. Consider, for example, Figure 2.7. Since the Os’ indifference curve through 
Cq1 passes below the endowment point E , the Os (the underinsured) would purchase
no insurance at all and so they would be worse off than in the laissez-faire 
equilibrium. However, a combination of minimum coverage requirements, taxes and 
subsidies can always lead to an increase in the Os’ true welfare.78
So far, we have identified the Os’ optimal contract as well as an intervention 
scheme that can be employed for its implementation. Needless to say, if types are 
observable, the Rs always choose their second-best contract. We now proceed to 
examine how the interaction between the two types of insurees affects the outcome of 
the intervention when types are hidden. In this case, the question is whether the 
intervention can lead to a Pareto improvement on the laissez-faire equilibrium. For all 
equilibria described in the previous section, there exist policies which can be used to
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78 However, because more insurance may result in the Os taking no precautions, it is not obvious 
whether the imposition of a binding upper bound in the amount o f insurance the Os can purchase would 
lead to an increase in their true welfare. In Appendix 2C we show that it is not possible.
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achieve this objective. However, the fact that types are not observable prevents the 
regulator from implementing the second-best contract for both types. Given the 
requirement that both types be at least as well off as in the laissez-faire equilibrium, 
the second-best contract can be implemented for at most one of the types. 
Furthermore, because of the subsidy they receive through the intervention scheme, the 
type that is less willing to take precautions may be better off in the equilibrium 
achieved after the intervention than at its second-best allocation.
Proposition 6: In the separating equilibrium of Proposition 1, the application of 
Policy 2 yields a strict Pareto improvement (see Figure 2.8).
Proof: After the application of Policy 2, the consumption bundles of the Rs and the 
Os, CR and C0 respectively, consist of two components: the insurance contract, Z R
and Z Q respectively, and the subsidy, r / ( l - p F) and r / ( l - p 0) respectively, which
is received only if the accident occurs. Since the Os’ indifference curve through CQ
lies above CR, the Os prefer the former allocation. Also, because the Os 
underestimate their accident probability, their perceived expected utility at the laissez- 
faire allocation Z Q exceeds that at C0 .79 However, their true expected utility is
higher at C0 . Both Z Q and C0 involve less than full insurance, but C0 involves
more coverage at the same, actuarially fair, per unit premium and precautionary effort
level. Thus, given risk aversion, C0 implies strictly greater actual expected utility.
That is, the Os are strictly better off whereas the Rs are as well off. Therefore, a strict 
Pareto improvement has been achieved.80 Q.E.D.
79 Notice that after Policy 2 has been applied, Z 0 is no longer offered. The tax shifts the origin of the
O T"1zero-profit lines down the 45 line to E. Hence, given that the Os take no precautions, in 
equilibrium, contracts are now offered along EN '  rather than along EN ' .
80 Note that the balanced budget condition is also satisfied. Since both types purchase insurance, the 
total tax revenue is T  (= JUT +  ( I  — J U ) t  ) which equals the total subsidy given to both types
M l ~ P f ) VO " P f ) + (! -  M(1 ~ P o ) T/ ( l - P o )  =  T -
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In the equilibrium attained after the intervention, both types pay the same per unit 
premium as in the laissez-faire equilibrium and the Rs still choose their second-best 
contract, Z R = CR . However, the imposition of the tax and the requirement that the 
subsidy is received only by those choosing a contract implying at least the minimum 
amount of consumption m in the bad state results in the purchase of more insurance 
by the Os which, in turn, leads to an improvement in their true welfare. Moreover, 
notice that, if a Pareto improvement is to be achieved, the Os’ second-best contract 
(the without-precautions full-insurance contract) cannot be implemented. The Os
prefer CR to their second-best allocation. However, because at CR the Os take no 
precautions, this allocation becomes infeasible if it is chosen by both types. In fact, 
because optimism discourages precautionary effort, at any feasible allocation chosen
by both types, the Rs are strictly worse off than at CR. That is, a Pareto improvement
requires that the Os be induced to take a contract which they (weakly) prefer to CR.
The possibility of a strict Pareto improvement also arises in the separating 
equilibrium of Proposition 2. However, in this case, Policy 1 rather than Policy 2 is 
appropriate. Under Policy 1, the subsidy is received regardless of whether or not 
insurance is purchased whereas the tax is paid only by those buying insurance through 
a higher per unit premium. The imposition of the tax makes the purchase of insurance 
less attractive for both types but more so for the Os. As a result, the Os go uninsured,
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their revelation constraint is relaxed, which allows the Rs to purchase more insurance 
while still credibly revealing their type.
More specifically, the tax per contract sold shifts the origin of the zero-profit lines
down the 45° line to J . On the contrary, the subsidy shifts the endowment point E
up the 45° line to E and the origin of the zero-profit lines along which the insured
can consume (consumption zero-profit lines) up the 45° line from J  to J  . In the 
new equilibrium, the Rs purchase more insurance but subsidise the Os. The question 
is whether the improvement in their welfare, because of the higher coverage, exceeds 
the welfare loss due to the subsidy they provide the Os in order to relax their 
revelation constraint?
Proposition 7: In the separating equilibrium of Proposition 2, applying Policy 1 
yields a strict Pareto improvement if the proportion of the Os is sufficiently small. In 
the new equilibrium, the Os go uninsured (purchase less insurance), the Rs purchase 
more insurance and both types take precautions (see Figure 2.9).81
Proof: After the application of Policy 1, the consumption bundle of the Rs, CR, 
consists of the insurance contract Z R and the subsidy, s = ju t  , whereas that of the 
Os’, E = C0, consists of their endowment, E,  and the subsidy, s = fj.r. If the 
proportion of the Os is small ( / / i s  large), J J ’ lies close to EJ'  and E lies well 
above E.  As a result, the Rs’ indifference curve through CR, I R, and the Os’ 
indifference curve through E = CQ, I 0 , lie above the corresponding indifference 
curves in the laissez-faire equilibrium. That is, in the new equilibrium, the perceived 
expected utility of both types has increased. Also, since the I T0 through E = C0
passes above Z0 , the Os’ true welfare at E = C0 is strictly greater than at Z Q. That 
is, both the Rs and the Os are strictly better off.82 Q.E.D.
81 Given the amount of the tax and the proportion of the Os, the higher the degree of optimism, the 
more the Os’ revelation constraint relaxes and so the greater the improvement in the Rs’ welfare.
82 It may be the case that E = C0 involves higher consumption in both states than Z Q . This clearly 
implies that the Os are strictly better off after the intervention.
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Intuitively, if the proportion of the Os is small, the per capita subsidy is high and so 
its effect both on the Os’ utility and revelation constraint is large. This, in turn, allows 
the Rs to purchase a considerably higher amount of insurance. As a result, the welfare 
gains of the higher coverage more than offset the welfare loss due to the net tax (tax 
minus subsidy) the Rs pay.
By similar arguments, applying Policy 1 in the separating and pooling equilibria of 
Proposition 2B.1 (Appendix 2B) also leads to a strict Pareto improvement. In fact, in 
the latter case the pooling equilibrium breaks and a separating equilibrium arises.
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Surprisingly, although in the separating equilibria of Propositions 2 and 2B.1 the 
Os are underinsured in the laissez-faire equilibrium, Policy 1, which results in the Os 
going uninsured, leads to a strict Pareto improvement. On the contrary, Policy 2, 
which would result in the purchase of more insurance, does not. In both cases the Rs 
are quantity-constrained in the laissez-faire equilibrium. A policy that would result in 
the Os purchasing more coverage would tighten rather than relax their revelation 
constraint. As a result, in order to reveal their type, the Rs would have to purchase 
even less insurance and so their welfare would worsen.83
What is more, the I T0 through E = C0 lies above C™ (the Os’ second-best
contract). That is, because of the subsidy they receive, the Os’ true welfare in the 
equilibrium arising after the intervention exceeds not only that at the laissez-faire 
equilibrium but also that at their second-best contract.84
This logic does not apply in equilibria where the Os are quantity-constrained.85 
Consider, for example, the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 3 and the separating 
equilibrium of Proposition 4. In both cases, because the Os underestimate their 
accident probability, their indifference curve through the contract they choose in 
equilibrium lies closer to the endowment point, E , than that of the Rs. Thus, Policy 1 
would drive out of the market the Os and be harmful for the Rs who would pay the tax 
without gaining anything. However, if the proportion of the Os is sufficiently high, 
Policy 2 could lead to a pooling equilibrium on EM'  where both the Os and the Rs 
would be strictly better off. Policy 2 also yields a strict Pareto improvement on the 
separating equilibrium in Part (ii) of Proposition 3.86
83 Note that the effectiveness of Policy 1 depends crucially on the fact that if the Os go uninsured, they 
do take precautions. If the Os never take precautions their indifference curve through E = CQ is
flatter than that of the Rs and so they strictly prefer the Rs’ consumption allocation, CR , to E = C0.
However, because the Os take no precautions, this allocation is not feasible. In fact, if the Os never take 
precautions, there exists no intervention policy that yields a Pareto improvement on the equilibrium of 
Proposition 2.
84 Notice that the implementation of the Os’ second-best allocation is not possible.
85 It is possible when the Os overestimate the decrease in their accident probability from taking 
precautions.
6 The analysis for this last case is similar to that in Proposition 8 and is omitted.
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Proposition 8: In the separating equilibrium of Proposition 4, applying Policy 2 
yields a strict Pareto improvement if the proportion of the Os is sufficiently high (see 
Figure 2.10).87
Proof: The intervention leads to the breaking of the separating equilibrium. The 
requirement that the subsidy be received only by those purchasing a contract implying 
at least the minimum amount of wealth m in the bad state, renders any contract 
offering less coverage unattractive for the Os. As a result, the pooling equilibrium at 
Cp sustains. Clearly, at Cp, the Rs are strictly better off. In contrast, because the Os 
underestimate their accident probability, their perceived utility at the laissez-faire 
allocation Z0 exceeds that at Cp . However, since I T0 passes above Z0 , the Os’ true 
welfare at Cp is strictly greater than at Z Q. That is, both the Rs and the Os are strictly 
better off. Therefore, a strict Pareto improvement has been achieved. Q.E.D.
Intuitively, if the proportion of the Os is high, the increase in the per unit premium 
they are charged is low. As a result, the improvement in their true welfare from the 
higher coverage more than offsets the welfare losses due to the higher per unit price. 
Furthermore, the per capita subsidy the Rs receive is high and so the welfare gains 
arising from the lower per unit premium exceeds the welfare losses due to the lower 
coverage. Notice, also, that in the laissez-faire equilibrium the Rs choose their second- 
best contract. Thus, if optimism encourages precautionary effort, it leads to lower per 
unit premiums and creates the possibility of everyone being strictly better off than in a 
world where all insurees are realists.88
2.5.1 Discussion
The above results provide a justification for the imposition of minimum coverage 
requirements in insurance markets. Notice, however, that the imposition of minimum 
standards only may not result in the desired outcome. Consider, for example, Figure 
2.10 under the following intervention scheme: the regulator uses no taxes and 
subsidies but requires that the insurance contracts offered imply at least the minimum
87 A similar result can be obtained for the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 3.
88 Obviously, if all insurees were optimists, everyone would be even better off after the intervention.
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amount of wealth m! in the bad state. Since the Os’ indifference curve through C0
passes below the endowment point E , the Os (the underinsured) will purchase no 
insurance at all and so they will be worse off than in the laissez-faire equilibrium. In 
contrast, a combination of minimum standards, taxes and subsidies (Policy 2) will 
result in the underinsured purchasing more insurance and being strictly better off.
Finkelstein (2002) examines the US market for private health insurance and finds 
that the imposition of minimum standards has had two effects: First, a decline in the 
proportion of people with coverage of about 25 percent. Second, a reduction in the 
amount of insurance purchased by those choosing the most comprehensive policies 
before their introduction. The results in Proposition 8 are consistent with these
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empirical findings.89 Moreover, these results suggest that in order for minimum 
coverage requirements to achieve their objective, they should be accompanied by a 
mix of taxes and subsidies.
The positive results of the imposition of minimum coverage requirements in 
standard asymmetric information models are similar to ours and so are also consistent 
with these findings. However, the welfare results are quite different. In the standard 
model, although the social welfare may be higher in the resulting pooling equilibrium, 
the safe type (the quantity-constrained) is strictly worse off. In contrast, in our model, 
both types are strictly better off in the pooling equilibrium arising after the 
intervention. That is, the use of minimum standards is indisputably warranted if, in 
addition to their type being unobservable, some insurees underestimate their accident 
probability. Therefore, our model provides a more convincing justification for the 
imposition of minimum coverage requirements than standard models as well as a case 
for the use of taxes and subsidies in insurance markets.
2.6 Intervention and Existence of Equilibrium
As we have mentioned, if the proportion of the Rs in the population of insurees is 
sufficiently high, the equilibria of Propositions 2 and 2B.1 break and a situation arises 
where no pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) exists.90 A similar 
situation arises when the proportion of the Os is sufficiently large in Part (i) of 
Proposition 3 and Proposition 4. This section explores the possibility of restoring the 
existence of equilibrium by applying Policy 2 in cases where a laissez-faire SPNE 
does not exist. For illustration, we consider the configuration yielding the pooling 
equilibrium of Proposition 3.91
89 Strictly speaking, in order for the theoretical results to be consistent with the empirical findings a 
third type should be introduced. This new type should also be optimist but less so than the existing one. 
In such a case, if only minimum coverage requirements were imposed, the moderately optimist and the
realist would choose a pooling contract like C p whereas the most optimistic type would go uninsured. 
If, however, the minimum standards were accompanied by a mix a taxes and subsidies, there could 
exist a pooling equilibrium where all three types would have purchased some insurance and would 
have been strictly better off.
90 This non-existence situation is similar to that in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
91 The same logic applies to Propositions 2, 3, and 4 as well as to the Rothschild-Stiglitz model (1976) 
if the non-existence problem arises.
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Proposition 9: In the configuration yielding the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 3, 
if the proportion of the Os is sufficiently large so that EM'  cuts the Os indifference 
curve through the pooling contract Zp , then the pooling equilibrium collapses and no 
SPNE exists.92 Applying Policy 2, we can restore the existence of the equilibrium. 
Depending on the size of the tax and the minimum amount of insurance, a unique 
pooling equilibrium arises on EM'  between the tangency point of EM'  and the Os 
indifference curve and the intersection of EM'  and P0P'0 93 This pooling equilibrium
involves the Os taking precautions, the Rs not, and both types purchasing more 
insurance than in the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 3. Also, the new equilibrium 
Pareto-dominates the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 3 (see Figure 2.11).
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92 However, in all these cases, there exist a Wilson pooling equilibrium (see Wilson (1977)).
93 If at the intersection of E M ' and P0P'0 the Os indifference curve is flatter than E M ' , then the 
pooling equilibrium can only lie at this intersection.
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Proof: Since EM'  cuts the Os’ indifference curve through the pooling contract Z p , 
an insurance company can profitably deviate by offering a contract in the area 
between EM'  and the Os’ indifference curve through Zp . This contract attracts both 
types but since it lies below EM ' , it implies strictly positive profits for the deviant. 
As a result, the pooling equilibrium at ZP breaks. Consider now, for example, the
pooling contract Cp .94 Without any intervention this contract is not a SPNE. Since the 
Os indifference curves are steeper than those of the Rs, an insurance company can
A A
profitably attract only the Os by offering a contract between I R and I 0 involving a
little less coverage than Cp .95 However, after the intervention policy has been 
applied, the offer of a contract implying less wealth than m is no longer attractive for 
the Os. The choice of such a contract by an O implies that he receives no subsidy, his 
consumption bundle lies on the relevant part of EJ'  and so he is strictly worse off.
Also, any contract offered along EM'  involving a greater amount of insurance 
attracts only the Rs and so is loss-making. Thus, given the tax and the minimum 
coverage, Cp is the unique pooling equilibrium. Furthermore, the fact that in the area 
between P0P'Q and PRPR the Os take precautions but the Rs do not, rules out any 
separating equilibrium. Therefore, the pooling contract Cp is the unique equilibrium.
A A
Finally, since the indifference curves of both the Rs and the Os through Cp, IR and 
l 0 respectively, pass above Zp the perceived utility of both types at Cp exceeds that 
at Zp . Moreover, since CP involves more coverage than Zp , the Os underestimate 
their accident probability and the Os’ perceived utility at CP exceeds that at Zp , their 
true utility at CP is also greater. Therefore, the pooling equilibrium at Cp Pareto- 
dominates that at Zp . Q.E.D.
If the proportion of the Os is high, the average accident probability does not increase 
significantly when the Rs take no precautions. Thus, an insurance company can
94 Notice that Cp is the unique Wilson equilibrium without intervention. However, by appropriately 
choosing the tax and the minimum coverage m , one can support any pooling contract between Cp 
and the intersection of E M ' and P0Pq along E M ' as a SPNE.
95 The same argument holds true for any pooling contract along the relevant part of E M ' .
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profitably attract both types by offering a contract involving more insurance than the 
pooling contract in Proposition 3 and so this pooling equilibrium breaks. Moreover, 
because the Os not only exhibit a lower true accident probability but also they 
underestimate it, insurers can always profitably attract them by offering a contract 
involving a little less insurance. Therefore, there exists no deviant contract which can 
be supported as a laissez-faire SPNE. However, the imposition of the tax and the 
requirement that the subsidy is received only by those choosing a contract implying at 
least the minimum amount of wealth m in the bad state renders unattractive all
deviant contracts involving less coverage. As a result, the pooling equilibrium at Cp 
sustains and the existence of the equilibrium is restored.96
2.7 Conclusion
We have explored the implications of optimism both on the optimists themselves and 
their realistic counterparts in a competitive environment where neither the type nor 
the actions of the insurees are observable. It has been shown that if the degree of 
optimism is sufficiently high there exist separating equilibria where the Os not only 
take fewer precautions (high-risk type) but also purchase less insurance than the Rs 
and both types choose the contract they would have chosen if types were observable. 
That is, because the Os considerably underestimate their accident probability, their 
presence has no effect on the choices of the Rs. For lower levels of optimism, 
depending on whether the Os are more or less willing to take precautions, either the 
Os or the Rs are quantity-constrained. If optimism encourages precautionary effort, 
the Os themselves are quantity-constrained whereas the Rs make the same choices as 
under full information about types. If the Os put less effort into reducing their risk 
exposure, the roles of the two types are reversed.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, optimism itself does not necessarily lead to 
the purchase of less insurance. If types are observable and optimism encourages 
precautionary effort, the effect of the lower per unit price may more than offset the 
effect of the underestimation of the accident probability and result in the Os 
purchasing more insurance than the Rs.
96 Note that Policy 2 is not unique in this respect. For example, the following intervention scheme 
could also be used to achieve the same objective: Any insurance contract offered must involve at least 
the minimum amount of insurance m '.
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If the objective is the improvement of the insurees’ true welfare, it is possible to 
find intervention policies that yield strict Pareto gains. If the Rs are quantity- 
constrained, then a tax on insurance purchase would result in the Os going uninsured, 
relax their revelation constraint and lead to a strict Pareto improvement. On the 
contrary, if the Os are quantity-constrained, this logic does not apply. Any attempt to 
drive out the Rs so as to mitigate the negative externality their presence creates would 
first drive out the Os. Thus, it would be harmful for the Rs who would pay the tax 
without gaining anything. However, if the proportion of the Os is sufficiently high, an 
intervention scheme involving a combination of minimum coverage requirements, 
taxes and subsidies would lead to a strict Pareto improvement. In the resulting pooling 
equilibrium the Os subsidise the Rs but purchase more insurance and both types are 
strictly better off. Because the proportion of the Os is high, the improvement in their 
true welfare from the higher coverage more than offsets the welfare losses due to the 
higher per unit premium.
These results provide a justification for the imposition of minimum coverage 
requirements in insurance markets. However, the imposition of minimum standards 
only may result in the Os going uninsured and so being worse off than in the laissez- 
faire equilibrium. In contrast, a combination of minimum standards, taxes and 
subsidies would lead to the Os purchasing more coverage and so being strictly better 
off. In fact, Fenkelstein (2002) finds that the imposition of minimum standards in the 
US private health insurance market resulted in a decline in the proportion of people 
with coverage of about 25 percent. Our results suggest that in order for minimum 
coverage requirements to achieve their objective, they should be accompanied by a 
mix of taxes and subsidies.
Although the positive results of the imposition of minimum coverage requirements 
in standard asymmetric information models are similar to ours, the welfare results are 
quite different. In our model, both types are better off in the pooling equilibrium 
arising after the intervention whereas in standard models the safe type (the quantity- 
constrained) is strictly worse off. Therefore, our model provides a more convincing 
justification for the imposition of minimum coverage requirements than standard 
models as well as a case for the use of taxes and subsidies in insurance markets. 
Furthermore, intervention schemes involving minimum coverage requirements can be 
used to create a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when otherwise none would exist.
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Finally, although here we have focused on insurance markets, the introduction of 
optimism into an asymmetric information framework may have interesting 
implications for other issues as well. The design of managerial compensation 
schemes, the choice between self employment and being an employee, the design of 
securities and other corporate finance issues are only some of them.
Appendix 2A: Curvature of PtP/
The equation of the P f i  locus (A, = 0) is:
(2A.1)
By totally differentiating (2A.1) we obtain:
(p ‘F -p',)[UXH)dH-UXL)clL] = 0 => %
dti
p,p,
U \H )
U\L)
>0 (2A.2)
Also P,Pf implicitly defines L as a function of H, that is
L = g ( H ) (2A.3)
Using (2A.2) and taking into account (2A.3) we obtain:
d 2L
dH‘ p,p;
U \ H )  U'(H)U”(L) dg(H) U \ H )  U \H ) U \L )  U'(H) 
~ U\L) [U\L)]2 dH ~ U'(L) [U\L)f  U \ L )
d 2L
dH1
U'{H)
p,p: U'(L)
U \ H )  U \L )  U'{H) 
U \H )  U'(L) U\L)
U'{H)
U\L)
(2A.4)
U ' O )where AO) = ----- — is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
U' (•)
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< 0, and using (2A.4) we have:P ^ '  is concave in the (L,H) space iff
A(L) ^  A(H) (2A.5)
U\L) U \H )
Since H>L, increasing or constant absolute risk aversion implies that />/>' is concave 
in the (L,H) space.
Notice that A/U' is the derivative of the inverse of the marginal utility (l/£/'). This 
implies that the condition (2A.6) is satisfied iff (1/C/') is strictly concave. This 
condition is stronger than decreasing absolute risk aversion. Therefore, decreasing 
absolute risk aversion is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for PfPf to be 
strictly convex in the (L,H) space.
PtP/ is strictly convex in the (L,H) space iff    > 0 and using (2A.4) we have:
dH BD,
A(L)  ^ A(H) (2A.6)
U'(L) U \ H )
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Appendix 2B
Proposition 2B.1: Suppose that, between PRP'R and P0P '0 , I R is steeper than I Q and 
EM' does not cut I R through the intersection of EJ' and P0P'0 (point Z p). Then, i) 
if the degree of optimism is sufficiently low so that the Os’ indifference curve through 
Z p is flatter than EJ' even below P0P'0 there exists a unique pooling equilibrium
where both types take precautions and purchase a strictly positive amount of 
insurance (see Figure 2B.1). ii) If the degree of optimism is such that the Os’ 
indifference curve is tangent to EJ' between Z p and E , there exists a unique 
separating equilibrium where both types purchase strictly positive coverage and take 
precautions but the Rs buy more insurance than the Os (see Figure 2B.2).97
L
M'.
L
0 HH
Figure 2B.1
97 This is true if ( p F — p 0 ) is sufficiently large (preventive efforts are sufficiently “productive”), the
R Rdegree of optimism is not very large, and, given the degree of optimism, p F — p Q is not much larger 
than p F — P q (the distance between PRPR and PQP'0 is not very large).
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Proof: i) Clearly, offers above EJ' are loss-making. The same is true for offers above 
PRP 'R. Between PRP'R and P0P'0 and below EJ' there is no offer that attracts the Rs 
and does not attract the Os, although there are some offers that attract only the Os. 
Thus, any offer in this region is unprofitable. Given the equilibrium contract, below 
EJ' and below P0P'0 there is no offer that is attractive to either type. Therefore, the
pooling contract zp is the unique equilibrium, ii) Similar arguments can be used to 
show that the separating pair (zR ,z0) is the unique equilibrium. Q.E.D.
L
L
H H
Figure 2B.2
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Appendix 2C
Proposition 2C.1: The imposition of a binding maximum coverage requirement can 
never improve the Os’ true welfare.
Proof: It suffices to show that if the Os choose a contract where they do not take 
precautions, they are strictly better off than at any other contract where they take 
precautions but they purchase less coverage. Suppose that, given their perceived 
accident probability, the Os are indifferent between the contract Z Q, where they take
precautions and purchase low coverage, and the contract Z Q, where they do not take
precautions but purchase more insurance. Since the I TQ through Z 0 passes above
Z 0 , at Z Q the Os’ true welfare is strictly greater (see Figure 2C.1). Q.E.D.
Intuitively, the Os will choose the contract offering more coverage only if their 
perceived welfare is greater than at the contract offering lower coverage. Because the 
Os underestimate their accident probability, their true utility at the high-coverage 
contract exceeds that at the low-coverage contract even more. For the very same 
reason, the Os’ true welfare at the high-coverage contract may be strictly greater than 
at the low-coverage contract even if the Os prefer the latter.
H H
Figure 2C.1
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Chapter 3
Asymmetric Information, Heterogeneity 
in Risk Perceptions and Insurance:
An Explanation to a Puzzle
3.1 Introduction
Most recent empirical studies of insurance markets have focused on the relationship 
between the coverage of the contract and the ex post risk (accident rate) of its buyers. 
The results are mixed. De Meza and Webb (2001) provide casual evidence for a 
negative relationship in the credit card insurance market.98 Cawley and Philipson 
(1999) study of life insurance contracts also shows a negative relationship which, 
however, is not statistically significant. A similar result is obtained by Chiappori and 
Salanie (2000)99 and Dionne, Gourieroux and Vanasse (2001) for the automobile 
insurance market.100 In contrast, Finkelstein and Poterba (2000) find a positive 
relationship in the UK annuities market. Individuals who purchase annuities tend to 
live longer than those who do not buy.
Starting with the seminal Rothschild-Stiglitz paper (1976), most theoretical models 
of competitive insurance markets under asymmetric information predict a positive 
relationship between coverage and the accident probability of the buyer of the 
contract. This prediction is shared by models of pure adverse selection (e.g. 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)), pure moral hazard (e.g. Amott and Stiglitz (1988)) as 
well as models of adverse selection plus moral hazard (e.g. Chassagnon and Chiappori 
(1997) and Chiappori et.al. (2002)). In fact, Chiappori et.al. (2002) argue that the 
positive correlation property is extremely general. However, in a recent paper, de 
Meza and Webb (2001) provide a model where agents are heterogeneous with respect 
to their risk aversion and face a moral hazard problem. Also, insurance companies pay
98 4.8% of U.K. credit cards are reported lost or stolen each year. The corresponding figure for insured 
cards is 2.7%.
99 In the Chiappori and Salanie (2000) study those opting for less coverage purchase the legal minimum 
of third-party coverage. Dionne et.al (2001) look at contracts with two different levels of deductibles.
100 All three studies control for observable characteristics known to insurers.
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a fixed administrative cost per claim. In this model, there exist a separating and a 
partial pooling equilibrium predicting a negative relationship but due to the fixed per 
claim cost the less risk-averse agents go uninsured.
In this chapter, we first show that these (seemingly) contradictory theoretical 
results can be reconciled. Given that fixed administrative costs are strictly positive, it 
is shown that the Chiappori et.al. argument holds necessarily true only if, in 
equilibrium, all agents purchase some insurance. If some agents choose zero 
coverage, then their assertion is not necessarily true. In this case, there exist 
separating equilibria that exhibit negative or no correlation between coverage and 
risk. The presence of these costs results in some agents (the risk tolerant) choosing not 
to insure. The fact that the administrative costs are now incurred only by the insured 
agents changes the computation of the premiums which allowed Chiappori et.al 
(2002) to derive their result.
Therefore, competitive models of insurance markets under asymmetric information 
can explain the observed negative or no-correlation between coverage and risk in 
cases where some agents choose zero coverage. For example, the de Meza and Webb 
(2001) empirical findings are perfectly consistent with the predictions of these 
models. Furthermore, if the fixed costs per claim are sufficiently high, they can 
possibly explain similar empirical patterns in cases with more than two events (more 
than one levels of loss), (e.g. the Chiappori and Salanie (2000) and Dionne et.al 
(2001) empirical findings).101 However, their prediction is not consistent with 
negative or no-correlation in insurance markets where all agents opt for strictly 
positive coverage and there are just two events (loss/no loss), (e.g. the Cawley and 
Phillipson (1999) findings).
Jullien, Salanie and Salanie (2001) provide a model where negative correlation 
between risk and coverage is possible even if all agents purchase some insurance and 
there is just one level of loss.102 As far as the insurees are concerned, their model is 
similar to de Meza-Webb (2001) but in their case the insurer has monopoly power. In 
order to reveal their type and obtain insurance at a lower per unit price, the less risk- 
averse insurees accept partial coverage. On the contrary, not only are the more risk-
1011 would like to thank David de Meza for this point.
102 Villeneuve (2000) reverses the information structure, he assumes that insurers know better the 
insuree’s accident probability than the insuree himself, and obtains separating equilibria displaying a 
negative relationship between risk and coverage. In order to convince the high-risk of his type, the 
monopolistic insurer must offer him a contract that he would not propose to the low-risk type. Profit 
maximisation then requires that the high-risk type be offered less coverage.
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averse agents willing to pay a higher per unit price to purchase more coverage but also 
take more precautions and so have a lower accident probability. The positive 
correlation property breaks because the insurer exploits his monopoly power and 
extracts more surplus from the more risk-averse insurees.
However, insurance markets seem to be fairly competitive and so monopoly is not 
a good approximation. More importantly, although in Jullien, Salanie Mid Salanie 
(2001) the low-risk type is better insured, more coverage is associated with a higher 
per unit price. Therefore, although they can explain the negative correlation between 
coverage and risk, the striking observation of Cawley and Phillipson (1999) that 
insurance premiums exhibit quantity discounts remains a puzzle.
This chapter, by introducing heterogeneity in risk perceptions in a competitive 
model of asymmetric information, provides an explanation to the puzzling empirical 
findings. On the one hand, several empirical studies by psychologists indicate that the 
majority of people tend to be unrealistically optimistic, in the sense that overestimate 
their ability and the outcome of their actions and underestimate the probability of 
various risks.103 104 On the other hand, Viscusi (1990) finds that more individuals 
overestimate the risk of lung-cancer associated with smoking than underestimate it 
and, on average, they greatly overestimate it.105 Also, those who perceive a higher risk 
are less likely to smoke. As these studies indicate, regardless of the direction of the 
bias, people do hold different beliefs about the same or similar risks.106
The more optimistic (henceforth Os) agents underestimate their accident 
probability both in absolute terms and relative to the less optimistic ones (henceforth 
Rs) and so purchase less insurance. They also tend to be less willing to take 
precautions. This gives rise to separating equilibria exhibiting negative or no 
correlation between coverage and risk. Two examples of these equilibria are presented 
where both the Os and the Rs purchase some insurance.
The first equilibrium predicts both negative correlation between coverage and risk 
and that per unit premiums fall with the quantity of insurance purchased. The Os not 
only take fewer precautions (high-risk type) but also purchase less coverage than the
103 For a survey see Weinstein and Klein (1996). See also de Meza and Southey (1996) and Manove 
and Padilla (1999) for a discussion of entrepreneurial optimism.
104 See De Bondt and Thaler (1995) for a survey of the behavioural finance literature.
105 There is some evidence that people overestimate their accident probability when it is objectively 
small (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)).
106 Given that agents may have different information sets or observe different signals, heterogeneity in 
risk perceptions is not necessarily inconsistent with rationality (or even rational expectations).
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Rs. Competition among insurance companies then implies that the Os also pay a 
higher per unit premium. Because they underestimate their accident probability, the 
Os purchase low coverage at a high per unit price, although contracts offering more 
insurance at the same or even lower per unit price are available.
The second equilibrium exhibits no correlation between coverage and risk and 
involves the Rs being quantity-constrained. In order to reveal their type, the Rs accept 
lower coverage than they would have chosen under full information about types. 
Moreover, if we allow for fixed administrative costs, this equilibrium displays a 
negative relationship between coverage and per unit premiums. Since both types take 
precautions they have the same accident probability and so are charged the same 
marginal price. But the fact that the Os purchase less coverage implies that their total 
per unit premium is higher.
These results have several interesting implications. First, they explain both 
puzzling empirical findings reported by Cawley and Phillipson (1999): The negative 
or no correlation between coverage and risk and the fact that insurance premiums 
display quantity discounts.
Second, Cawley and Philipson (1999), Chiappori and Salanie (2000) and Dionne 
et.al. (2001) argue that the no-correlation empirical findings imply that there is no 
(risk-related) adverse selection. Thus, there are no information barriers to trade in the 
life and automobile insurance markets under study. Through underwriting, appropriate 
risk classification and other procedures, insurers can distinguish risks and no 
additional self-selection mechanism or government intervention is needed. The result 
in the latter equilibrium suggests that their assertion is not generally true.
Insurance companies may be able to distinguish risks in cases where the accident 
probability is exogenous. However, in most cases, accident probabilities are 
endogenous and are affected by the insurees’ actions which are unobservable and 
determined by the insurees’ personal characteristics. Although insurers can detect 
some of these characteristics, it is highly unlikely that they can identify all of them 
(e.g. degree of risk aversion, risk perceptions). If insurees differ with respect to their 
risk perceptions and types are hidden, there exist equilibria involving some agents 
being quantity-constrained even if the data show no correlation between coverage and 
the accident rate. Furthermore, in these cases, there exist intervention policies that 
yield a strict Pareto improvement on the laissez-faire equilibrium.
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Third, they allow us to empirically distinguish our approach from standard 
asymmetric information models. To this end, we rely on a very general result derived 
by Chiappori etal (2002). If an agent chooses one contract over another offering more 
coverage, then it must be true that his accident probability under the contract chosen is 
strictly lower than the per unit premium of the additional coverage offered by the 
other contract. This is a revealed preference argument. Its validity is independent of 
the market structure or whether some agents go uninsured. However, because some 
agents underestimate their accident probability, this prediction fails in both equilibria 
presented in this chapter.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present a simplified version 
of the Chiappori et.al. framework and show that if some agents choose zero coverage, 
the relationship between coverage and risk is not necessarily positive. In Section 3, we 
present a model where agents differ with respect to their risk perceptions and face a 
moral hazard problem. Section 4 provides a diagrammatic proof for the existence of 
the two separating equilibria described above. In Section 5, we consider the welfare 
properties of the latter equilibrium. Section 6 deals with the empirical implications of 
our results. Finally, section 7 concludes.
3.2 Reconciliation of Existing Results
To show that the de Meza-Webb (2001) and Chiappori et.al (2002) results are 
consistent, we employ a simplified version of the latter model. There are two states of 
nature: good and bad. In the good state the agent incurs no loss whereas in the bad 
state he incurs a loss of De . The parameter 6 represents all the characteristics of the 
agent (potential insuree) that are his private information (risk, risk aversion, loss, etc). 
An agent of type 0 may privately choose his loss probability 1 -  p  in some subset of 
[0,1]. This choice implies a prevention cost that is assumed to be a negative function 
of the loss probability. In pure adverse selection models this subset is a singleton 
whereas in moral hazard models where agents choose their preventive effort level, this 
subset may include two or more points. A contract consists of coverage and premium: 
C -  (Ay, y ) , A > 1. The ex post risk of an insuree is a function of the contract he 
chooses. The average ex post risk of insurees choosing contract C is 1 -  p(C). Also, 
the following assumptions are made:
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Assumption 1: For all contracts offered and all agent types overinsurance is ruled out 
by assuming Zy <Dg.
Assumption 2: Agents are risk averse (in the sense that they are averse to mean- 
preserving spreads on wealth).
Assumption 3: Insurance companies are risk neutral, and incur a cost per contract 
c > 0 and a cost per claim c' > 0. So, the expected profit of an insurance company 
offering contract C = (Zy,y) to an agent with ex post risk 1 -  p  is
7T =  y  -  (1 -  p){Z y + c ' ) - c
Profit Monotonicitv (PM) Assumption: If two contracts C, and C2 are chosen in 
equilibrium and Zxy x < Z2y 2, then 7t(Cx) > 7r(C2) .101
We now generalize the Chiappori et.al result to cover cases where some agents go 
uninsured.
Proposition 1: Under Assumptions 1 to 3 and PM if two contracts C, and C2 are 
chosen in equilibrium and Zly l < Z2y 2, then 1 - p(Cx) < 1 - p(C2) is necessarily true 
if 0 < Zxy l < Z2y 2 and c,c' > 0. If Zxy ] = 0 and c > 0 or c' > 0 or c,c' > 0, then 
1 -  p(Cx) < 1 -  p(C2) is not necessarily true, 1 -  p(Cx) > 1 -  p{C2) is also possible.
Proof: The proof is done through two lemmas.
Lemma 1: Suppose an agent 6 chooses the contract C, = (Zxy x,y x) = (0,0) over the 
contract C2 = (Z2y 2,y2) where Z2y 2 > 0. Then it must be true that
i - p (c ,)<^- = y 2-
A 2 2~y 2
107 Assumptions 1-3 and the profit monotonicity (PM) assumption are taken from Chiappori et al.
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Proof: See Appendix 3A.
Intuitively, given risk aversion, if the per unit premium under C2, \/X2 , were less 
than his accident probability under C,, the agent would be strictly better off taking 
contract C2, rather than going uninsured, while keeping 1 -  p(Cx).
Lemma 2: Suppose C, = (Xxy x,yx) = (0,0) and C2 =(X2y 2,y 2) are chosen in 
equilibrium. If c > 0  or c ' > 0 or c ,c '>  0, then it may be true that 
1 - p(Cx) > \ - p { C 2) . If X2y 2 > Xxy x >0,then I - p ( C x) < \ - p ( C 2) is always true.
Proof: By Lemma 1 we have
1 - p ( c , ) < - ^ — => y 2 - ( I - p ( C l))A2y 2 >0 (3.1)
iy  2
In this case, n{Cx) is (identically) equal to zero. Therefore,
x(C\) = 0 < y2 -  (1 -  p(Cx ))X2y 2 (3.2)
The expected profit for an insurance company offering contract C2 is
< C 2) = y 2 -(1 - p ( C 2))(X2y 2 + c ' ) - c  (3.3)
Given (PM), 7t{Cx) = 0 , and the fact that in equilibrium profits cannot be negative, it 
follows that 7r(Cx) = x(C2) = 0. Then, using (3.2) and (3.3) we obtain:
[1 -  p(C2) -  (1 -  p(Cx m y 2X2 + c') > -[(1 -  p(Cx ) y  + c] (3.4)
Given X2y 2 >0 and c > 0 or c' > 0 or c,c' > 0, it is clear from (3.4) that it may well 
be true that 1 -  p{Cx) > 1 - p(C2) .
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If Z2y 2 > Axy x > 0 , using similar arguments we have:
1 ~ P ( C l ) <  y — - y '—  => (^2 -  3^ 1) ~ (1 -  .PCC'l ))(^2^2 “  ) > 0 (3-5)Ky2-\y\
Using the expected profit functions n{Ci) , i = 1,2, and (3.5) we obtain:
«<c,) -  *(C2) < [(1 -  p(C2)) -  (l -  />(C, ))](/l2>’2 +C-) (3.6)
Given (PM), (3.6) implies 1 -  p(Cx) < 1 -  p(C2). Q.E.D.
Intuitively, if all agents purchase some insurance, they all pay the fixed administrative 
costs through a higher per unit premium. Also, given risk aversion, if an agent 
chooses the low-coverage contract, Cx, it must be true that the per unit price of the 
additional coverage offered by C2 exceeds his accident probability under Cx. 
Otherwise, the agent would be strictly better off by choosing C2 while keeping the 
same accident probability. Hence, because insurance companies’ profit on C, is not 
less than on C2, the accident probability of an agent choosing Cx must be strictly 
lower than an agent choosing C2.
However, if some agents go uninsured, they do not incur these fixed costs. As a 
result, although their accident probability is lower than the per unit premium paid by 
the insured, it is not necessarily lower than the insured’s accident probability because 
the per unit premium paid by the latter covers both their accident probability and the 
fixed costs. Therefore, the negative correlation equilibria obtained by de Meza and 
Webb (2001) are perfectly consistent with the predictions of Chiappori et.al. (2002) 
general framework.
In summary, if some agents choose zero coverage, then both negative and no 
correlation between coverage and risk can arise. However, if, in equilibrium, all 
agents choose contracts offering strictly positive coverage, then asymmetric 
information plus competition among insurance companies imply a strictly positive 
relationship. Therefore, competitive models of insurance markets under asymmetric 
information can explain the observed negative or no-correlation between coverage
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and risk if the comparison is between those who actually purchase some insurance and 
those choosing not to insure (e.g. the de Meza and Webb (2001) empirical findings). 
Furthermore, if the fixed costs per claim are sufficiently high, they can possibly 
explain similar empirical patterns in cases with more than one levels of loss (e.g. the 
Chiappori and Salanie (2000) and Dionne et.al (2001) empirical findings). However, 
their prediction is not consistent with negative or no-correlation in insurance markets 
where all agents opt for strictly positive coverage and there is just one loss level (e.g. 
the Cawley and Philipson (1999) findings).
Jullien, Salanie and Salanie (2001) provide a model where negative correlation 
between risk and coverage is possible even if all agents purchase some insurance and 
there just two events (loss/no loss). As far as the insurees are concerned, their model 
is similar to de Meza-Webb (2001) but in their case the insurer has monopoly power. 
In order to reveal their type and obtain insurance at a lower per unit price, the less 
risk-averse insurees accept partial coverage. In contrast, not only are the more risk- 
averse agents willing to pay a higher per unit price to purchase more coverage but also 
take more precautions and so have a lower accident probability. The positive 
correlation property breaks because the insurer exploits his monopoly power and 
extracts more surplus from the more risk-averse insurees.
However, insurance markets seem to be fairly competitive and so monopoly is not 
a good approximation. More importantly, although in Jullien, Salanie and Salanie 
(2001) the low-risk type is better insured, more coverage is associated with a higher 
per unit price. Therefore, although they can explain the negative correlation between 
coverage and risk, the striking observation of Cawley and Phillipson (1999) that 
insurance premiums exhibit quantity discounts remains a puzzle.
This chapter, by introducing heterogeneity in risk perceptions in a competitive 
model of asymmetric information, provides an explanation to both puzzling empirical 
findings. Most standard asymmetric information models of insurance markets 
(including the Chiappori et.al. (2002) model) implicitly assume that all insurees have 
an accurate estimate of their accident probability108 (given the precautionary effort 
level). Our model retains the assumption of perfect competition among insurance 
companies but allows agents (insurees) to have different perceptions of the same risk. 
Except for the misperception of risk, all agents are fully rational. They aim at
108 Villeneuve (2000) is an exception.
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maximising their (perceived) utility and understand the nature and implications of 
market interactions.
3.3 The Model
There are two states of nature: good and bad. In the good state there is no loss 
whereas in the bad state the individual (insuree) suffers a gross loss of D. Before the 
realisation of the state of nature all individuals have the same wealth level, W. Also, 
all individuals are risk averse and have the same utility function but differ with 
respect to their perception of the probability of suffering the loss. There are two types 
of individuals, the Rs and the Os. The Rs have an accurate estimate of their true loss 
probability whereas the Os underestimate it.109
Furthermore, all agents can affect the true loss probability by undertaking 
preventive activities. Given the level of precautionary effort, the true loss probability 
is the same for both types. We consider the case where agents either take precautions 
or not (two effort levels). If an individual takes precautions (F. = F),  he incurs a
utility cost of F  and his true probability of avoiding the loss p(Ft) is p F. If he takes
no precautions (Fj =0), his utility cost is 0 but his true probability of avoiding the
loss p(Ft) is p 0, where p F > p 0.
Now, let p' = p{Fi,K i) be the (perceived) probability function. Where K t is the
degree of “optimism” and takes two values: 1 for the Rs (KR = 1), and K  > 1 for the
Os (K 0 = K > 1). This probability function is assumed to be strictly increasing in K , .
As a result, the following relationships are true:
Pj  =P(Fi>KR) = P(Fi ,l) = p ( Fi) = P j ,  i = 0 , R ,  j  = F,  0 (3.7)
P °  = p ( Fi , K 0 ) = p ( Fi , K ) >  p (Ft) = p J9 j = 0 , R ,  j  = F ,0 (3.8)
109 For expositional simplicity, we assume that the more optimistic are optimists whereas the less 
optimistic are realists. However, all the results go through if two types are respectively optimists and 
pessimists.
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where pj  is the true probability of avoiding the loss.
In this environment, the (perceived) expected utility of an agent i is given by:
EUi (F(,K, ,y , ,4 ,  W) = p)U{W -  y) + (1 ■- p ) )U(W - D  + ( A - 1 )y) -  Ft ,
j  = F, 0 i = 0 ,R  (3.9)
where W: insuree’s initial wealth 
D : gross loss 
y: insurance premium 
(A -  l)y : net payout in the event of loss, A > 1 
Ay : coverage (gross payout in the event of loss)
Hence, the increase in (perceived) expected utility from taking precautions is:
&,=(p‘F - P l ' P ( W - y ) - U ( W - D  + ( .X -r )y)] -F , i = 0 ,R  (3.10)
where U is strictly concave and W -  y , W -  D + (A -  \)y are the wealth levels in the 
good and the bad state respectively.
There are two risk neutral insurance companies involved in Bertrand competition. 
Insurance companies know the true accident probability (given the precautionary 
effort level) and the perceived accident probabilities of the Os and Rs but they can 
observe neither the type nor the actions of each insuree. They also know the cost for 
the insuree corresponding to each precautionary effort level, the utility function of the 
insurees and the proportion of the Os and Rs in the population. In order to make the 
distinction between the results under different risk perceptions and those of the 
standard competitive models of asymmetric information clearer, we assume that the 
costs of processing claims (or underwriting costs) are zero.110
The insurance contract (y, Ay) specifies the premium y  and the coverage Ay . As 
a result, since insurance companies have an accurate estimate of the true accident 
probability, the expected profit of an insurer offering such a contract is:
x  = P j y - ( l - P j ) ( A - l ) y ,  j  = F, 0 (3.11)
1,0 All results go through if fixed administrative costs are strictly positive but not very large.
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Equilibrium
Insurance companies and insurees play the following two-stage screening game:
Stage 1: The two insurance companies simultaneously make offers of sets of
contracts (y, Ay) . Each insurance company may offer any finite number of contracts. 
Stage 2: Given the offers made by the insurers, insurees apply for at most one contract 
from one insurance company. If an insuree’s most preferred contract is offered by 
both insurance companies, he takes each insurer’s contract with probability Vi. The 
terms of the contract chosen determine whether the insuree will take unobservable 
precautions.
We only consider pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). Depending 
on parameter values, three kinds of equilibria can arise: separating, full-pooling and 
partial-pooling. In this chapter, we only present the two most interesting separating 
equilibria.
A pair of contracts z0 = (y0 ,A0y 0) and zR = (yR,ARy R) is an equilibrium if the 
following conditions are satisfied:
i) The revelation constraints
E U r {z r ) > E U r {z 0 )
(3.12a)
E U 0 ( z 0 ) > E U 0 ( z r )
ii) The effort incentive constraints 
F  if A, > 0 , i = 0 ,R
F; = (3.12b)
0 otherwise
with A( defined in (3.10).
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iii) The participation (or IR) constraints o f both types:
EUt{zt) > EU^Zq) , i = 0 ,R (3.12c)
where z0 =(y,Ay) = (0,0) 
iv) Profit maximisation for insurance companies:
• No contract in the equilibrium pair (z0 ,zR) makes negative 
expected profits.
• No other set of contracts introduced alongside those already in 
the market would increase an insurer’s expected profits.
3.4 Negative and Zero Correlation Equilibria
Let H = W - y  and L = W -D  + (Z -  \)y  denote the income of an insuree who has
chosen the contract (y, Ay) in the good and bad state respectively. Let also H - W
and L = W - D  denote the endowment of an insuree after the realisation of the state 
of nature.
3.4.1 Effort Incentive Constraints
Let us first consider the moral hazard problem an insuree of type i faces. A given 
contract (y,Ay) will induce an agent of type i to take precautions if
Let P,Pf be the locus of combinations (L, H) such that A. = 0. Since F , U' > 0, 
the P.Pj locus lies entirely below the 45° line in the (L, H) space. This locus divides 
the (L, H) space into two regions: On and below the PtPf locus the insurees take 
precautions (this is the set of effort incentive compatible contracts) and above it they
{ p ' r - p H u m - U i L f e F  O  A; > 0 , i = OtR (3.13)
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do not. The slope and the curvature of PtP! in the (L, H) space are given respectively 
by:
dL
dH P,P!
U \H )  
U \L )
>0 since U' >0 (3-14)
d 2L
dH ‘
U'(H)
p,p; U \L )
A ( L ) ^ ^ - - A ( H )  
V U'(L)
(3.15)
U”(L)where A(L) = ----- —  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
V U \L)
Since both types have the same utility function, it is clear from the above formulas 
that the shape of P,PJ is independent of the type of the insuree. In addition, P,P! is 
upward sloping. Also if £/(•) exhibits either increasing or constant absolute risk 
aversion P f i  is strictly concave. If U(•) exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, it 
can be either concave or convex. (See Appendix 2A for a necessary and sufficient 
condition in order for PtPJ to be strictly convex).
However, the position of PtP( does depend upon the insuree’s type. Although the
Os overestimate their probability of avoiding the loss at any given precautionary 
effort level, they may either overestimate or underestimate the increase in that 
probability from choosing a higher preventive effort level. Though both cases are 
possible, the latter seems to be more reasonable especially if, given that no 
precautions are taken, the perceived probability of avoiding the accident is high.111 In 
this chapter, the analysis is carried out under the assumption that the latter case is 
relevant. In particular, the following assumption is made:
Assumption 1: P* ~ Po > P? ~ Po
That is, the Rs’ set of effort incentive compatible contracts is strictly greater than 
that of the Os. It is also assumed that
111 This assumption is also consistent with Viscusi’s (1990) finding that those who perceive a higher 
risk are less likely to smoke. The more pessimistic agents take more precautions.
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Assumption 2: (p'F - p'0) \ lJ (H )-U (L) ]>  F ,  i = 0 , R
Assumption 2 implies that both PRP'R and P0P'0 pass above the endowment point,
and so the effective set of effort incentive compatible contracts is not empty for either 
type. If Assumption 2 does not hold for either type, the corresponding type never 
takes precautions.
Two points must be stressed here. First, Assumption 1 is required for but does not 
necessarily imply a negative relationship between coverage and ex post risk. It may 
well be the case that Assumption 1 holds and a separating or a partial pooling 
equilibrium arises exhibiting a positive relationship.112 Second, although, Assumption 
1 is necessary for the negative correlation prediction, Assumption 2 does not need to 
hold for the Os. In fact, this result obtains more easily if the direction of inequality in 
Assumption 2 is reversed for the Os. That is, if the Os never take precautions. On the 
contrary, the no-correlation result requires Assumption 2 but not Assumption l .113 It 
obtains even if the Os overestimate not only their probability of avoiding the accident 
but also the increase in that probability from taking precautions.
3.4.2 Indifference Curves
The indifference curves, labelled /,, are kinked where they cross the corresponding 
PtP/ locus. Above P,P/, insurees of the the i-type do not take precautions, their 
perceived probability of avoiding the loss is p ‘0, and so the slope of I t is:
dL
dH l - p ' o  U X L )
P° U (H> i = 0 ,R  (3.16)
On and below ^ P ' insurees of the i-type do take precautions, their perceived 
probability of avoiding the loss rises to p ‘F and so the slope of 7, becomes:
112 Chapter 2 provides some examples.
113 The no-correlation result obtains even if the direction of the inequality in Assumption 2 is reversed. 
However, this assumption would imply that both types never take precautions and so this case is not 
very interesting.
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dH
dL P f U \ H )  
I - P f  U'{L)
i = 0 , R (3.17)
Hence, just above P,P’ the i-type indifference curves become flatter.
Furthermore, because the Os underestimate their accident probability, at any given 
identical preventive effort level and (L ,H ) pair, the Os indifference curve is steeper 
in the (L ,H ) space. Intuitively, the Os are less willing to exchange consumption in 
the good state for consumption in the bad state because their perceived probability of 
the bad state occurring is lower than that of the Rs.
3.4.3 Insurers’ Zero-profit Lines (Offer Curves)
Using the definitions H = W -  y  and L = W -  D + (X -  \ )y , and the fact that 
insurance companies have an accurate estimate of the true accident probabilities, 
given the precautionary effort level, the insurers’ expected profit function becomes:
Conditional on the preventive effort level chosen by the two types of insurees, there 
are three zero-profit lines with slopes:
jr = p JQ V -H ) -Q .-p J)(L -W  + D) (3.18)
The zero-profit lines are given by:
L = -—-— W —H - D , j  = F, 0
1 - P j  1 ~ P j
(3.19)
1 ~Po
Po (EN’ line) (3.20)
dL P f (EJ’ line) (3.21)
1 ~ P f
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= — —  (EM’ line (pooled-line)) (3.22)
d H ^  1 - q
where q = ppj + (1 -  p )p k, j  = F ,0, A: = F ,0, and p  is the proportion of the Rs in
the population of insurees.
Also, at H = H = W , Eq. (3.19) becomes:
L - W - D  (3.23)
Eq. (3.23) is independent of the value of P j . This implies that all three zero-profit
lines have the same origin (the endowment point, E).
We can now provide a diagrammatic proof of the existence of the two separating 
equilibria. The negative correlation result is shown in Proposition 2 whereas 
Proposition 3 provides an example of a separating equilibrium exhibiting no­
correlation between coverage and ex post risk.
Proposition 2: If the Os’ indifference curve tangent to EN ' , I*Q, passes above the
intersection of EJ' and PRPR and meets P0P ’0 above E J', then there exists a unique
separating equilibrium (zR,zQ) where the Rs take precautions whereas the Os do not.
Both types choose strictly positive coverage but the Rs buy more than the Os (see 
Figure 3.1).114
Proof: We test whether (zR,zQ) is an equilibrium by considering deviations.
Clearly, the Os strictly prefer z0 to zR. Offers above EJ' are clearly loss-making. 
Similarly, offers above PRPR either do not attract any type or, if they do, are 
unprofitable. Below EJ' and below PRPR there is no offer that attracts the Rs but
114 This is true if ( p F — p 0 ) is sufficiently small and the degrees of optimism and risk aversion are 
sufficiently large.
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0 HH
Figure 3.1
there are some offers that attract the Os and so are unprofitable (given the equilibrium 
contract zR, the Rs are attracted only by contracts that he above EJ' which are, of 
course, loss-making). So, there is no profitable deviation and the (zR,za) pair is the 
unique separating equilibrium. The fact that I*Q passes above zR rules out any 
pooling equilibrium. Therefore, (zR,zQ) is the unique equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Intuitively, given the contracts offered, because the Os considerably underestimate 
the reduction in their accident probability from taking precautions, they choose to take 
no precautions. Also, although insurance is offered at actuarially fair terms, because 
they underestimate their accident probability, the Os underinsure choosing a contract 
with low coverage while contracts with higher coverage are available at the same or 
even lower per unit premium.
That is, this separating equilibrium has two interesting features. The Os not only 
purchase less coverage than the Rs but also take fewer precautions and so their 
accident probability is higher. Competition among insurance companies then implies 
that the Os also pay a higher per unit premium. Therefore, this equilibrium is 
consistent with both the negative correlation between coverage and risk (point 
estimate) and the fact that per unit premiums fall with the quantity of insurance 
purchased as reported by Cawley and Philipson (1999).
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Proposition 3: Suppose EM ' does not cut I R through the intersection point of E Jf
and I*0 (the Os’ indifference curve tangent to EJ' below PQP'0 and to the left of E).
Then there exists a unique separating equilibrium where both types purchase strictly 
positive coverage and take precautions but the Rs buy more insurance than the Os. 
That is, this equilibrium exhibits no correlation between coverage and the accident 
probability (see Figure 3.2).115
Proof: Consider the following deviations. Clearly, offers above EJ' are loss-making. 
The same is true for offers above PRP 'R. Between PRPR and P0P'0 and below EJ'
there is no offer that attracts Rs and does not attract the Os, although there are some 
offers that attract only the Os. Thus, any offer in this region is unprofitable. Given the 
equilibrium contracts, below EJ' and below P0P'0 there is no offer that is attractive
to either type. Hence, the pair (zR,z0) is the unique separating equilibrium. 
Furthermore, the fact that EM' does not cut I R below PRP'R rules out any pooling 
equilibrium. Therefore, the pair (zR,zQ) is the unique equilibrium. Q.E.D.
L
L
0 HH
Figure 3.2
115 This is true if (p F — p 0) is sufficiently large (preventive efforts are sufficiently “productive”), the
R Rdegree of optimism is not very large, and, given the degree of optimism, p F — p 0 is not much larger 
than p R — P q (the distance between PRP'R and P0P'0 is not very large).
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Although they purchase more coverage than the Os, the Rs are quantity-constrained. 
Under full information about types, the Rs would have purchased the contract at the 
intersection of PRPR and EJ ' , instead of zR, which involves more insurance. 
However, since types are hidden, this contract is not offered because it violates the 
Os’ revelation and effort incentive constraints and so is loss-making for the insurance 
companies. In order to reveal their type, the Rs accept lower coverage than they 
would have chosen if types were observable.
Strictly speaking, the no-correlation prediction is unlikely to be observed in 
practice. However, if one interprets it as a failure to reject the no-correlation null, then 
it is consistent with the findings of Cawley and Philipson (1999), Chiappori and 
Salanie (2000) and Dionne et.al. (2001) about the relationship between coverage and 
the accident rate. Furthermore, if we allow for administrative and/or underwriting 
costs, this equilibrium also explains the negative relationship between coverage and 
per unit premiums (see Figure 3.3). Since both types take precautions they have the 
same accident probability and so are charged the same marginal price. But the fact 
that the Os purchase less coverage implies that their total per unit premium is higher. 
In fact, Cawley and Philipson (1999) find that a fixed production (underwriting) cost 
and a constant marginal cost explain almost all risk-adjusted variation in prices.
L
M\
L
0 H H
Figure 3.3
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3.5 Welfare Implications
Cawley and Philipson (1999), Chiappori and Salanie (2000) and Dionne et.al. (2001) 
argue that no correlation between coverage and ex post risk implies that there is no 
(risk-related) adverse selection. As a result, there are no information barriers to trade 
in the life and automobile insurance markets under study. Through underwriting, 
appropriate risk classification and other procedures, insurers can distinguish risks and 
no additional self-selection mechanism or government intervention is needed. 
However, the separating equilibrium of Proposition 3 suggests that their assertion is 
not generally true.
Insurance companies may be able to distinguish risks in cases where the accident 
probability is exogenous. However, in most cases, accident probabilities are 
endogenous and are affected by the insurees’ actions which are unobservable and 
determined by the insurees’ personal characteristics. Although insurers can detect 
some of these characteristics, it is highly unlikely that they can identify all of them 
(e.g. degree of risk aversion, risk perceptions). If insurees differ with respect to their 
risk perceptions and types are hidden, there exist equilibria involving some agents 
being quantity-constrained even if the data show no correlation between coverage and 
the accident rate (e.g. equilibrium of Proposition 3).
In this section we explore the welfare properties of this equilibrium. Because some 
of the insurees, the Os, underestimate their accident probability, the definition of the 
efficiency of the equilibrium is not straightforward. The very presence of the Os raises 
the question of what is the appropriate efficiency criterion. Should we employ 
objective probabilities (true expected utility) or subjective probabilities (perceived 
expected utility)? The answer to this question depends crucially on the origin of the 
agents’ biased estimate. In our environment, the different estimates of the same risk 
arise because of different perceptions not because of different underlying preferences. 
Both the Os and the Rs have identical preferences. As a result, the preferences 
revealed by the insuree’s choices coincide with the true underlying preferences. 
Therefore, the appropriate efficiency criterion seems to be objective rather than 
subjective probabilities. However, in this case, regardless of which criterion is used, 
the suggested intervention policy yields a strict Pareto improvement on the laissez- 
faire equilibrium.
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Proposition 4: In the separating equilibrium of Proposition 3, introducing a fixed tax 
per contract sold, with the proceeds returned as a lump-sum subsidy to the whole 
population yields a strict Pareto improvement if the proportion of the Os is 
sufficiently small (see Figure 3.4).
Proof: The tax per contract sold shifts the origin of the zero-profit lines down the 
45° line to J . On the contrary, the subsidy shifts the endowment point E up the
y-v A
45 line to E and the origin of the zero-profit lines along which the insured can 
consume (consumption zero-profit lines) up the 45 line from J  to J  . After the 
intervention, the consumption bundle of the Rs, CR, consists of the insurance contract 
Z R and the subsidy whereas that of the Os’, E = C0, consists of their endowment, E , 
and the subsidy. If the proportion of the Os is small, J J ’ lies close to EJ' and E  lies 
well above E . As a result, the Rs’ indifference curve through CR, I R, and the Os’
indifference curve through E = C0, I 0 , lie above the corresponding indifference
curves in the laissez-faire equilibrium. That is, in the new equilibrium, the perceived 
expected utility of both types has increased. To show that the Os’ true welfare has 
also improved, we employ true accident probabilities and construct a curve along
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which the Os’ true welfare is constant, given their precautionary effort level choice 
(the I q curve in Figure 3.4). Since the I q through E = C0 passes above Z0 , the Os’ 
true welfare at E = CQ is strictly greater than at Z Q. That is, in the new equilibrium 
both the Rs and the Os are strictly better off.116 Q.E.D.
Intuitively, the imposition of the tax results in the Os going uninsured and 
mitigates the negative externality their presence creates. In the new equilibrium, the 
Rs purchase more insurance but subsidise the Os. The question is whether the 
improvement in their welfare, because of the higher coverage, exceeds the welfare 
loss due to the subsidy they provide the Os in order to relax their revelation 
constraint? Because the proportion of the Os is small, the per capita subsidy is high 
and so its effect both on the Os’ utility and revelation constraint is large. This, in turn, 
allows the Rs to purchase a significantly higher amount of insurance. As a result, the 
welfare gains of the higher coverage more than offset the welfare loss due to the net 
tax (tax minus subsidy) the Rs pay.
Surprisingly, although the Os are underinsured in the laissez-faire equilibrium, an 
intervention scheme which results in the Os going uninsured, leads to a strict Pareto 
improvement. On the contrary, a policy that would result in the Os purchasing more 
coverage would tighten rather than relax their revelation constraint. As a result, in 
order to reveal their type, the Rs would have to purchase even less insurance and so 
their welfare would worsen.
3.6 Implications for Empirical Testing
The results of Propositions 2 and 3 also allow us to empirically distinguish our 
approach from standard asymmetric information models. To this end, we rely on a 
very general result derived by Chiappori et.al (2002) (see Lemma 1 of this chapter). If 
an agent chooses one contract over another offering more coverage, then it must be 
true that his accident probability under the contract chosen is strictly lower than the 
per unit premium of the additional coverage offered by the high-coverage contract. 
This is a revealed preference argument. Its validity is independent of the market
116 It may be the case that E = CQ involves higher consumption in both states than Z 0 . This clearly 
implies that the Os are strictly better off after the intervention.
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structure or whether some agents go uninsured. For example, it holds in the models of 
Julien, Salanie and Salanie (2001) and de Meza and Webb (2001) where the positive 
correlation property breaks.117 However, in our framework, because some agents (the 
Os) underestimate their true accident probability, this prediction fails.
Corollary 1: In the separating equilibria of Proposition 2 and 3 it is respectively true 
that
O'* -  y 0 ) / (A*yR -  K y 0 ) < 1 -  p & o  ) = 1 -  Po (3 -24)
O'* - y0VC^*^* -  A0y0) = 1 - p (z o) = 1~Pf (3-25)
Proof: See Appendix 3B
In words, in both equilibria the per unit price of the additional insurance offered by 
the high-coverage contract is not higher than the Os’ true accident probability under 
the low-coverage contract. Nevertheless, due to the underestimation of their accident 
probability, the Os purchase the low-coverage contract although the high-coverage 
contract is also available. Therefore, a rejection of this revealed preference argument 
by the data is consistent with our model but not with standard asymmetric information 
models.
3.7 Conclusion
Most recent empirical studies on the relationship between coverage and risk find 
either negative or no correlation. Moreover, Cawley and Philipson (1999) report that, 
in the US life insurance market, insurance premiums exhibit quantity discounts. 
Standard asymmetric information models cannot simultaneously explain these 
empirical findings.
This chapter provides an explanation to this puzzle by introducing heterogeneity in 
risk perceptions in a competitive model of asymmetric information. The more
117 It even holds in the Villeneuve (2000) model provided insurance companies do not observe all the 
insuree’s characteristics that affect his accident probability.
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optimistic agents (the Os) underestimate their accident probability both in absolute 
terms and relative to the less optimistic ones (the Rs) and so purchase less insurance. 
They also tend to be less willing to take precautions. This gives rise to separating 
equilibria exhibiting negative or no correlation between coverage and risk. Two 
examples of these equilibria are presented where both the Os and the Rs purchase 
some insurance.
In the first case, the Os not only take fewer precautions (high-risk type) but also 
purchase less coverage than the Rs. Competition among insurance companies then 
implies that the Os also pay a higher per unit premium. Because they underestimate 
their accident probability, the Os purchase low coverage at a high per unit price, 
although contracts offering more insurance at the same or even lower per unit price 
are available. The second equilibrium exhibits no correlation between coverage and 
risk. Both types take precautions but the Os choose less coverage than the Rs. 
Nevertheless, the Rs are quantity-constrained. Moreover, if we allow for fixed 
administrative costs, this equilibrium displays a negative relationship between 
coverage and per unit premiums.
These results have several interesting implications. First, they explain both 
puzzling empirical findings: The negative or no correlation between coverage and risk 
and the fact that insurance premiums display quantity discounts.
Second, Cawley and Philipson (1999), Chiappori and Salanie (2000) and Dionne 
et.al. (2001) argue that the no-correlation empirical findings imply that there is no 
(risk-related) adverse selection. Thus, there are no information barriers to trade in the 
life and automobile insurance markets under study. However, our results suggest that 
their assertion is not generally true. If insurees differ with respect to their risk 
perceptions and types are hidden, there exist equilibria involving some agents being 
quantity-constrained even if the data show no correlation between coverage and the 
accident rate. Furthermore, in these cases, there exist intervention policies that yield a 
strict Pareto improvement on the laissez-faire equilibrium.
Third, based on the revealed preference argument of Chiappori et.al (2002), the 
predictions of the separating equilibria of Propositions 2 and 3 allows us to 
empirically distinguish our approach from standard asymmetric information models. 
The rejection of this revealed preference argument by the data is consistent with our 
model but not with standard asymmetric information models. Clearly, its empirical 
validity is an interesting topic of future research.
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Appendix 3A: Proof of Lemma 1
Consider a contract C' = (A2y 2,y') with premium: y' = (1 -  p(Cx ))A2y 2.
We will show that the agent prefers C  to Cx. Notice that if the agent still has ex post 
risk 1 -  p  under C  (1 -  p(Cx) = 1 -  p {C ) ), then he faces the following lottery:
V  = (-D e + A2y 2 -  y \  1 -  p \ - y \p )
The expectation of this lottery is:
(1 - p)(-D 0 + Z2y 2 - y ') - py’ = (1 - p)(-D 0+A2y 2) - /  = - ( l - p)D0
Clearly, it is equal to the expectation of the lottery
A = (-D 0,l-p;O ,p)
which the agent faces under Cx. Since 0 = Aly l < A2y 2 and contracts do not 
overinsure, lottery Lx is a mean-preserving spread of L! . Thus, given risk aversion, 
the agent strictly prefers L' to Lx. Furthermore, since under C  he may choose 
another 1 -  p ’ * 1 -  p  that costs him less than 1 -  p , he strictly prefers C  to Cx and 
hence to C2 (by assumption, Cx is preferred to C2). However, contracts C’ and C2 
offer the same coverage. Therefore, since C  is strictly preferred to C2, it must be the 
case that
> 2 > y = a - M c , ) ) ^ l  = >  i - p(c,)<-p —=
^ 2 ^ 2  2
Q.E.D.
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Appendix 3B: Proof of Corollary 1
Using the zero-profit conditions, we obtain:
* 1  = P ( Z i ) y i - ( 1 - P ( Z , ) ) ( 4 , - l ) y ,  = 0  => X, = l / ( l - p ( Z i ) ) ,  i =  o , r  
In the separating equilibrium of Proposition 2 we have:
1 — /?(Z Q) =  1 — p 0 > 1  — ) = 1 — p F => XR > X0
Therefore,
y R - y 0 _  y R - y 0 <  _ L  = l _ p
K y R ~ K y 0 ^ o ( y R ~ y o ) ^ ( ^ ,R ~ ^ o ) y R ^o
In the separating equilibrium of Proposition 3 we have:
1 — p( 7 j q)  =  1 — P ( ^ R) = 1 — P f  —^  XR =  X0 
Therefore,
y R - y 0 _  y R - y Q i =1  
^Ry R - A 0y 0 ^R( y R ~ y o ) ^
Q.E.D.
(3B.1)
(3B.2)
(3B.3)
(3B.4)
(3B.5)
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Conclusion
In this thesis we studied financial and insurance markets under various specifications 
of asymmetric information.
In Chapter 1, we analysed and discussed the roles of debt, equity and warrants 
under adverse selection and (effort) moral hazard. Several interesting results were 
obtained. First, we explained the issue of combinations of debt and equity as the 
outcome of the interaction between adverse selection and moral hazard. Firms 
willingly incur the adverse selection cost of issuing equity because this cost is more 
than offset by the benefit from relaxing the moral hazard constraint. Second, we 
showed that, in the presence of moral hazard, adverse selection may result in the 
conversion of a negative into a positive NPV project and an improvement in social 
welfare. Third, we provided two rationales for the use of warrants. Under pure 
adverse selection, warrants can serve as separation devices in cases where other 
standard securities cannot. Under adverse selection cum moral hazard, warrants allow 
for the implementation of the socially efficient outcome even if this is not possible 
when we restrict ourselves to debt, equity and/or convertible debt. We also showed 
that, under certain conditions, a debt-warrant combination can implement the optimal 
contract as a competitive equilibrium.
The interaction between adverse selection and moral hazard may also have 
interesting implications for issues such as internal versus external financial markets 
and the theory of the firm.
In Chapter 2, we explored the implications of optimism in competitive insurance 
markets when neither the type nor the actions of the insurees are observable. 
Optimism may either increase or decrease precautionary effort and we showed that 
this determines whether optimists or realists are quantity-constrained in equilibrium. 
There also exist intervention schemes that lead to a strict Pareto improvement on the 
laissez-faire equilibria. These results provide a more convincing justification for the 
imposition of minimum coverage requirements than standard models as well as a case 
for the use of taxes and subsidies in insurance markets.
Chapter 3 focused on the relationship between the coverage offered by the 
insurance contract and the ex-post risk of its buyer. If all agents purchase strictly 
positive coverage, competitive models of asymmetric information predict a positive 
relationship between coverage and the accident probability. Yet some recent empirical
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studies find either negative or zero correlation as well as that per unit premiums fall 
with quantity. If the more optimistic agents both underestimate their accident 
probability and are less willing to take precautions, there exist separating equilibria 
that potentially explain these puzzling empirical findings. It was also shown that zero 
correlation between coverage and risk does not imply the absence of barriers to trade 
in insurance markets. We concluded with some testable implications of our results.
Although in this thesis we focused on insurance markets, the introduction of 
misperception of risk into an asymmetric information framework may have interesting 
implications for other issues as well. The design of managerial compensation 
schemes, the choice between self employment and being an employee, the design of 
securities and other corporate finance issues are only some of them.
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